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INTRODUCTION
Since ground testing of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) began in Ig?5,
the detection of engine anomalies and the prevention of major damagehave been
achieved by a multi-faceted detection/shutdown system. This system continues
the monitoring task today and consists of: sensors, automatic redline and
other limit logic, redundant sensors and controller voting logic, conditional
decision logic and human monitoring. Typically, on the order of 300-500
measurementsare sensed and recorded for each test, while on the order of lO0
are used for control and monitoring.
Despite the extensive monitoring by the current detection system, twenty-seven
(27) major incidents have occurred. This number seems to be insignificant
when percentage comparedwith over 1200 hot-fire tests which have taken place
since lg?6. However, when examining each incident for the effects listed
below the number suggests the requirement and future benefit for a more
advanced failure detection system.
•Program schedule delay impact
• Engine damagecosts
• Facility damagecosts
• Repair costs to the facility and engine
• Failure analysis costs
• Loss of high time engine fleet leader components
• Loss of failure evidence
The time impact has ranged from 3-weeks to 24-weeks. For individual tests the
estimated cost impact of engine and direct facility damage has ranged from
$1-million (in lgSO dollars) to $26-million (in 1982 dollars) per test; in
terms of repair/analysis it has ranged from $.24-million (in 1982 dollars) to
$3-million (in lgB5 dollars). Figure l, on the next page itemizes some of the
damage, cost, and time delay effects for forty (40) tests with significant
anomalies including the 2?-major incident tests. Tests g01-364, 901-436, and
750-259 listed in Figure-1 are incident tests where engines were totally
lost. The current replacement cost for an engine is estimated at $45-million,
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and therefore, the three engines represent a 1987-dollar loss of $0.135
billion. The impact of lost high time fleet leader components and failure
evidence cannot be measured precisely• Their absence however is certainly
felt in the important area of data base refinement for engine flight life
expectancy and component condition monitoring.
In recognition of both the system required and advances in detection and
computing technology, the SAFO (SSME Anomaly and Failure Detection) program
was initiated under NASA MSFC contract number NAS8-36305. It's objectives are:
l • To define an improved anomaly detection/shutdown system for the SSME
(Space Shuttle Main Engine).
. To eventually build and install the improved detection system for
SSME test stand applications.
To achieve the SAFD objectives, the program has been structured into three
phases. The objective and content of each phase are listed below.
Phase I: Feasibility Study. The goal of Phase I (this study) is to generate
a feasibility recommendation and a preliminary conceptual design based on a
failure data base that can be used by NASA/MSFC to make an informed decision
on the continuation of the effort. The feasibility study consists of five
study tasks which are; Collect/Analyze Engine Test Data (Section 2),
Feasibility/Criteria Development (Section 3.0), Survey/Acquire Failure
Detection Methods (Section 4.0), Quantify Engine and Test Stand Data (Section
5.0), Phase II/III Plan Development (Section 6.0) and a final task to provide
a Phase I Final Report.
Phase II (Option l): Development. Should Phase I determine that the
objectives are feasible, Phase II (Option l) will be exercised. In Phase II
selected failure detection algorithms and failure simulations will be
accomplished to quantify system requirements for the proposed failure
detection system. Phase II includes five tasks which are; Develop Failure
Simulation Models, Implement Detection Methods, Quantify Failure Detection
Methods, Define Primitive System Concepts and submit a Final Report.
Phase III (Option 2): Design. During Phase III (Option 2), the SAFD system
will be designed for implementation in a test stand. This Phase consists of
three tasks which are; Final System Design Specification/Cost Estimates
including functional, software and hardware requirements, work breakdown
structure and cost estimation; Definition of Future Research Needs and a Final
Report.
SUMMARY
Phase I has been completed and the results are presented in this final report
in the sections described below which conform to the Phase I tasks described
above. Section l.O below was not included as a Phase I task however, it is
included for reference purposes in discussing the other tasks.
Section 1.O: Section I describes the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) in
terms of an overview of the engine, the major components and the modes of
operation. This section is included to facilitate understanding of the
results which follow in the remaining sections.
Section 2.0: This section summaries the contents of the Phase I study which
are presented in Sections 3.0, 4.0 and 5.0 below. A description of the SSME
Data Acquisition Systems used during all SSME testing is given. The
operational characteristics of the SSME Data Acquisition instrumentation are
noted.
Section 3.0: This section presents the conditions, premises and guidelines
for constructing the anomaly detection system and a preliminary scheme for the
system's development (Phase II).
Section 4.0: This section presents the literature review results conducted to
survey and acquire failure detection methods. Ten failure and isolation
techniques are discussed as a result of this review.
Section S.O: This section describes the results of examining data from forty
(40) past incident tests. The results are presented in four (4) categories,
i.e.: general overview, data base support to detection system development,
delineation of data base and data base observations and comments. Three
extensive data tables are included.
Section 6.0: This section presents the Phase II/III Plan Development
including task descriptions, schedules and organization.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Based on the Phase I Study results and conclusions as shown in Section 3.0, an
improved anomaly detection/shutdown system for SSME Test Stand operation has
been found to be feasible and it is recommended that this study continue into
Phase II.
l.O SSMEDESCRIPTION
This section provides a description of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) by
outlining the propulsion system under three headings: engine overview, major
components, and modes of operation.
l.l ENGINE OVERVIEW
The SSME is a liquid-propellant, pump-fed, regeneratively cooled rocket engine
with variable thrust. It is the first reusable engine system of its kind.
Three SSME's are the Space Shuttle vehicle's main propulsion system. They are
ignited on the ground at launch and operate in parallel with the solid rocket
boosters during the initial ascent phase and continue to operate for
approximately 520 seconds total firing duration. The SSME operates at a
mixture ratio (liquid oxygen/ liquid hydrogen) of 6:1 and a chamber pressure
of approximately 3000 psia to produce a sea level thrust of 375,000 Ibs and a
vacuum thrust of 470,000 Ibs (rated power level). The engines are
throttleable over a thrust range of 65 to lOg percent of the rated power
level. This provides a higher thrust level during lift-off and the initial
ascent phase, and allows orbiter acceleration to be limited to 3 g's during
the final ascent phase. The SSME uses a staged combustion cycle. In this
cycle the propellants are partially burned in preburners producing
hydrogen-rich gas to power the high-pressure turbopumps. The fuel-rich steam
is then routed to the main injector where it is injected, along with
additional oxidizer and fuel, into the main combustion chamber (at a high
mixture ratio and high pressure). Hydrogen is used to cool all combustion
devices directly in contact with high-temperature combustion products. The
SSME is mounted with an electronic controller package which operates in
conjunction with engine sensors, valves, actuators, and spark igniters to
provide a self-contained system for engine control, checkout, and monitoring.
The controller provides responsive control of engine thrust and mixture ratio
through the digital computer in the controller, updating the instructions to
the engine control elements 50 times per second (every 20 milliseconds).
Additionally, precise engine performance is achieved through closed-loop
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control, utilizing 16-bit computation, 12-bit input/output resolution, and
self-calibrating analog-to-digital conversion. Engine reliability is enhanced
by a dual redundant control system that allows normal operation after the
first failure and a fail-safe shutdown after a second failure of any control
system component. High-reliability electronic parts are used throughout the
controller.
1.2 MAJORCOMPONENTS
Besides the controller, a myriad of other key components establish the SSME's
performance and physical characteristics. Some of the latter components are:
turbopumps, preburners, combustion devices, and valves. Figure-l.l presents a
schematic of the first three components and the hot-gas manifold which joins
them together. Figure-l.2 identifies a number of the engine system's valves.
A description of the above cited components are presented along with their
standard abbreviations used in literature.
1.2.1 Turbopumps. Four turbopumps, two low-pressure and two high-pressure
are used by the SSME system. The low-pressure fuel turbopump (LPFTP) and the
low-pressure oxidizer turbopump (LPOTP) are located at the inlet to respective
high pressure fuel and oxidizer turbopumps (see Figure-l.2). The low pressure
pumps operate at relatively low speed to permit low pressures in the vehicle
tanks. The function of these pumps is to provide NPSH (Net Positive Suction
Head) to the high pressure turbopumps (preventing their cavitation). The
LPOTP's turbine is powered by high pressure LOX (liquid oxygen) from the high
pressure oxidizer turbopump discharge. The LPFTP's turbine is powered by
gaseous hydrogen from the main combustion chamber coolant circuit.
The high pcessure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) consists of two centrifugal-type
pumps on a common shaft directly driven by a two-stage, hot-gas turbine. The
main pump supplies oxidizer to the main chamber injector, the heat exchanger,
LPOTP turbine, and preburner oxidizer pump (the other HPOTP constituent). The
preburner pump raises the pressure of the LOX and supplies oxidizer to the
preburners. At I09% of rated power level the shaft spins at 29194 rpm.
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The high pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) is a three-stage, centrifugal flow
pump, directly driven by a two-stage hot-gas turbine. The pump provides fuel
for: cooling the main combustion chamber, nozzle, and hot-gas manifold,
driving the LPFTP turbine, and pressurizing the vehicle fuel tank. At 109% of
rated power level the pump spins at 36595 rpm.
1.2.2 Preburners. The power for the HPFTP and HPOTP is generated from
fuel-rich gases from respective preburners, the fuel preburner (FPB) and the
oxidizer preburner (OPB) (see Figure-l.2). Each preburner consists of a
combustor (with fuel-cooled liner) and a baffled, coaxial element injector.
Each combustor's fuel and oxidizer come from the nozzle coolant circuit and
the preburner oxidizer pump. The OPB's hot-gas is directed to the HPOTP
turbine, LOX heat exchanger (which provides gaseous oxygen for vehicle
oxidizer tank pressurization), and the hot-gas manifold. The FPB's hot-gas is
directed to the HPFTP turbine and the hot-gas manifold.
1.2.3 Combustion Devices. The hDt-gas from both preburners are eventually
mixed with HPOTP LOX at the exit of the main injector's elements. This mixing
along with separate mixing of HPOTP LOX and coolant circuit hydrogen permit a
uniform distribution of propellants to the main combustion chamber (MCC). The
injector elements support primary and secondary plates. The primary plate
separates combustion chamber hot-gas from cooling circuit hydrogen. The
latter fluid is separated from preburner hot-gas by the secondary plate. The
plates, in turn, are transpiration cooled by the cooling circuit hydrogen.
The MCC is a cylindrical, regeneratively cooled, structural chamber that
contains the burning propellant gases and initiates their expansion from the
chamber throat. The expansion ratio from the throat to the nozzle attach
flange is 5:1. It is flange attached to the hot-gas manifold (see Figure
l.l). The MCC consists of a coolant liner, a high strength structural jacket,
coolant inlet and outlet manifolds, a throat ring, and two thrust vector
control actuator support struts.
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1.2.4 Valves. The fluid control for the MCC and for the interconnected
components upstream is achieved by five valves, i.e. the MFV, CCV, MOV, FPOV,
and OPOV. These valves are shown in Figure-l.2. A function description of
each is listed:
Abbreviation Description
MFV Main Fuel Valve, controls engine fuel downstream of the HPFTP,
i.e. thrust chamber coolant circuits, the LPFTP turbine,
hot-gas manifold coolant circuit, OPB, FPB, and three augmented
spark igniters (ASI's).
CCV Chamber Coolant Valve, controls MCC and nozzle coolant flow.
MOV Main Oxidizer Valve, controls LOX flowrate to the main injector
and the main chamber augmented spark igniter (ASI).
FPOV Fuel Preburner Oxidizer Valve, regulates LOX flow to the fuel
preburner.
OPOV Oxidizer Preburner Oxidizer Valve, regulates LOX flow to the
oxidizer preburner.
1.3 MODES OF OPERATION
The electronic controller controls the five valves by open-loop and/or closed
loop command during three basic modes of the SSME's operation, i.e.: start,
main stage and cutoff. During start and cutoff modes the valve position versus
time profiles are as shown in Figure 1.3. The valve profiles during start,
for instance, reflect the requirements for: controlling main injector LOX
dome, FPB and OPB prime times and minimizing FPB temperature spikes. The
valve profiles during cutoff, for instance, reflect the requirements for:
satisfying the ICD (Interface Control Document) thrust decay rate and
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controlling preburner power and preventing HPFTP stall. During main stage,
the FPOV and OPOV are under closed loop operation with the controller; the
other three valves are not permitted to change their positions (except the CCV
as a function MCC chamber pressure). The FPOV and OPOV will change their
position to maintain the commanded power level chamber pressure and mixture
ratio.
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2.0 PHASE I CONTENT SUMMARY
2.1 PHASE I PURPOSE
The objectives of Phase I were:
l • To establish the feasibility of constructing the anomaly detection
system around the SSME's current instrumentation and recording
system, and
. To define a preliminary scheme for the detection system's algorithm
and decision making logic.
2.2 CURRENT SSME INSTRUMENTATION AND RECORDING SYSTEM
All SSME test stands have three (3) data acquisition systems, the command and
data simulator (CADS), the facility recording (FR) system, and the analog high
frequency recording (AHFR) system. The AHFR system consists of 6 to 14 tape
recorders; each recorder has 14 to 28 tracks and capable of a frequency
response of 0-20 kHz. The system receives its data from such sources as:
turbopump internal strain gages and external accelerometers, main combustion
chamber inlet strain gages, gimbal bearing accelerometers, and preburner
(longitudinal and radial) accelerometers. The command and data simulator is a
digital computer unit in the teststand blockhouse. This CADS unit receives
and displays engine measurements from the SSME controller every 40 milli-
seconds (25 samples/second). The CADS measurements are displayed with
parameter identifiers (PIDS), ranging from l to 299. The facility recording
system consists of two separate digital computers. One computer receives data
directly from engine mounted sensors and the other from sensors mounted on
certain facility components• These measurements are sampled every 20
milliseconds (50 samples/second) and are displayed with PIDS, ranging from 300
to 1999.
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The three figures on the following pages further describe the CADS and FR
measurements. A directory is presented here:
FiQure Description
CAD and FR Measurement Samplings
CAD and FR Transducer Repeatability, Response and/or Range
CAD and FR Shutdown Parameter Samplings with Monitoring Limits
2.3 PHASE I TASKS
To achieve the objectives of Phase I, two broad tasks were accomplished. The
detailed conclusions and results of each task are presented in Section 3.0,
4.0 and 5.0, respective. The tasks consisted of (1) examining the elements of
the aforementioned digital recording systems* along with incident
documentation and (2) reviewing the current literature on failure detection
techniques. The CAD and FR recording systems were screened for interfacing
with added SAFD test electronics and sensor singal tap-off. Forty (40) past
incident tests were studied:
•To assess the feasibility of using existing digital* sensor measurements
for early anomaly detection (prior to redline time). Some of the
assessment criteria were: damage-reducing effectiveness, sufficient
changes from nominal conditions, and sufficient numbers of sensors
reflecting the anomaly.
•To define sensor deviations under normal operating conditions for a
typical test and from test-to-test.
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HPFr Turbine Discharge Temperature Ch. A (2C)
Start +5.04 sac. to Start +5.8 sac.
Start +5.B set. to Shutdown
HPFT Turblne Discharge Temperature Ch. S (2C)
Start +5.04 sac. to Start +5.8 sec.
Start +5.8 sec. to Shutdown
HPOT Turbine 01scharge Temperature Oh. A (2B)
Start +2.3 sac. to Start +5.8 sec.
Start +3.8 sac. to Start +5.8 sec.
Start +5.B sec. to Shutdown
HPO] Turbine Discharge Temperature Ch. B (28)
Start +2.3 sac. to Start +5.8 sec.
Start +3.8 sac. to Start +5.8 sec.
Start +5.8 sec. to Shutdown
HPFT Turbine Otscharge Tamp T' Ltmtt (4)
HPOT Turbine Discharge Temp T' Limit (4)
HPOP IMSL Purge Pressure (2A)
HPOT Secondary Seal Cavity Pressure (2A)
HPFP Coolant Ltner Pressure (2C)
Preburner S/D Purge Pressures (2A)
Oh. A: Fuel; Ch. B: Oxidizer
_ower Limit
SSO'R
550"R
550"R
550"R
50* above
channel lower
ltmlt
170 psta
Upper Limit
]76OAR
1850"R
1820eR
1960eR
1GGO'R
15"60"R
17GO'R
ISGO'R
1560°R
1760"R
50"R below channel
upper limit
(depending on time)
SO° below channel
upper limit
_dependlng on tlme)
100 psta
Variable (5)
300 psia
NOTES:
|.
2.
3.
4.
S,
Each sensor channel of the listed parameters shall be Individually checked against the limits.
Limit Shutdown monitoring shall be Initiated at.the Following times:
(a) At Start for HPOP IMSL Purge Pressure, HPOT Secondary Seal Cavity Pressure, and Preburner
Shut_own Purge Pressures.
(b) At Start +2.3 seconds for the HPOT rOT upper limit and at Start +3.8 seconds for HPOT TOT
lower ltmit.
(c) At Start +5.04 seconds For HPFP rOT and HPFP Coolant Liner Pressure.
Monitoring shall then be performed continuously until Start +2.3 seconds for Preburner
Shutdown Purge Presures, and for other parameters, until tntttatln of Shutdown Phase or when
both sensor channels of a particular parameter have been permanently dtsquaHf|ed.
A sensor chanhe] shall be considered to have exceeded Limit Shutdown Monitor limits
(Redltnes') tf Its readings are equal to or outside listed limits for three consecutive major
cycles.
The T' or blueline limits are not Limit Shutdown Monitor limits, but shall be used to test for
actuator contro] swttchover In the event of an RVDT mtscompare. After such a miscompare, if
both channels of either HPOT TOT or HPFT TOT are outside their respective T' limits, actuator
control shall be swttched to channel B. Monitoring times for T' limits correspond to the
monitoring times for the respective Limit Shutdown Mon|tor 11mtts.
The upper limits for HPFP Cooland Liner Pressure shall be initialized at Start +5.04 seconds
to 4000 psta. Beginning at that time the 11mlts shall then be calculated in each major cycle
as a linear function of MCC Pc:
limit - A0 + A1 *(PcReal) + (limit tolerance)
Nomtnal values for the coefficients are A0 - -97.3 psi, A1 - 1.1583. and llmtt tolerance -
451 psi. Calculation of the limit shall be bypassed In any major cycle that both channels or
MCC Pc are not qualified.
CADS (Computer and Data SimuLator)
ORIGINAE PA-GE 1_
0]_: POOR QUAL1T:E_
L,
Parameters
Facility Fuel Flovneter Discharge Temperature
[ngine Fuel Inlet Pressure
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39.8*R
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38,500 rpm
40 psla
FR (Facility Recorder) System
Figure-4: CAD and FR Shutdown Parameter Samplings
with Monitoring Limits
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•To establish the data base which would assist in defining:
-How sensitive the detection system should be to certain anomaly
changes (i.e. someanomaly changesmayresult in only minor damage).
-What are the experienced anomalycharacteristics the detection
system should be able to detect. (Programs with new technology and
design have the potential of reviving someof the basic failure
characteristics.)
The latter study utilized CRT-time slice plots and written documentation, see
Figure-l. Approximately fifty-seven (5?) sensor measurementswere generated
for each time-slice indicated in the figure. The written documentation
consisted of available Rocketdyne incident reports, briefing charts, internal
reports, and NASAinvestigation reports.
*NOTE: Phase I's objectives incorporating both the AHFRsystem and the
digital recording systems could be achieved in another study. This
study would require sufficient test data be assembled to adequately
define the nominal 'g-level's. Extensive investigation would be
required to define the appropriate hardware and software integration
schemefor AHFR,CADSand FRmeasurements.
The literature review of detection techniques consisted of contacts with
industry leaders, including Alphatech and Intermetrics, as well as surveys of
over seventy (?0) papers.
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The methods and material which were reviewed are listed below:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
Alphatech Material/Approach.
Intermetric Material.
Bank of Kalman Filters Technique.
Failure Sensitive Filter Technique.
Observers Technique.
Voting Technique.
Innovations Based Failure Detection Scheme.
A. Generalized Likelihood Ratio (GLR) Test.
B. Sequential Probability Ratio Tests (SPRT).
C. Weighted Sum Square Residual (WSSR) Test.
D. Modified Kalman Filter.
Parameter Estimation Technique.
3ump Process Technique.
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3.0 PHASEI CONCLUSIONSANDDEFINITIONFORDETECTIONSYSTEMDEVELOPMENT
This section presents the conditions, premises, and/or guide lines for
constructing the SAFD anomaly detection system and a preliminary scheme for
the system's development (Phase II).
3.1 DETECTION SYSTEM FEASIBILITY
The construction of an anomaly detection system is attainable using available
recording systems and under well-founded premises and/or guidelines. An
existing CADS-II system* possesses data ports which can permit a separate
system (such as the SAFD) to access the data tables from the controller (both
A and B channels). The only equipment necessary to achieve the acquisition is
an interface unit to interpret the signal coming from the CADS II system. The
estimated cost of building this unit is $50-thousand (in 1986 dollars). The
FR sensor measurements can be tapped off from the facility recording channels.
*NOTE: The CADS II system appears to h_ve the capabilities required by the
SAFD detection system (except it would exclude the FR measurements
from the detection system). The CADS II system is built around the
INTEL 8086/8087 combination of processors, making floating point
arithmetic available. It takes advantage of the Multibus I 16-bit
architecture allowing the addition of a large supply of high speed
processor boards (6BOxx series, for example), as well as analog or
digital input processor boards. Since the processor boards reside
on the CADS II bus, it would be a fairly straightforward task to
modify the operating system to allow a "SAFD processor" to send
shutdown commands to the CADS processors (to directly initiate an
engine shutdown). The CADS II system can also store any SAFD data on
a magnetic tape along with the controller data for later analysis.
If the option of solely using CADS-measurement data is deemed
acceptable (during detection system development-Phase II), cost and
software development will be determined. The cost of developing the
SAFD system as an integrated part of CADS II would certainly be much
less than designing a separate computer system.
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Based on an assessment of past incident test data and written documentation
(described in Section 5.0), the detection system is also attainable under six
(6) premises and/or guidelines. These are:
l • Even though action to prevent reoccurrence has been taken as a
result of the major incidents, future programs (test bed, for
example) require the advanced detection system be sensitive (but not
be limited) to previous experienced anomaly characteristics. These
characteristics can be initially grouped into classes of failure
types (see Figure-l). Each of these types can in turn have
innumerable failure modes which can propagate to characteristics of
another given class. In addition, programs with new technology and
design have the potential of reviving some of the basic failure
modes (see Section 5.0 for test evidence).
. The detection system's response to a failure should consist of a
cutoff signal.
3. The detection system should be l_mited in scope:
.
•To ground tests of the SSME (flight applications will require
modifications in the ground detection system's priorities and
design for engine shutdown).
•To steady state operations of the SSME. A detection system
sensitive to anomalies occurring during start or throttle
should be formulated in a future study. For this latter study
sufficient test data should be gathered to adequately define
the "nominal" start and throttle transient envelope profiles.
The detection system's input data should be tapped from the current
set of CADS and/or FR sensor measurements.
item-l above and Section 5.O's data base,
sufficient for the SAFD detection system•
terms of:
Under the premise of
the measurements are
The sufficiency is in
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• Numberof sensor measurementsindicating an anomaly.
• Damagereducing effectiveness, i.e. a sufficient interim from
first measurementindications of an anomaly to redline cutoff
time (such that major damagecan be avoided).
• Magnitude of (anomaly induced) change from nominal conditions.
. The detection system's development requires the following concerns
to be acknowledged or accounted for.
a. Recognition of an anomaly serious enough to warrant a shutdown.
b° Recognition of sensor malfunctions to avoid a premature
shutdown.
C° Recognition for a sufficient number of sensors to be
incorporated into the detection system. There should be
sufficient numbers which -indicate a failure even if a few
sensors either malfunction and/or do not reveal anomaly
indications.
do Recognition that the sensors (to be incorporated into the
detection system) should represent key aspects of the SSME
operation. If all sensors of the detection system malfunction,
the resulting premature shutdown would be justified for safety
and adequate test monitoring concerns.
e. Recognition of the engine operating state and goals.
f. Recognition of the different manner in which anomalies reveal
themselves.
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g° The system's shutdown should be rapid enough to improve upon
the current detection system's performance. In several anomaly
tests, particularly the HPFTP (High Pressure Fuel Turbopump)
failures, the time intervals from first indications of an
anomaly to the current redline cutoff are substantial. The
sensor measurement trace below is from test 901-340 where the
HPFTP was destroyed. Section 5.0 presents additional
measurement trace examples. Figure-5 presents a summary of
time intervals for twenty-eight anomaly tests.
Interim where
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h. Recognition that even after extensive simulated testing with
actual incident and nominal test data, as well as, model
generated data from FMEA (Failure Mode Effects Analysis)
critical-l tables, the SAFD system may signal a premature
shutdown (due to unforeseen circumstances)•
i-
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ALGORITHMSENSOREVALUAT|ON TABLE: SENSORVS, TEST-TO-TEST PERCENTCHANGEFROMSTEADYSTATE CONDITIONS
X---Psramater does not exist for the test number.
N---Parameter malfunction.
NC---No change is strikingly indicated.
NS---Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions. ORIGINAL '"_"
OF POOR QUALITY
Test Numbers:
TYPICAL "901 901 750 901 902 901 SFIO "901 750
PID NO.(S) PARAMETER -173 -331 -148 -183 -W8 "30__Z -01 -284 -25_99
3_-371 (INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC HG IN PR) 124.4 125.0 30.0 157.1 4.2 X X X X
366-383 (INa CLNTPR) -(MCCPC) 30.0 7.2 50.7 9.7 5.3 X X X X
371-383 (HCC HG IN PR) -(HCC PC) 4.1 17.6 10.6 2.4 21.8 NC X X 100.0
395-383 (HCC OX INJ PR) -(HCC PC) 5.6 25.5 9.9 1.4 X 8.0 X 270.8 92.1
940-371 (HPFP CL LNR PR)-(HCC HG IN PR) X X X X X 25.0 X X X
459-383 (HPFP DS PR) -(NCC PC) 6.7 1.6 9.0 .8 1.9 NC X 70.0 X
412-371 (FP8 PC) -(HCC HG IN PR) 5.3 3.2 4.2 NC 3.4 NC X X 4.1
480-371 (OPB PC) -(HCC HG IN PR) 3.9 5.6 4.2 NC 6.6 NC X X 5.7
63, 163 NCC PC 4.4 3.6 6.4 .3 1.5 .4 1.8 31.0 3.9
566 HCC CLNT DS T X 10.2 10.6 1.0 12.5 NC 4.0 79.8 275.0
24 HCC FU ]NJ PR 4.4 5.3 H NS 1.8 3.4 X 43.2 56.3
704 HPFP SPEED 1.5 1.2 1.5 X .4 NC NC 19.4 100.0
663 HPFT DS T1A 7.5 10.1 30.9 1.6 84.1 4.0 6.3 25.1 24.9
664 HPFT DS T1S 7.5 10.7 R 1.4 5.5 4.6 5.3 H 14.0
233 HPOT DS T1 4.9 41.0 32.6 .5 30.1 4.4 8.0 69.7 24.0
234 HPOT DS T2 3.0 40.0 37.6 .3 28.5 4.5 9.0 H 3.9
854 FAC OX FN OS PR NC NC 4.7 NC 3.7 NC X 28.0 NC
858, 860 ENGOX IN PR gC 9.7 8.6 NC 3.4 NC X 51.6 36.3
302 LPOPDS PS 3.4 5.8 3.8 gC 4.7 9.2 X 28.6 55.9
878 HX INT PR .9 4.7 3.4 MS 4.5 1.5 X 53.5 1.0
879 HX INT T .4 7.2 .7 .2 15.4 3.8 X 7.6 6.1
683 HX VENT DP 1.1 4.3 NS NC 1.9 NC X 53.6 X
40 OPOVACT POS 4.2 7.2 8.0 1.1 5.0 3.4 3.4 31.7 1.8
42 FPOVACT POS 1.8 6.6 2.2 .4 2.3 1.3 2.2 5.4 5.7
Number of above parameters over _ change: 15 20 18 3 17 10 7 16 16
Sample sensor interval (sec) from
anomaly start time tocutoff time:
901 901
-48._5 -13._66
X 3.3
NC .8
X 2.2
NC 1.7
X X
NC .4
NC .2
NC 1.1
NC .3
NC NS
NC NS
NC 1.1
NC 1.5
HC 2.4
4.0 1.9
3.1 1.4
NC NC
NC NC
NC NC
1.7 .8
NS 1.9
1.8 .5
1.0 3.0
NC 1.8
2 4
.48 .05 - .55 27.1 2.9 20.3 5.15 6.03 .17 8.1 %.
Test Numbers:
901 901 901 902 "901 901 901 902 902 "901
PARA.ETER -340 -363 -436 -11__8 -364 -362 -410 -095 -249 -225
(INJ CLNT PR) -(MCC HG IN PR) X X X 45.7 X X X NC X N
(INJ CLNT PR) -(NCC PC) X X NS 6.8 X X X .4 X 12.9
(HCC HG IN PR) -(HCC PC) 17.7 2.0 X 6.9 11.9 6.8 4.0 .8 X H
(SCC OX INJ PR) -(HCC PC) 1.8 1.5 9.6 4.8 NC NC NC NC 3.2 38.9
(HPFP CL LNR PR)-(NCC HG IN PR) 51.0 30.2 X X 45.0 X 50.0 X X X
(HPFP OS PR) -(HCC PC) 1.9 1.0 4.2 2.1 1.6 1.2 NC NC 2.2 3.3(FPe Pc) -(.co .n XNPR) 4.8 .8 x 7.9 4.3 2.8 5.s NC X .
(OPB PC) -(HCC HG IN PR) 3.3 1.2 X 4.5 3.1 NC NC NC X H
NCC PC 1.6 .5 3.9 NC .8 .4 NC NC NC 6.0
HCC CLNT DS T .7 H 3.3 X 1.4 2.2 NC N 4.2 X
XCC FU INJ PR 2.2 .6 1.9 X .7 X NC .9 1.1 5.1
HPFP SPEED 1.4 .3 5.7 .9 .3 .3 .5 NC 4.3 4.2
HPFT DS T1 A 6.4 1.3 20.0 13.9 2.4 1.7 2.0 NC 23.4 15.1
HPFT DS T1 S 6.0 1.9 22.8 10.1 3.0 1.6 1.0 N 9.2 15.1
HPOT OS T1 5.3 .6 2.6 2.3 5.3 NC 1.8 MS 6.9 12.3
HPOT DS T2 4.6 .7 1.5 2.4 6.3 NC 2.3 NS 4.9 12.3
FAC OX FH OS PR NC NC NC NC 144.0 NC NC 9.2 220.0 6.5
ENG OX IN PR NC NC 4.8 NC 1_.0 NC NC 8.7 220.0 23.7
LPOPDS PS 2.1 NC 8.8 NC 34.4 NC NC 2.1 20.0 45.8
HX iNT PR 1.0 .6 NC X .5 .6 NC 1.1 1.1 5.1
HX INT T 2.7 NS .4 X 4.7 NS NS NS 4.2 H
HX VENT DP 1.5 .6 NC X NS .7 NC NS 3.8 2.2
OPOVACT POS 2.1 3.1 3.6 NC 3.9 1.8 3.2 2.7 7.0 NS
FPOV ACT PO$ 4.4 1.0 11.9 2.8 2.9 1.0 .3 NC 3.5 .4
Number of above parameters over _ change: 13 3 12 12 14 3 6 4 15 15
SampLe sensor interval (sec) from
anomaly start time to cutoff time:
902 901
-112 -346
NC X
NC X
NC NC
NC NC
X 18.9
4.3 NC
6.2 NC
NC NC
3.3 NC
x 3.3
X 8.2
10.9 .5
23.8 3.2
21.6 3.3
7.4 5.8
9.0 2.6
NC NC
NC NC
4.4 NC
1.5 1.0
X 5.8
X 1.7
2.3 3.1
8.3 3.5
11 10
116. 114. .56 1.84 189. 175. 90. 10.3 351. .18 .75 400.
Figure-5 : Test Sensor Measurement Samplings for
Percent Changes from Steady State Conditions and
Time Intervals from Anomaly Indications to (Redline) Cutoff
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However, the cost of the premature shutdown ($250-thousand for
engineering teststand personnel and facilities), would be more
than offset by the millions of dollars saved for just one
proper SAFD system shutdown command. Figure-l displays such
damage costs of previous incident tests.
. The detection system should utilize the algorithm framework to be
described in the following section. The detection techniques
reviewed and outlined in Section 4.0 should be considered in some
form if the latter scheme does not prove performance effective. The
techniques should not be considered initially in the system
development phase for reasons of:
•Need for a simple structured detection system.
•Need in some cases for a quick performance responding system
(i.e. 500 milliseconds before current redline cutoff).
•Concern for susceptibility to instrument errors and random
disturbances.
3.2 DETECTION SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
The preliminary scheme for the SAFD's system development consists of an
initial coding framework and basic approaches which may be used'to measure the
system's performance.
3.2.1 Codinq Framework
The initial program coding framework incorporates the considerations cited in
Section 3.1. The salient features of the framework are the three (3)
approaches to sensing anomalies. The approaches are tailored to meet
anomalies when they: occur shortly after a scheduled transient, occur slowly
(e.g. lO0-seconds before major damage), and occur rapidiy (e.g. 500
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milliseconds or less before major damage). The framework encompasses: input
provisions, computations, decision making logic, and diagnostics. Diagnostics
will be displayed, for example: to indicate corrective action for input
errors or inconsistencies, to indicate the anomaly area within the SSME,and
to identify the detection system's scanning approach which signaled an engine
shutdown. A brief content description of the first three framework components
are presented on the following pages. Figure-6 summarizes how they are
logically linked with the three (3) anomaly sensing approaches.
1. Input provisions. Some of these provisions consist of:
a. Stored input data, i.e.
•Expected steady state average values (AVGI) for the number of
engine sensors monitored by the detection system. There will be
sufficient numbers of sensors which will indicate an anomaly even
if a few monitored sensor measurements malfunction. The average
values can be test data based or from an off-design model
(influence coefficient governed) prediction for different power
levels (to be start or throttled to for a particular test).
•Standard deviations (SD's) for each sensor's average value, as well
as, multiplying N-factors on the SD's (i.e. Nl, N2, and N3, see
Figure-6 for the overall system utilization). The values for the
SD's will be based on the data base described in Section 5.0. The
N-factors will be derived from integrity verifications of the
detection system on sensor measurement data indicating either SSME
anomaly or nominal operation. The data reflecting anomaly
operations will come from previous tests (causing major damage) and
from transient and/or off-design model simulations of selected FMEA
(Failure Mode Effects Analysis) critical-l failure modes. The data
reflecting nominal operations will come from previous nominal tests
and transient model simulations of sensor measurement variations
(for example noise, bias, or drift). During the latter
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2.
verifications, the detection system's ability to detect anomalies
rapidly enough to improve upon the current detection system's
performance and its ability to avoid a premature shutdown will be
two (of several) significant criteria for final value assignments
of the N-factors.
•Scheduling times for throttle and tank venting.
b. CAD and FR sensor measurements monitored by the system
•Selection of the sensor measurements to be monitored are based on
Section 5.0 data tables and recognition that the measurements
should represent key aspects of the SSME operation. If all sensors
of the detection system malfunction, the resulting premature
shutdown would be justified for safety and adequate monitoring
concerns.
Computations. The computations will be initiated during steady
state power level intervals (s_e Figure-6 for the approximate time
interims). During scheduled transients (i.e. scheduled start,
throttling, or tank venting), detection system parameters holding
calculated values will be re-initialized; computations will begin
again once steady state operation is achieved. The computations
will consist of, for instance:
a. Delta-P calculations around components (from individual sensor
measurements).
bt
C •
Averaqe steady state values (AVG2) computed for up to
2-seconds. After 2-seconds AVG2 values will be updated with
new values (AVGINC) averaged from an 80 millisecond interim.
Two-seconds after scheduled transients, the AVG2 value for each
sensor is stored under the array name AVG3.
•;l¸
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. Decision Making Logic. The logic decisions will apply during steady
state power level intervals (see Figure-6 for the approximate time
interims). During scheduled transients logic parameters will be
re-initialized; logic decisions will again apply once steady state
operation is achieved. The decision logic will consist of, for
instance:
a. Logic to identify possible sensor malfunctions or to verify an
anomaly is being sensed, i.e. cross checking with other
parameters for change; for instance FPOV (Fuel Preburner
Oxidizer Valve) or OPOV (Oxidizer Preburner Oxidizer Valve)
positions, or cross checking for consistent directions in
change for given directions of change (from other sensor
measurements).
b. For a 2-3 second interim after the end time of a scheduled
transient, scanning Approach-1 will be used exclusively to
screen for anomaly induced changes in sensor measurements. If
sufficient and consistent numbers of sensors meet the condition
below, a cutoff signal will be initiated. This approach is
intended to detect anomalies occurring shortly after a
scheduled transient.
Co
AVG2 > (AVGI ± Nl * SD)
At the conclusion of scanning Approach-l's interim until the
start time of the next scheduled transient, scanning Approach-2
or Approach-3 will be used to screen for anomaly induced
changes in sensor measurements. If sufficient and consistent
numbers of sensors meet the respective conditions below, a
cutoff signal will be initiated. Approach-2 is intended to
detect anomalies occurring slowly (for example,lOO-seconds
before major damage); Approach-3 is intended for those
anomalies occurring rapidly (for example, less than 500
milliseconds before major damage).
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Approach-2 condition: AV62 > (AVG3 ± N2 * SD)
Approach-3 condition: AVGINC > (AVG2 ± N3 * SO)
3.2.2 Detection System Performance Measurement. During the latter portion of
the verification effort (for the programming framework in Figure-6), three (3)
measurements for the detection system's performance may be utilized. These
measurements are generally described in Figure-7; they will be refined during
detection system development for application.
jr¸
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Initial
ALgorithm Logic and Computation Scheme
Computation
or Logic Checking
Applicability
During Test
Detection
Purpose
(]f Al:_ticabte)
inputs: -Expected steady state average values (AVG1) for algorithm
sensing; the values are for applicable main stage conditions.
-Standard deviation (q,) for each sensing parameter's
AVG1 value.
-Scheduling times for throttle and refuting.
Sensor test data are each computed for average steady-state values.
-The above values (AVG2) are computed for up to 2-seconds.
-After 2-seconds AVG2 values are updated with new values averaged
from an 80 msec interim (AVG]NC)
-AVG2 values are reinitiatized and recomputed subsequent to
transient throttle or tank venting end time.
-The AVG2 values are stored as AVG_....33and used in Approach-2 if
Approach-1 does not signal a cutoff. The stored values
progressively (in time) represent either the average from
start time +6 to +8 seconds, or from throttle/vent end time
÷1 to +3 seconds.
ORIGINAL p _:<c ,o
OF, POOR QUALrrZ
-From start time +5 sec
until initial|on time
of a throttle or tank
vent ing.
-From throttle or
venting end time
+1 sec until another
transient initiation
time.
Scannin 9 Approach-l:
If sufficient and consistent numbers of sensors meet the condition
below, a cutoff signal will be initiated:
AVG2 • (AVGI_ NI*I" )
Where, d'-Standard deviation, input,
N1 -A sufficiently large multiplying factor on the
standard deviation to avoid premature cutoff thru
normal overshoot or slight miscalculations in
predicted steady state averages (AVG1). The value
for "NI" is based on algorithm simulations using
anomaly and nominal test data.
Scanning Approach-2:
[f sufficient and consistent numbers of sensors meet the condition
below, a cutoff signal wilt be initiated:
AVG2 • (AVG3 _ N2*d')
Where, N2 -A multiplying factor on the standard deviation;
the value of "NZ" is based on algorithm simulations
using anomaly and nominal test data.
I
Scanning Approach-3:
%f sufficient and consistent numbers of sensors meet the condition
below, a cutoff signal wiLL be initiated:
AVGINC • (AVG2 _ N3*d _ )
Where, AVGINC -The average steady state values from an 80maec
interim.
N3 -A multiplying factor on the standard deviation; the
value of "N3" is based on algorithm simulations
using anomaly and nominal test data.
NOTE: For this initial scheme the following relation
is envisioned: N1 • N2 • N3.
" Figure-6:
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-From start time
+5 to +8 sec.
-From throttle or vent
end tima +1 sec to
+3 sec.
-To detect anomalies
occurring shortly after
a system transient.
-To account for detection
shortcomings of
Approach-2 and/or -3,
e.g. use of the computed
steady-state average,
AVG2 to establish cutoff
decisions
-From start time +8 sec
until initiation time
of a throttle or tank
venting.
-From throttle or
venting end time
+3 sec until another
transient initiation
time.
-To detect anomalies
Vnich could occur
gradually in time, i.e.e.g.
anomaly induced changes in
steady state measurements
have taken 100+ seconds
before redtine cutoff and
subsequent major damage.
-From start t|me +8 sec
until initiation time
of a throttle or tank
venting.
-From throttle or
venting end time
+3 sec until another
transient initiation
time.
-To detect anomalies which
could occur rapidly in
time, i.e.e.g, anomaly
induced changes in steady
state measurements have
taken +500msec or tess
before redtine cutoff and
subsequent major damage.
-To account for sensor drift.
SAFD Initial Algorithm Framework
Possible Approaches to Neasurin_ the SAFD's Detection System Performance:
General: The detection performance relates to how effective the selected algorithm is in detecting a failure.
If the detection algorithm requires a large amount of core memory and is "slow" to respond, the
concept is not acceptable. The resl:x_se of the concept in detecting various induced failures
can be quantified in the following terms:
Hit .............. A failure occurs and detection is accomplished by the selected concept.
Miss ............. The concept detects no failure(s) for which it was programmed, despite the fact
that such a failure was induced.
False Alarm ...... A condition in which the concept incorrectly detects a failure when no failure
actually occurred.
Response Time .... Length of time after the failure before detection of the failure occurs. Time to
detect.
The detection performance may be measured as follows:
I. Hit/Miss Ratio:
DSCORE = NIF - NOH*WT1
NIF
where: NIF .... Number of induced failures.
NOH.... Number of hits.
WT1.... Chosen weighting portion of the weight in_ortanace of this criteria.
WTI= 80 will yield 40 points.
If. Time to Detect: (15 points score)
Rationale: The advanced electronic control design_for the SSME (Space Shuttle Main Engine) takes
approximately 40-60 millseconds to detect a failure (assuming a 3-hit criteria); therefore the
concept is penalized for times greater than this. A 120-180 milliseCond time results in a worst score.
The concept is penalized for excessive parameter changes between when the failure was induced to when
the failure was detected for steady state opeation. A parameter change of IOX results in a worst score.
The typical scoring equation: DSCORE = ( ANAXl(O., (TFO-TFI-60))/120) * WITD + (PNTI - PNTD)/PNTI * WPF
where: TFD .... Time failure detected.
TFI .... Time failure induced.
PNTI...Parameter value when failure induced.
PNTD...Paramoter value when failure detected.
WITD...Weight on induced time delay.
WPF.... Weight on percent parameter change.
Ill. Nun4_er of False Alarms.
Ground Rules- For every 10 hits, one false alarm is tolerable, three false alarms scores 15 points.
Scoring: DSCORE = NOFA/NOH * 50.
where: NOFA...Nurnber of false alarms.
NOH.... Number of hits.
Figure-7 : Detection System Performance Measurements--
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4.0 LITERATUREREVIEWRESULTS
A literature search was performed on Failure Detection and Isolation (FDI)
techniques. A list of over 70 papers were collected and contacts made with
two research firms, Alphatech (Boston, Massachusetts) and Intermetrics
(Cambridge, Massachusetts). A bibliography of the collected literature (in
•three pages) may be found at the end of this section. The methods/material
which were reviewed are listed below. Each are subsequently discussed.
I. Alphatech Material/Approach.
II. Intermetric Material.
Ill. Bank of Kalman Filters Technique.
IV. Failure Sensitive Filter Technique.
V. Observers Technique.
VI. Voting Technique.
VII. Innovations Based Failure Detection Scheme.
A. Generalized Likelihood Ratio (GLR) Test.
B. Sequential Probability Ratio Tests (SPRT).
C. Weighted Sum Square Residual (WSSR) Test.
D. Modified Kalman Filter.
VIII. Parameter Estimation Technique.
IX. 3ump Process Technique.
I. Alphatech Material/Approach.
Since all Failure Detection and Isolation (FDI) techniques are fundamentally
based on models of system redundancy, it is not surprising that model error
creates problems in FDI techniques which do not adequately address the issue.
A design methodology described by Alphatech (ref. 29 & 37) provides an
interesting framework for analyzing the impacts of such errors on FDI
performance. A simple description can be found on page 4 of ref. 29. The
difficulty with this method lies in the computational burden associated with
the large number of linear models required to generate the redundancy
relations for each steady state operating point. More work on a practical
level needs to be done before this technique is plausible for plant failure
detection.
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Robustness of an FOI system is defined by Alphatech as a measure of FDI
performance. They consider the probability of a false alarm as a measure of
FDI robustness. The FDI algorithm must also have robustness in the presence
of unavoidable modeling errors. The overall design process is to design the
FDI system to have the best performance when averaged over all the likely
error sources.
II. Intermetric Material.
A very comprehensive review of failure detection techniques can be found in
ref. 30 and 40. In ref. 30 Intermetrics Corporation reviewed over 73
publications on failure detection. In this review three key areas of
implementation were discussed:
l • Kalman Filtering. System states are often estimated using the
sequential optimal Bayes linear estimator, known as the Kalman
filter. For real time applications a reduced-order Kalman filter
(extended) must be used. This is due to the computer memory and
computation delay required for fill-state Kalman filters.
o "Truth" Modeling Derivation. When the "truth" model or the error
model is derived, it is assumed that the state description has
filter residuals that are unbiased and white for the nominal
operating case. The filter residuals can be nonwhite or biased for
the following reasons:
a. Because a failure occurred.
b. Because a bad measurement was received.
C. Because of the use of a reduced-order Kalman filter
(suboptimal).
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Any failure detection approach that does not account for the last
two reasons above will attribute any nonwhiteness as solely due to
the occurrence of a failure. One possible solution to this problem
involves the on-line calculation of the mean and variance from the
windowing of statistics, i.e.:
a. Sampling a "frame" of time at a steady-state level and
estimating the variance.
be Comparing the above to a suboptimal estimate from a
reduced order extended Kalman error covariance matrix.
C° Developing a "metric" based on the error between the
statistical estimates.
. Robust Techniques. Three other approaches to solving the nonwhite
filter residual problem can be termed "robust" techniques.
a. Voting between three-(or more) comparable components.
b. Mid-value selection (between three comparable components).
Co Reliance on parity equation checks between either identically
redundant systems or functionally redundant systems or
combinations of systems which together cover the function of
another system (known as analytical redundant systems).
NOTE: The first two of the above techniques are present in the SSME
controller electronics (e.g. self-checking processors and sensor
voting logic). The third type can be related to the SSME (Space
Shuttle Main Engine) actuator electronics voting logic. This
failure detection scheme relies on 2nd order transfer function
simulation of the actuator dynamics that is then compared against
the actuator's actual position. An error is then generated and a
threshold value of 6% to 10% is then used to trigger engine shutdown.
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Ill. Bank of Kalman Filters Technique.
This technique employs a group ('bank') of Kalman filters to hypothesize each
failure mode. Normal operation of the system is represented by the null
hypothesis, H-sub-o. The failure hypotheses are labeled as H-sub-i. The
residuals of each filter are monitored and likelihood functions
(e.g.probability density functions) are generated. Other statistical tests
(ref. 60) can also be performed on the filter innovations. The hypothesis
with the maximum likelihood of occurrence is then selected as representing the
true failure mode. Concepts underlying the bank of filter's approach are
discussed in ref. 61 and 62. The concept is schematically shown below:
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The advantages of the bank of filters technique are: (1) it provides a good
yardstick for comparison with simple techniques, and (2) it allows insight
into the failure propagation dynamics after detection. The disadvantages
are: (1) the bank of filters approach results in excessive computational
complexity, and (2) there is the possibility of the bank of filters becoming
oblivious and failures going undetected.
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IV. Failure Sensitive Filter Technique.
Failure sensitive filters can be classified as filters using failure states in
dynamics and detection filters. The block diagram below illustrates this
technique.
KALMAN
Z (T) FILTER\
J
_(T)
P(T) \
DETECTION PERFORMED BY ONE OF THE
FOLLOWING:
A
UPDATE X (T) AND P(t) AT EACH
DECISION TIME AND PERFORM TESTS,
THRESHOLD CQMPARISON OF FAILURE
STATE.
CHOOSE FILTER GAINS TO MANIFEST
FAILURE AS A RESIDUAL IN A FIXED
DIRECTION
. Failure State Auqmented Filters. This type of filter augments the
state vector with failure states to form a higher dimensional system
in state space. Several techniques which use these filters and are
sensitive to specific types of -failures have been developed. Kerr
(ref. 63) discusses an approach where a bounded region is defined
around the nominal and estimated trajectories and tests are
performed to determine overlapping of the two regions. It is a
geometrical approach and simulates failures as states (for detection
purposes). The figure below demonstrates this concept.
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. Detection Filters. Detection filters were developed by Beard (ref.
64) and Jones (ref. 65). The basic idea is to select the gain
matrix such that filter innovations tend to zero in the no-failure
state and give an indication of plant failure in the failed state.
Beard's choice of gains is directed towards making the innovations
point in a fixed direction in case of a failure. For example, it is
easy to show that if a component fails, the components of the filter
residual vector have distinguishing characteristics that are large
relative to other component failure characteristics.
The major advantage of detection filters is the simplicity with
which they can be used. The disadvantages are: (1) susceptibility
to instrument errors and random disturbances, (2) applicable in
theory only to linear regimes where the model structure does not
change, (3) modeling errors may appear as soft failures, (4)
criteria for declaring faults are hard to set, and (5) in general,
this method requires measurements of all state variables.
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If the mathematical model of a system is "close to" the actual
physical system, Kalman filtering is the optimal technique for
estimation. Performance may be degraded, however, due to modeling
errors and the tendency of Kalman filters to become"oblivious" to
the sensor outputs. As more and more information is received, the
state estimation error covariance is decreased. Consequently, the
filter gains are reduced and the filter band-width is reduced.
If a failure occurs early in the measurementsequence, while the
filter gain and bandwidth are large, the filter can respond properly
to the change. However, as the error covariance and gain decrease,
the filter begins to "know the state too well" Thus, as time goes
on, it becomesoblivious to incoming information and fails to track
the actual system behavior. In fault tolerant systems, it is
desired to have filters which are sensitive to new data so that
abrupt changesare reflected in the filter behavior.
Two techniques exist for avoiding the oblivious filter. They are
the exponentially age weighted filtering and the limited memory
filtering (ref. 66). Both techniques ensure that the filter gains
on all failure modesnever approach zero. Hence, the filters remain
sensitive to failures.
V. Observers Technique.
A traditional scheme for protecting a system against failures in its feedback
sensors is to provide the system with three (or more sets of sensors, so that
there is redundancy in the feedback information. A voting logic may then be
used to identify a faulty component's output sensor. This approach works well
in systems where redundant instrument sets do not cause cost, weight, or size
problems.
The technique of using observers requires only one set of instruments for each
incident type. The redundancy provided by multiple sets of instruments is
provided artificially in the failure detection computer by a subsystem of
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multiple observers (see the figure below). It is assumedthat the single set
of instruments consists of three or more individual sensors. The outputs of
each set of sensors is used to drive an observer, which is designed for that
incident type. Thus each incident type has its own observer. Each observer
estimates the states, so there is redundancy in estimates. These observer
estimates are compared in a voting manner. For perfect componentsand perfect
system dynamics, the estimates will converge to the real state vector in a
very short time.
If a component fails, however, the observer estimate (corresponding to that
component) is in error and a comparison between the estimated states
identifies the faulty component. Ref. 67 discusses a scheme using multiple
observers.
A plant failure detection system will utilize a set of sensors feeding in to
an observer that simulates the behavior of the normal system but is sensitized
to detecting a particular plant failure mode.
SENSOR
SET #i
/_-(_ OBSERVER
SENSOR
COMPARATOR AND FAILUREJ FAILED
DETECTION LOGIC l COMPONENT #1
#I I
COMPARATOR AND FAILURE
DETECTION LOGIC
#2
FAILED
COMPONENT #2
SENSOR
SET # £
Zt (K_ OBSERVER
COMPARATOR AND FAILURE
DETECTION LOGIC
#L
FAILED
CO. ONE T
BANKOF OBSERVERSTECHNIQUE
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VI. Voting Technique.
When redundant sensor channel information is available (analytic or hardware
redundancy) Voting techniques are useful. These methods work very well for
hard failures and certain types of soft failures.
The standard voting process considers three (or more) "identical" signals. A
marked deviation in one of the three redundant signals is sufficient to
identify a failure. A recent voting scheme is presented in ref. 68 by Broen.
The voting test technique has the following advantages (from ref. 30):
° Can be applied either directly to the raw measurements prior to
possible contamination from subsequent processing or applied to
subsequently filtered and therefore further refined estimates of the
sources of potential problems; or applied to both.
. Voting tests can be posed in a form that is compatible for
representation as a parity vector/table cross checking to simplify
failure isolation.
.
°
To account for differing accuracies of contributing components,
parity equations can be modified from merely being equated to zero,
to being equated to a quantity that is operationally equivalent to
zero (for all practical purposes) by using variable decision
thresholds for comparison. This can provide sufficient additional
leeway for expected standard deviations of each participant along
with components to account for noise and maneuvers.
Sophisticated generalization of the voting test operates on the
output of the Kalman filter and gently de-weights dissenting
contributions to the overall solution.
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The disadvantages of the voting technique include:
l ° Detection of hard failure is possible, but only for systems with a
high level of parallel redundancy.
2. Soft failures, like bias shifts, are hard to detect.
VII. Innovations-Based Failure Detection Schemes.
These schemes involve monitoring of the innovations of a filter based on the
hypothesis of no-failure operation of the system. For a system described by a
set of linear differential equations, a Kalman filter is often used to
generate this innovation process (or sequence). Mehira and Peschon (ref. 60)
have discussed various innovations in testing for failure detection and
isolation. Four detection schemes will be discussed here.
A. Generalized Likelihood Ratio (GLR) Test.
The generalized likelihood ratio (-GLR) technique requires existing functional
redundancy to extract fault detection information. This technique monitors
the output of one Kalman filter, see the block diagram below:
SENSOR
OUTPUT
Z(T) J Z (K)
KALMAN I V(K)FILTER
CORRELATION C1 AND THRESHOLDJ HYPOTHESIS
COMPARISON I_ H1
CORRELATION C2 AND THRESHOLD t
COMPARISON H2
CORRELATION CM AND THRESHOLD /
/
COMPARISON . _-- HM
INNOVATIONS BASED DETECTION SCHEME
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A bank of simple correlation operations and threshold comparisons is driven by
the filter innovations. These very complex correlations were obtained from
two papers. The first paper is titled "The Controversy Over Use of SPRT and
GLR Techniques and Other Loose-Ends in Failure Detection. The second paper is
titled "A Conservative View of the GLR Failure and Event Detection
Approaches" See reference 3 and 5 respectively.
The GLR technique detects the onset of abrupt changes in linear systems. It
allows simultaneous detection of failure, the time of occurrence of failure
and the extent of the failure. The failure of a plant produces a nonwhite
residual.
y(k) : y'(k) + Gi (k,e)_ (i)
where y'(k) is the residual for the normal operating filter and Gi(k,e)
describes the effect of failure y of type "i", occurring at a time e on a
residual at time "k". A set of hypotheses are established to distinguish
between failure and no failure modes, as follows:
H = No failure mode.
o
Hi = Failure mode of type "i" (y and e unknown)
The generalized likelihood ratio is defined as:
P (y(1),...y(k))/H i, e =_(k), y =_'(k)
Li(k) = p(y(1),...y(k))/Ho
(2)
where "P" is the probability density function of the innovations sequence
(,f(i), i = l, ...k), given the hypothesis Hi and given the maximum
likelihood estimates of e and y.
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Whena failure occurs, the decision rule for choosing between a failure and no
failure is
for Hi TRUE: Li(k)>k D
for Ho TRUE: Lo(k)<_ D
(3)
where XD is a predetermined threshold.
The advantages of this technique are: (1) built in functional relationships
allow reduced requirements for multiple redundancy, (2) the technique is
computationally feasible, (3) fast failure recovery is obtained since the time
of failure occurrence is explicitly determined. The technique therefore does
not have oblivious features.
The major disadvantage of this technique is that it is very sensitive to
modeling errors. An accurate model is therefore required for a good estimate
of failure parameters.
The likelihood ratio (LR) technique is in principle similar to GLR technique
except that it does not involve prediction of failure time or the extent of
failure. The LR is simply a ratio of two probabilities, i.e.:
P(Y(1),...y(k))/H i
Li(k) = P(y(1) ....y(k))/H o (4)
B. Sequential Probability Ratio Tests (SPRT).
The sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) differs from the likelihood ratio
test (LR) in that SPRT compares the likelihood ratio Li(k ) (equation (4))
against two thresholds
If the ratio exceeds one threshold or falls below the other, a decision is
made corresponding to the threshold that was crossed (see the schematic
below). The decision is, however, deferred until a threshold is crossed.
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This technique requires a valid state estimate at each time step for the
control logic. Therefore a decision on whether or not a failure has occurred
has to be made. This reduces the SPRT to a simple hypothesis test.
C. Weighted Sum Square Residual (WSSR) Test.
This technique was devised to suppress extremely large residuals, obtained
from bad sensor data, by modifying the least squares criterion. A very small
weighting is given to large residuals. This method essentially involves
performing a static test at each point in time, incorporating the new
measurement and the predicted estimate of this measurement based On previous
data.
To be more specific, this technique (ref. 61) uses filter innovations for
decision making. The innovation sequence y(k) is white with known
covariance if the model is perfect and there is no failure. In case of a
failure the residual becomes: i:
x(k) = White Noise + Effect of Failure
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and the detector is used to identify the failure using a'priori knowledge of
white noise covariance and the new statistics.
To detect a failure, one therefore has to compute the quantity, over the last
"N" observations.
k
1 _ yT(j)V-I(J)Y(J) (5)
li(k) - N
j = k - N + l
where y(j) is given by ref. ??.
The quantity l(k) is called the weighted sum square residual. For normal (no
failure) operation, l(k) is expected to remain small. However, in case of a
failure, l(k) will increase. If _ is the threshold value to make a decision
between H° and Hi, we have:
<_ implies H true
0
1(k) (6)
>k implies H. true
l
The size of "N" and k are chosen to provide acceptable trade-off between
false alarms and misses. A flow chart for this technique is in the figure
below:
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D. Modified Kalman Filter.
This procedure uses the functional redundancy in the system together with a
modified Kalman filter as a means of fault detection. Several methods have
been developed which modify the design of the Kalman filter to achieve
specific requirements. For example, a nonlinear single-stage filter algorithm
with filter gains calculated using a linearized system model is discussed in
ref. 74. This approach reduces the computational burden of a bank of Kalman
filters running in parallel. A second example is the application of nonlinear
filtering to failure detection in linear systems. This is discussed in ref.
75. This approach derives linear optimal estimator equations using nonlinear
filtering equations. Several other techniques are discussed in ref. 76 and
77. These techniques control the estimate error divergence in the case of a
failure. _
y
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VIII. Parameter Estimation Technique.
The failure modes (such as scale factor, failure parameters, and bias) are
estimated from input and output data. These estimated values are compared
with known values and substantial differences between the two indicates a
failure. The technique is discussed in ref. 71. A simplified block diagram
of the above concept is shown below:
SENSOR
OUTPUTS
(T) J z (K)Z f ,
BANK OF
ESTIMATORS
PARAMETER
ESTIMATION Xl' B_
FAILURE
COMPARATOR DETECTION
LOGIC
FAILED
COMPONENT/PLANT
IX. Jump Process Technique.
This technique considers failures as jump processes with known probability
distribution (ref. 71). It allows the formulation of failure sensitive
control laws and computation of conditional probabilities of failure.
Another technique (ref. 9) based on nonlinear filtering theory reparameterizes
the Kalman filter for both tracking the state and detecting a fault. It is,
however, limited to specific types of failures. This approach is still in
early stages of theoretical development.
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5.0 DATA EXAMINATION RESULTS
This section describes the results of examining data from forty (40) past
incident tests (see Figure-l). As outlined in section 2.0, the data
included: CRT-time slice plots (CADS and FR sensor measurements) and written
documentation. The results are presented under four (4) headings, i.e:
general overview, data base support to detection system development,
delineation of data base, and data base observations/comments.
5.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW
After screening thru the CRT-data of Figure-l's incident tests (excluding six
tests where, the incidents occurred after cutoff), 82% revealed pre-cutoff
(redline or nominal) indications of an anomaly. Included in the 82% are 20 of
27 major incident tests. The other four tests (approximately 18%) either
appeared to reveal no early anomaly indications or the anomaly occurred during
a start or throttle transient. A list of these tests along with tests where
the incident occurred after cutoff are presented below.
Test
Designation Cateqory
"901-147
"901-222
901-345
"902-132
902-383
"750-041
"750-160
750-165
"750-168
*SF6-003
STS-8
FRF-2
Anomaly occurred in the middle of a throttle
Anomaly occurred during transient (c/o at 4.3 sec)
Anomaly occurred after cutoff (c/o)
Anomaly occurred during transient (c/o at 2.3 sec)
Anomaly occurred after cutoff
Anomaly occurred after cutoff
Anomaly occurred during transient (c/o at 3.2 sec)
No changes were strikingly indicated
Anomaly occurred after cutoff
Anomaly occurred after cutoff
Anomaly occurred after cutoff
No changes were strikingly indicated
*Indicates a major incident
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5.2 DATABASE SUPPORT TO DETECTION SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
A data base was derived to support the detection system development. This
base encompasses the contents of Tables I, IIA, lIB, and III; it ranges from
the specific to the general. Tables-IIB thru -III are examples of the
specific data; Tables I and Tables IIA are examples of the general. A brief
description of and purpose for each table in the system's development are
presented on the next page. Each table's contents are described in more
detail in section 5.3.
Tables
Brief Background/
Content Description of Tables
Purpose of
Tables in the
Detection System
Development
III-4
thru
III-31
These tables were generated
for every applicable incident test.
Fifty-seven measurements were
examined for:
•Anomaly induced percentage
change from the steady state
condition.
•Rate of percent change.
•Interim from first indications
of an anomaly to cutoff
(redline or nominal).
•Each of the above items were
weighted.
-To identify
possible sensors
for system
utilization; the
weighing values
permit (in most
cases) an ease
in spotting
likely candidates.
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Tables
Brief Background/
Content Description of Tables
Purpose of
Tables in the
Detection System
Development
III-l
thru
III-3
These tables contain data related
to test-to-test sensor measurement
envelopes, as well as, the standard
deviation (SD) around each sensor
measurement's average steady state
value. The three SD's (STDI, STD2,
and STD3) collectively indicate
a sensor's deviation behavior.
They also can define different
bandwidths around the average steady
state sensor measurement, i.e.
(from Table III-2 and III-3):
BAND1 = AVGI + $TDI
BAND2 = AVG2 + STD2
BAND3= 2 * (3*STD3)
-The sensors
identified from the
tables above will
be further
screened for use
by Table III-l.
For each such
selected sensor
the worst case
bandwidth among
BANDI, BAND2, and
BAND3 will be used
in the sigma value
within Figure-6,
page 3-9. This
figure presents the
initial algorithm
framework.
IIB-l
thru
IIB-32
These tables were generated for
every applicable incident test.
The tables, for example, describe
in all cases, the incident and
damage and in most cases the
direction of (anomaly induced)
changes in selected sensor
measurements.
-To identify e.g.,
how sensitive the
system should be
to certain anomaly
changes (some tests
revealed minimal
damage).
-To be part of a
sensor malfunction
determining scheme.
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Tables
Brief Background/
Content Description of Tables
Purpose of
Tables in the
Detection System
Development
I thru
IIA-6
These tables were generated for
six (6) failure types (see
Figure-l, page 2). They
generalize and summarize the
anomaly indicating characteristics.
-To assist in
defining specific
anomaly
characteristics
which the detection
system should
be able to detect
(in conjunction
with the content
set of Table IIB).
5-4
5.3 DELINEATIONOFDATABASE
As noted in the previous section, the data base consists of three (3) tables.
They are headed and subdivided as follows:
Criteria TabLe
TABLE iii
SUi-
COWTENT
lll-l...St,mmmry of Se_or Standard Deviltiom
lIl-Z...Teit-to-Test Envelope Data Ease
Definition
III-3...DIII Bile for Time Sliced Vetue
Deviations fr_ the Average
Steady State Sensor Mea|urement
_riterl _ Table s for TesTs:
w/Iniector Failure
i11"4 ............ 901-173
Ill-5 ............ 901-331
III-6 ............ 750-148
Ill-7 ............ 901-183
IIl-8 ............ 902-198
III-9 ............ 901-307
Ill-t0 ........... SFIO-01
w/ControL Feature
111-11 ........... 901-284
w/Duct, Nanifgld Failure
111-12 ........... 750-259
111-13 ........... 901-465
111-14 ........... 750.175
111-15 ........... 902-112
w/Valve Failure
111-16 ........... SF6-O01
III-17 ........... 901-225
w/HPOTP Faiture
I11-18. .......... 901-110
111-19 ........... 901-136
lll-ZO ........... 902-120
w/HPFTP Fai|ure
11I'21 ........... 901-340
111"22 ........... 901-363
111"23 ........... 902"118
III-24 ........... 901-_36
111"25 ........... 901-364
III'26 ........... 902"209
111"27 ........... 902-249
111-28 ........... 902-095
111-29 ........... 901-346
111-30 ........... 901-362
Iii-31 ........... 901-410
Generic Chsraetar|st_c Table
TABLE 11
gJS-
Charectecfstics fgr:
llA-l...Injector Failure
llA-2...Controi Failure
llA-3...Duct, Manifoid,-RX Failure
llA-&...Vltve FaiLure
IIA-S...HPOTP Failure
IIA-6...HPFTP Failure
Failure Summery for Te_:
w/Injector Failure
!16-1 .......... 901-173
IIB-2 .......... 901-331
I18-3 .......... 750-148
118-4 .......... 901-183
118-5 .......... 902-178
I18-6 .......... 901-30?
116-? .......... SFIO-01
w/Control Faiture
II8-8 .......... 901-284
u uc Manifold Faiture
IIB-9 .......... 750-259
118"10 ......... 901-485
II8"11 ......... 7_0-175
116"12 ......... 902-112
y/Valve Failure
118-13 ......... SFB-01
118-14 ......... 901-225
w/HPOTP Failure
IIB-15 ......... 901-110
IIB-16 ......... 901-136
11B-17 ......... 902-120
w/HPFTP Failure
118-18 ......... 901-340
118-19 ......... 901-363
118-20 ......... 902-118
118"21 ......... 901-436
118-22 ......... 901-364
118-23 ......... 902-209
llB-2A ......... 902-269
119-25 ......... 902-0QS
118-26 ......... 901-346
116-27 ......... 901-362
118-28 ......... 901-410
wfAr_lte_ Durtnq Tronsi_ts
118-29 ......... 901-22Z*
118-30 ......... 902-132"
118-31 ......... 750-160"
118-32 ......... 901-147 t
3. Rarme & DBmqe Sunmury Tobie
TABLE 1
SUB-
CO,TEWT
Range & Damage for:
1-I .... Injector -MCC Failure
I-2 .... Injector -FPB FaiLure
1"3 .... Control Failure
I-4 .... Duct, Manifold, HX-Faiiure
!-5 .... VaLve Faflure
!-6 .... HPOTP FaiLure
I-7.... HPFTP Failure
The tables above (with four exceptions) focus on anomalies occurring at steady
state operation**. This section delineates the contents of each table.
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
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**NOTE: A definitive cutoff criteria when anomaly induced changes occur
during start or throttle should be formulated in a future study.
For this latter study sufficient test data should be gathered to
adequately define the "nominal" start and throttle profiles. The
four (4) incident tests which should be studied are identified with
asterisks (*) in the table listing• Tables IIB-29 thru IIB-32
contain descriptions of the incident and damage, exclusive•
Criteria Tables, Table III. Each of 5?-sensor measurements (derived for each
test time slice) was examined for its pre-cutoff (anomaly induced) percentage
change from the steady-state condition, the rate of percent change, and the
interim from first indication of an anomaly to cutoff. The latter measurement
data were weighted (subjectively) to more easily identify possible sensors for
detection system development use. The results for twenty-eight (28) incident
tests are presented _n Tables III-4 thru III-31. In addition to these results
the information/data below are included in the tables:
l •
.
A brief description of the test.
A summary of the damage and impact (cost and delay time).
3. A schematic describing the terms used within the table•
4. Weighting provisions for sensor algorithm selection.
Tables III-l thru III-3 contain measurements of each sensor's variance during
steady-state conditions. Table III-1 will be used to refine the selection of
detection system sensors, initially assembled from Tables III-4 thru III-28
and assist in other algorithm definitions (as listed on page 5-2). Table
III-l lists three standard deviations. Two standard deviations (STDI and STD2
in Table III-l) reflect a sensor's test-to-test envelope variance and are
derived from test envelope measurements at 2-seconds and lO-seconds from the
first early indication of an anomaly. Table III-2 (in three pages) presents a
schematic illustrating the necessity of a 2-second and lO-second envelope
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measurementfor each test. Table III-2 also lists the data source of the
sensor standard deviations, i.e. ten (lO) tests and their corresponding
average (under the headings AVGI and AVG2in Table III-2). STD3 in Table
III-l measures a sensor's variance around its average steady state value.
Table III-3 schematically illustrates the type and volume of data encompassed
in this standard deviation. Where available, STD3's standard deviation was
assigned from the derivation of data taken every 20 milliseconds over a
5-second interval (generated by NewTechnology Inc. of Hunstville, Alabama);
and where the latter data was unavailable, STD3's value was assigned from the
derivation of data taken every lO0 milliseconds over a l-second interval. A
comparison in Table III-3 of these two standard deviations (where both
existed) reveals a close agreement in most cases.
Using Table III's data set, a list of possible sensor measurementswhich may
be utilized during the detection system development is presented in Figure-5
(of section 3.0).
Generic Characteristic Tables, Table II. These tables describe the generic
characteristics of six failure types with examples of sensor measurement
traces, as well as describing the anomaly characteristics for individual
incident tests. The tables are subdivided into Table IIA and Table lIB.
These tables are further subdivided as shown on page 5-3 and are described
for content below:
Table IIA The elements of this subdivision narrate the generic
characteristics for six failure types and displays
examples of sensor measurement traces.
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Table IIB The elements of this subdivision describe the anomaly
characteristics for individual incident tests thru:
I. A narration of the incident.
. A description of the engine/facility damage,
along with a schematic.
. A time line of anomaly indicative parameters,
along with the direction of change, and the
excursion and duration interval. There are four
(4) exceptions to this content; these are tests
where the anomaly occurred during a transient.
The data set of Table IIB will be used to identify how sensitive the detection
system should be to certain anomaly changes (i.e. some tests revealed minimal
damage). Table IIB's parameter direction of change data will be used (along
with verification incident tests* and other approaches) to develop the
detection system's sensor malfunction decision logic.
*NOTE: Use will be made of the sensor malfunctions which occurred in the
twenty-eight incident tests examined. They are summarized here:
Sensor Mat functions
Sensor Identification Test No_(s) of Occurence
INJ CLNR PR-MCC HG IN PR ...... 901"225
MCC HG IN PR" MCC PC .......... 901"225
HPFT Delta-P .................. 901-225
HPOT Detta-P .................. 901-225
MCC FU INJ PR ................. 750-148
MCC LN CAV PR ................. 901-331,
901-364,
MCC CLNT DS T ................. 901-363,
MCC OX INJ T ................. 901-410
FAC FU FL CT .................. 901-331
HPFP BAL CAV PR ............... 901-110,
HPFT D$ T1B .................. 750-146,
ENG FU FLOW CT ................ 901-183
PBP DS PR ..................... 901-331,
FAC OX FLOW CT ................ 901-183,
FAC OX FLOW ................... 901-307
HPOT DS T2 .................... 901-284
HPFP DR TEMP .................. 750-259
HX INT T ...................... 901-225
750-148, 902-198, 901-284, 750-259, 901-485, 901-363
902-209, 902-249, 901-362, 901-410, 901-436
902-209, 902-095
901-364
901-284, 902-209, 902-095
901-284
901-307
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Range & Damaqe Summary Tables, Table I. A data summary of the anomaly
indicative parameters in Table IIB are presented in these tables by failure
type. This summary is in the form of a data range for the direction of change
and the excursion and duration interval. A data range is also defined for the
direction of percentage change from steady state conditions. The table
concludes with a schematic summary of either the test-to-test damage or the
location of the damage source by failure type. The subdivisions of this table
are presented on page 5-3.
Tables I and IIA have been used to define three basic failure characteristics
which the detection system should be able to detect. These characteristics
consist of anomalies which occur:
l. Shortly after a scheduled transient.
a. "Shortly after" is the approximate interim of +l to <+3 seconds
after the completion time of the scheduled transient.
b.
"Scheduled transient" is defined as a start, throttle, or tank
venting.
0 Well after a scheduled transient and occur slowly.
a.
"Well after" is approximately _+3 seconds after the completion
time of the scheduled transient.
.
b.
"Occur slowly" is where major damage occurs approximately 5 to
300+ seconds after the first anomaly indications.
Well after a scheduled transient and occur rapidly.
a. "Well after" has the same general definition as above.
b.
"Occur rapidly" is where major damage occurs approximately <5
seconds after the first anomaly indications.
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5.4 DATABASE OBSERVATIONS/COMMENTS
This section concludes with data base comments, incident test observations,
and/or lessons learned from incident tests (other than re-design needs or life
related discoveries).
These topics will be presented by failure type with the following outline
structure:
I.
If.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
Injector Failure.
Control Failure.
Duct, Manifold, and Heat Exchanger Failure.
Valve Failure.
HPOTP (High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump) Failure.
HPFTP (High Pressure Fuel Turbopump) Failure.
I. Injector Failure
A. Sensitive Sensors. The injector failure sensors listed within
Tables I thru IIB were chosen based on:
l , A sensor's closeness to the Level A+B criteria maximum (2.0),
see Table III-4 for an example of what is meant by a Level A÷B
criteria.
. Item-l's condition is true for the majority of injector failure
tests. One of five MCC injector failure tests e.g. was cutoff
earlier than the other tests by a malfunctioning sensor. This
test's parameters therefore reflect low percentage change from
steady state values (less than 1%) as well as low Level A+B
values, see Table I-l.
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3. The anomaly tests listed below.
MCC Injector Failure Type FPB Injector Failure Type
Test 901-173
Test 901-331
Test 902-198
Test 901-183
Test 750-148
Test 901-307
SFIO-OI
B. Injector Failure, Sensitive Sensor Observations. Nine of the
fourteen MCC-injector failure sensors (in Table I-l) show the same
direction of change for all five data base tests; the remaining five
parameters have different directions depending on the extent of
damage. For the cases where the secondary and primary faceplates
were burned through e.g. the injector hotgas delta-P trace
consistently shows a rise from steady state conditions (see Table
IIB-l thru lIB-3). A consistent drop in injector hotgas delta-P is
shown if only the primary faceplate was burned through (see Table
IIB-4 and IIB-5).
Another observation can be noted in regards to the latter two types
of faceplate damage. For burn throughs of only the primary
faceplate the algorithm has more than 2.9 seconds for cutoff
assessment and implementation; for burn throughs of both the primary
and secondary faceplates, the algorithm has less than l-second.
NOTE: Due to the different damage sources for the preburner
injector failures (Test 901-307 and SFlO-Ol), a common
direction or trend of anomaly change cannot be defined.
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II. Control Failure
A. Sensitive Sensors.
IIB-8 were:
The sensors listed in Tables I-3, IIA-2, and
° Based on Test 901-284. This test represents an incident where
the engine was miscontrolled due to erroneous chamber pressure
measurements.
. Chosen to match some of the parameters selected for the MCC or
FPB injector failures (if the sensors were available).
B. Sensor Observations.
measurements
reflected:
Almost all of the available sensor
for this miscontrolled chamber pressure failure
I. Large changes (>3%) in steady state conditions.
2. Maximum Level A÷B criteria values (see Table III-II).
o A time interval between first indications of an anomaly to
redline cutoff of approximately 6 seconds.
III. Duct, Manifold, and Heat Exchanger Failure
A. Sensitive Sensors. The sensor measurement ranges presented in Table
I-4 are based on the following tests:
750-175
750-259
901-485
902-112
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Be Sensor Observations. Half of the above tests reflected sensor
measurement changes (induced by an anomaly) which had a duration
interval* of less than 500 msec.
*See Table I-4 for a schematic definition of this interval.
C. Lessons Learned. One the tests which had less than a 500 msec
duration interval (Test 750-175) provided a lesson on the need for
more extensive analysis and testing. Catastrophic failure of the
high pressure oxidizer duct was initiated by a high cycle fatigue
(HCF) crack adjacent to a specially developed ultrasonicflow
transducer. The high cycle fatigue was caused by a combination of
thinning the duct wall to install the transducer blocks, physically
adding the block masses to the duct, and increasing local stresses
brought about by brazing the blocks to the duct wall. From
Rocketdyne's incident report (cited in Table IIB-ll): "...it is
clear that brazed joints are not to be relied upon for HCF
application without extensive analysis and testing. The HCF
properties of Rocketdyne braze-alloys do not exist, but should be
presumed to be lower than parent metal properties. Braze fillet
geometry is difficult to control, and the surface of braze fillets
inherently have shrinkage voids. Therefore, relying on braze
fillets to reduce stress concentration is unconservative".
Test 902-I12 (another test with less than a 500 msec duration
interval) provided insight on relocation of a redline sensor. In
this test the facility fuel inlet Franz-screen was partially blocked
by solidified nitrogen. Nitrogen was inadvertently introduced into
the tank during chilling. Cavitation of both HPFP (High Pressure
Fuel Pump) and LPFP (Low Pressure Fuel Pump) occurred due to the
LPFP inlet pressure dropping below zero psig. From Rocketdyne's
incident summary sheet the facility hardware and procedures were
revised; and the fuel inlet pressure redline was relocated from the
tank bottom to below the valve and screen.
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IV. Valve Failure
A. Sensitive Sensors. The sensor measurement ranges in Table I-5 are
based on Test g01-225 and SF6-OI.
B. Sensor Observations. In both test cases the measurement changes
(induced by an anomaly) had a duration interval of less than 500
msec.
V. HPOTP Failure
A. Sensitive Sensors. The sensor measurement ranges in Table I-6 are
based on Test 901-110, 901-136 and 902-120.
B.
C.
Sensor Observations. In all cases the measurement changes (induced
by an anomaly) had a duration interval greater than 500 msec,
however, the percentage change from steady-state conditions was less
than 2% in some cases.
Lessons Learned. Test 902-120 provided a lesson on the need for
more analysis and testing. Failure of the HPOTP was centered on the
first time use of a capacitance device which was designed to
determine HPOTP shaft, bearing, and bearing cartridge movement.
Rubbing between the device pads and speed nut ignited a fire which
burned into the turbine end bearings and main pump. From
Rocketdyne's incident report (cited in Table IIB-l?): "...the
following changes were therefore recommended before testing of the
HPOTP could be resumed:
l .
2.
3.
No capacitance device.
Increase the LOX seal slinger clearance.
Eliminate round-cornered cup washers.
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VI. HPFTP Failure
A. Sensitive Sensors. The measurement ranges in Table I-7 were based
on eleven incident tests:
901-340 901-364 901-346
901-363 902-209 901-362
902-I18 902-095 901-410
901-436 902-249
B. Sensor Observations. All tests under this category appear to
possess sufficient sensors which have large duration intervals (as
much as 200 to 300 seconds) and large changes from steady state
conditions (>3%).
C. Lessons Learned. Test 901-364 (Kaiser Hat Failure) provided a
lesson on the need for more analysis and testing. From NASA's
incident report (as cited in Table IIB-22): "During the
investigation, it was established that all changes, including the
nut which caused this failure, (were) reviewed formally both by
Rocketdyne and NASA. Late changes to a design, such as the undercut
feature of this nut, may not have had the thorough evaluation that
the original design had been given. The undercut was made for
structural consideration and its significance as a potential flow
path cause apparently was overlooked." A schematic of this nut is
presented in Table IIB-22.
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INDICATIVE PARAHETER DATA RANGE OF INCIDENT TYPES:
Tests
Used for
Type of Data
Incident Range
Injector 901-173
(HCC) 901-183
901-331
902-198
750-148
Conznents (if necessary)
The two schematics betoa
nespectivety define the
measurement for the
adjacent detta-P indicative
parameters and the MCC
injector burn areas for
four of the tests used in
deriving the adjacent
vatue ranges.
(IN3 C1.NR PR) -(MC£ HG ]N PR)
AP I_EQO_DARY F_C:EPLATIE
I'.  ;ll %' ")
BURNED POSTS
ENGINE 0002
Test 901-173
LOX Post: PIO, R13
ENGINE 2108
Test 901-331
LOX Post: P79, R13
Fuel Pre_urnsr
ENGINE 000S
Test 901-183
LOX Post: P76, I%13
Table I-i:
TIHE L]NE FOR INDICATIVE PARAHETERS
! _-Excu|]ntervat "_11rsi°n
Duration Interval_/p/o Time
SampLe
Indicative
Parameters
Secondary
faceptate
detta-P
Primary
faceptate
detta-P
Hotgas
injector
detta-P
RCC OX
%ntet PR -
HCC PC
HPFP
Disch PR -
HCC PC
FPB PC -
HCC HG |N PR
OPB PC -
HCC HG IN PR
HCC PC
HCC CL DS T
HPFT DS T1A
HPFT, DS T1B
HPOT DS T1
HPOT DS T2
LPOP DS PR
Range of
Percent
Change from
Steady State
-157. to -4.17
-50.7 to -5.33
-21.8 to +17.6
-9.9 to +25.5
-9.0 to +.77
-4.2 to +5.3
• 5.55 to +6.63
-6.43 to -.27
+1.04 to +12.3
+1.6 to +84.1
+1.4 to +10.7
+.53 to +41.0
+.28 to +40.0
-4.73 to +5.76
Range of
Rate of Change
(psi/see,
or deq/sec)
-666.7 to -5.7
-589.3 to -8.4
-44.1 to +362.5
-862.5 to +200.0
-1500. to -33.3
-750. to +216.2
-1000. to +92.3
-1000. to -39.5
+1.5 to +101.9
+260 to +3625
+147 to +583
+24 to +1620
+12 to +1560
-66.8 to +170.
Range of
Excursion
Intervat
.12 - 4.8
.15 - 3.3
.08 -1.45
.10 - 2.2
.10 - .60
.10 - .50
.10- 1.3
.11 - .48
.52 - 3.2
.10 - .50
.15 - .40
.25 - .74
.25 - .75
.I0 - .36 i
I
(sec)
.48 - 27.1
.48 - 26.8
.48 - 26.3
.10 - 26.9
.36 - 27.0
.60 - 2.75
.63 - 3.00
.48 -26.89
.52 - 26.5
.36 26.61
.36 - 26.6
.36 - 26.6
.36 - 26.6
.36 - 2.9
ORIGINAE PAGE IS
POOR QUALITY
2004
Test 902-198
LOX l=olt: P61,RI2
.. VIEW LOOKING FORWARD
Indicative Parameter Data Range of Incident Types
(Injector - MCC)
Range of
Duration
Intervat
INDICATIVE PARAMETERDATA RANGEOF INCIDENT TYPES:
Tests
Used for
Type of Data
Incident Range
Injector 901-307
(FPB) SFIO-Ol
Comments (if necessary)
The schematic below summarizes
the FPB injector burn areas.
ORIGINAL p.,kGF, IS
OF POOR QIJALYI'_
Sample
Indicative
Parameters
HPFT DS 71A
HPFT DS TI B
HPFP CL LR PR.
MC9 HG IN PR
MCCOX
Inter PR -
MCC PC
HPOT DS T1
HPOT DS T2
LPOP DS PR
OPOVACT POS
TIRE LINE FOR INDICATIVE PARAMETERS
pm.Excursi on
Duration Intervs[(.c/o Time (sec)I
Range of
Percent
Change from
Steady State
-4.0 to +6.3
-4.6 to +5.3
-25.
-8.
-4.4 to +8.
-4.5 to +9.
-9.2
.3.4 to +3.43
Rate of
Change Range
(psi/sec,
(pos/sec,
or deg/sec)
-17.4 to 324.
-1.1 to 413.
-60.0
-.89
-1.80 to 25.
-1.75 to 26.6
- .71
-.2 to .88
Range of
Excursion
Interva[
.25 - 3.5
.15 - 44,
.5
28.0
3.2 -26.0
3.2 -28.0
31.0
2.5 - 9.0
Range of
Duration
Interva[
5.15 -14.0
5.15 -44.0
20.3
28.0
5.2 - 26.0
5.2 - 28.0
31.0
5.2 - 37.0
II
Test 901-307 Burn Area
,o
_]_ Indicates eLements
where erosion
penetrated facepLate
SFIO Burn Area
oration
Cap Erosion
Deep Erosion
Arrows indicate
_t) _ unusatly biased
posts and direction
O @ {,_ of bias
• li -.i
(Test 901-307)
Table I-2 : Indicative Parameter Data Range of Incident Types
(Injector - FPB)
INDICATIVE PARAMETER DATA RANGE OF INCIDENT TYPES:
Type of
Incident
Control
Failure
Tests
Used for
Data
Range
901-284
ORIGINAE P2+2GE _g
OF POOR QUA
Corm_nts (if necessary_
The schematic below illustrates
the Lee Jet orifice which
dislodged and caused an
erroneous sensed value (for
the chamber pressure) to the
engine Controller.
TIME LINE FOR INDICATIVE PARAMETERS
14-Excursion_
[ -- -- 4 .Lnterva_ ___ + ..
_=--_Duration Interval-_/oTime
Sample
Indicative
Parameters
HPFP DS PR "
HCC PC
delta-P
HCC PC
HPFT DS T1 A
HPOT DS T1
LPOP DS PR
OPOV ACT POS
Range of
Percent
Change from
Steady State
-70.
+31.
-25.1
-69.7
+28.6 ,
-31.7
Rate of
Change Range
(psi/see,
(pos/sec,
on deq/sec)
-2961.5
+18000.0
-394.65
-495.
+500.
-71.4
Range of
Excursion
Interval
.65
.05
.35
2.0
.2
.28
Range of
Duration
Interval
6.03
6.03
6.01
5.88
5.76
6.03
TAPE R
i
__SCREEN
_PUAGE
'+.=_ ORIFICE\
i? -- SCREEN
--JET
BODY
V
-- --.187§
I
PRESSURE PORT
MCC
FUEL
DISCHARGE
MANIFOLD
ISOLATOR
REMOTE MOUNT
FLIGHT
TRANSDUCER
MCC
ACOUSTIC
CAVITY
Table I-3: Indicative Parameter Data Range of Incident Types
(Control Failure - Erroneous Sensor, Lee Jet)
INDICATIVE PARAHETER DATA RANGE OF INCIDENT TYPES:
Tests
Used for
Type of Data
Incident Range
DUct, 750-175
Manifold, 750-259
or Heat 901-485
Exchange 902-112
Failure
Comments (if necessary)
The value ranges on the right
were derived from the listed
anomaly tests on the Left. The
schematic below summarizes
the system location of the
points of failure for each test,
i.e.: the high pressure
oxidizer duct, the HCC outlet
manifold, the nozzle tube, and
the fuel pump inlet duct.
ORIGINAI; PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALIT_J
Sample
Indicative
Parameters
Hotgss
Injector
delta-P
HCC OX
Inlet PR -
HCC PC
FPB PC "
HCC HG IN PF
OPB PC "
HCC HG IN P_
HCC PC
HCC CL DS T
HPFP SPEED
HPFT DS T1
HPFT DS T1
HPOT DS 1"1
HPOT DS T2
LPOP DS PR
Range of
Percent
Change from
Steady State
-I00.
• 484.6 to -92.1
+4.1 to +6.2
+5.7
-3.9 to -3.3
-275 to -24.7
-5.4 to +27.7
-61 to +23.8
-33 to +21.6
-33.3 to +7.4
-33.3 to +9.0
-48.3 to -4.4
Rate of
Change Range
(psi/sac,
(rpm/sec,
or de_/sec)
-4281.3
-45000 to -3625
+200 to +888.9
+3833.3
-673.7 to -163.6
-15714 to -2300
-_7 to +66420
-47000 to +690.9
-11800 to +1882.4
-16667 to +234
-16667 to +600
-2800 to -97.1
Range of
Excursion
Interval
.07 - .16
.09 - .5
.19 - .55
.05 - .07
.03 - .45
.05 - .55
.05 - .17
.03 - 8.1
.03 - 8.0
.05 - .19
SEC
Range of
Duration
Interval
,16
.07 - .16
.22 - .5
.19 - .55
.05 - .19
.06 - .45
.05 - .55
.05 - .17
.03 - 8.1
.03 - 8.0
.05 - .19
PUMP
MCC OUTLET
MANIFOLD
NOZZLE TUBE
LOCATIONS
DISC
PUMP
PREBUIINER IqJMP
-HIGH PIIESSUR| OXIDIZER DUCT
i _#OV. OXIOIZ|R PR|IIURN|M OXIOIZ|M VAI.V| |
I
F_ F_L PR|_MN|R OXIDJ_|m VALV|
mF¥ •_IN F_L ¥AI.VIE
•MAiN OX0DIZ|R ¥AL¥|
C_ •_BEM COOL_Ir ¥At.¥|
Table I-4 : Indicative Parameter Data Range of Incident Types
(Duct, Manifold, or Heat Exchanger Failure)
INDICATIVE PARAMETER DATA RANGE OF INCIDENT TYPES:
Tests
used for
Type of Data
Range
atve 901-225
aiture SF6-01
Comments (if necessary)
The value ranges on the right
were derived from the listed
anomaly tests on the left. The
schematic below summarizes
the system Location of the
valve failures for each test,
i.e.: the MOV and the MFV.
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
TIME LINE FOR INDICATIVE PARANETERS
i _,q--Excurs i on l.IJ
.._ [n...tervat I
i . _ Duration Interva_c/o Til1'_ I'
Sample
Indicative
Parameters
HCC PC
HPFT DS T1 A
HPFT DS T1 B
HPOT DS TI
HPOT DS T2
HPFP SPEED
MCC OX [N PR"
HCC PC
Primary
faceptate
detta-P
Range of
Percent
Change from
Steady State
-5 to +6
+15 to +30
+15 to +29
+12 to +36
+12 to +36
+4.2
+38.9
-12.9
Rate of
Change Range
(psi/sec,
(rpm/sec,
or decJ/se¢)
-3750 to +9000
+2750 to +4875
+2750 to +4500
+2000 to +4000
+2000 to +4000
+30000
+7000
-1000
Range of
Excursion
Interval
.02-.04
,08-.10
.08-.10
.08
.08
.05
.04
.O4
Range of
Duration
Interval
.12-.14
,08-.10
.08-.10
.08
.08
.05
.10
.10
-MAIN OXIDIZER DOME
-ill.=-
.; -: ..._,
- _ :. ..
DISC
N PUMP
PREBURNER PUMP
HIGH PRESSURE OXIDIZER DUCT
LEGEND
OPOV- OXIDIZER PREBURNER OXIDIZER VALVE
FPOV. FUEL PREBURNER OXIDIZER VALVE
MFV. MAIN FUEL VALVE
MOV • MAIN OXIDIZER VALVE
CCV . CHAMBER COOLANT VALVE
STAGE
SSHE Propellant Flow Schematic
Table I-5 : Indicative Parameter Data Range of Incident Types
(Valve Failure)
|NOiCAT|YE PARAMETERDATA RANGEOF |NCIDENT TYPES:
TIME LINE_ FOR INDICATIVE PARANETERS
Excursion
"z-I
,nterval-- ,o i 
Tests
Used for
Type of Data
incident Range
HPOTP 901-110
Failure 901-136
902-120
Comments (if necessary)
The value ranges on the right
were derived from the listed
anomaly tests on the left. The
schematic belo_ summarizes
some of the Nigh Pressure
Oxidizer Turbopump failure
points, e.g: bearings (BRG),
and the special capacitance
device.
Sample
indicative
Parameters
NPOT DS T1
HPOT DS T2
HPOT PRSL DR
OPOVACT POS
=
i
Range of
Percent
Change from
Steady State
+1,4 to +1.7
+1.5 to +1.8
-32 to +1.3
+,5 to +3.0
Rate of
Change Range
(pos/sec,
or deg/sec)
+2.3 to +31.4
+2.7 to +28.6
-370 to +1.46
+.21 to +100.
Range of
Excursion
interva_____.LL
.7 - 11.
.7 - 11.
1. -10.3
.02-25.0
Range of
Duration
Interva.__..._L
16.3 - 25.0
16.3 25.0
14.0 17.8
.02 - 25.0
(3z) _us_m_
FLOW OUl"
Capacitance Device
Table I-6 : Indicative Parameter Data Range of Incident Types
(High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump (HPOTP) Failure)
INDICATIVE PARAMETER DATA RANGE OF INCIDENT TYPES:
• El,. • , . .
) . ' • T-OF I0_,.._. _zF_
Type of
Incident
HPFTP
Failure
Tests
Used for
Data
ean.e
901-340
901-363
902-118
901-436
901-364
902-20<;
902-249
902-095
901-346
901-362
901-410
Comments {if necessary)
The value ranges on the right
were derived from the listed
anomaly tests on the left. The
schematic below summarizes
some of the Nigh Pressure
Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP) failure
points, e.g: at the turn
around duct, nut, Kaiser cap,
and 2nd stage seal.
Sample
Indicative
Parameters
TIME LINE FOR INDICATIVE PARAMETERS
HPFP CL
LNR PR "
MCC HG IN PR
HPFT Delta-P
HPOT Detta-P
NPFP SPEED
HPFT DS T1A
HPFT DS T1B
HPOT DS T1
HPOT DS T2
FPOV ACT POS
Range of
Percent
Change from
Steady State
-21.1 to +89.7
-2.8 to +18.7
-3.1 to +5.95
-5.7 to +2.90
-7.3 to +20.0
-3.2 to +22.8
-5.3 to +5.30
-6.3 to +9.33
-3.5 to 11.90
Turn Around
2nd Stage Duct
Tip Seal (INNER
WALL)
Rate of
Change Range
(psi/sec,
rpm/sec,
pos/sec,
or deq/sec)
-23.0 to +55.5
-16. to +467.7
-.91 to +161.3
-4255 to +375.0
-1300 to +686.3
-10. to +764.7
-22.4 to +237.5
-22.4 to +200.0
-.99 tO + 19.0
Range of
Excursion
Interval
1.1 - 222.
.62 - 92.
.62 - 69.
.15 -400.
.10 -200.
.40 -210.
.16 -190.
.11 -190.
.51 -200.
Range of
Duration
Interval
.62 - 260.
.62 -186.2
.19 - 485.
.51 - 495.
.51 -384.9i
.16 - 485.]
.11 485.1
.51 345 1
Turn Around
Duct
(OUTER
WALL)
Heat Shield
Nut
Table I-7 :
Turbine End
Cap (Kaise r
Helmet/Cap)
ist Stage
Turbine
Indicative Parameter Data Range of Incident Types
(High Pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP) Failure)
FAILURE MOOE OUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS:
Type of
Incident
Injector
(HCC and
FPB)
Generic Description of Incident Type and Sample Indicative Parameters:
The HCC (Main Combustion Chamber) iniector anomalies observed in five-previous SSHE tests can be
characterized as being initiated from a LOX injector post element failure. This failure is followed
briefly by:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Additional damage to other posts and a burn through of either the primary and secondary faceptate,
or primary faceplate exclusive.
Ejection of burned debris causing damage to the MCC liner and severe damage to the nozzle tubes.
A loss in C-star efficiency and the associated RCC pressure.
The controller opening of the OPOV (Oxidizer Preburner Oxidizer Valve) in response to the toss of
HCC pressure.
One of the high pressure turbines exceeding its redtine temperature with the above controller
response and fuel toss to the preburners.
The FPB (Fuel Preburner) injector anomaties observed in tuo-previous tests also can be characterized as
being initiated from a failure of a LOX injector elemant post. This causes subsequent damage to other
posts, the fuel preburner injector, and moderate to severe damage to the HPFT blades.
MCC Injector Anomaly
Sample
Indicative
Parameters CRT Example of the Indicative Parameter*s Anomaly Change From Steady State
3882PID _ ,-_ID 372
Secondary
Faceplate
Delta-P
(For MCC
Injector
Failure)
|r_ I m A
o. I
r" !
" hi,I
-, p
I
I
-I'_
• I
22.0 124"9
|
APPROX.
ANOMALY
BEGIN TIME
-IC
-- Scheduled Constant
__92% Power Level. Interim
I i I
_l,'r 'I!P ' " r,, [pv
27.8 33
38.7 38.5
TIHE FROH ENGINE START,
Table-IIA-l:
42.3 48.1 I
|Throttle Time tollSECS! 100% Power Levell
c/o
TIME
I
I
f
I
I
1
I
I
Failure Mode Qualitative Characteristics
--Injector Failure Type (MCC and FPB)
_CC Injector Anomaly C:_:_':GIi',_AL PAGE IS
s_ote OF POOR'QUALITy.Inclicative
Parameters CRTExampLeof the Indicat|ve Paremeter'$ AnomaLyChange Frm Steady State
9888PIO 386-'P|D
Primary
Faceplate
Delta-P
(For MCC
Injector
Failure)
202. _
388. C I- "I
I
c: i
282. _ i
! i
288. C I ' V
, IA
277. _ I _!
" I
P'" 1
22.0
4.9
APPROX •
ANOMALY
BEGIN TIME
-- Scheduled Constant
92% Power Level Interim--,
I I
27.8 3_
30.7 36.5
TIME FROM ENGINE START, SECS
1
45.2
42.3 48. !
Throttle Time to
100% Power Level
$1.8
c /o
TIME
Hotgas
Injector
Delta-P
(For MCC
Injector
Failure)
38{
27(
I *NOTE: TEST902-197,S THRUSTPROFILEWASIDENTICAL
TEST902-198,S FROHSTARTTO 8.5 SECONDS.
;1
• .,' "+ .: • *.
•_ .; -
\
\
I
I
:%. I
TO--
e
-i/:U: v
+,, q ., : .. -.
,"..: :..-..'
*NOMINAL
TEST 902-197
TEST 902-198
Ej,
_.e I
APPROX.
ANOMALY
BEGIN TIME
6._ 75
6.d 7._
TIME FROM ENGINE START, SECS
a.a t
c/o
TIME
Table-IIA-l:
(cont.)
Failure Mode Qualitative Characteristics
--Injector Failure Type (MCC and FPB)
FPB PC -
MCC HG IN PR
(For MCC
Injector
Failure)
OPB PC -
MCC HG IN PR
(For MCC
Injector
Failure)
HCC Injector Anomaty
Sampte
Indicative
Parameters
177:"
I
1 "
1 "
11.8 12 1
11.5 12.5
TIME FROM ENGINE START, SECS
CRT ExampLe of the ted|cat|re Pormneter, s AnomaLy Chat_je From Steady State
" "V ,,yi_
14.
t 13.S ;4.S
Throttle Time
to 105% Power Level
,v •
o"
Io2c;
I C
;\
I
I
I 5
I C
1775.
11.8 12.8
11.5 12. S
TIME FROM ENGZNE START, SECS
Table-IIA-l:
(cont.)
a
' ' /iI w
'j
• i
I I
I I
11 •
1,t.0
_. 13.5 :4.5 g.5 I
Throttle Time APPROX. C/O
to 105% Power Level ANOMALY TIME
BEGIN TIME
_S.S I
c/o
APPROX'TIME
ANOMALY
BEGIN TIME
Failure Mode Qualitative Characteristics
--Injector Failure Type (MCC and FPB)
MCC Injector Anomaly
Sample
Indicative
Parameters CRT Exampte of the Indicative Parmeter's Anomaty Change From Steady State
MCC OX Inlet Ps -
MCC PC
(For MCC
Injector
Failure)
230..0
I
I
I
I
I
t
I
I
I
l
I
23_
230.5 231.5 .5
TIME FROM ENGINE START, SEES APPROX.
ANOMALY
!
I
l
I
I
I
I
I
I
233.S
c/o
TIME
BEGIN TIME
\
234.0 ;,
234.5
HPFP Disch Ps -
MCC PC
(For MCC
Injector
Failure)
2400-
11.8 12.8
11.5 12.5
TIME FROM ENGINE START, SEES
Table-IIA-l:
(cont.)
14.8 1S.8 I_.8
13.S 14.S 5.5 C;O/
Throttle Time APPROX. T_ME
to 105% Power Level ANOMALY
BEGIN TIME
Failure Mode Qualitative Characteristics
--Injector Failure Type (MCC and FPB)
MCC PC
(For MCC
Injector
Failure)
HCC Injector Ano_ly
SabLe
Indicative
Parameters CRT Exampte of ,the Indicative Peram_er's Anomty Change From Steady State
381
'm
3840
*NOTE: TEST 902"197'S
TEST 902-198'S
38., _{.-
." .....
_-i- /"
_i ._/o!
d
A
4.8
I I I
*NOMINAL f "k ^
TEST 9o2-197/ v __
THRUST PROFILE WAS IDENTICAL
FROM START TO 8.5 SECONDS.
,'°"
. .., /" ".."_
4.4 4.8
4.2 4.6 5.8
_.2
,2 I
I
I, TEST
I
I
I
L
I
A
S.6
TIME FROM ENGINE START, SECS
S.4
APPROX.
ANOMALY
BEGIN TIME
,..............
!
.,-"
902-198
8.0
S.8
C/O TIME
AT 8.5 SEC
MCC CL DS T
(For MCC
Injector
Failure)
47!
46(
44! \
44_
43_
4.8
/
/-
/
50
4,S
.J
_/
/,,
/
/
APPROX.
ANOMALY
BEGIN TIME
TIME FROM ENGINE START, SECS
¢ 8
7.5
i
I
c/o "
TIm_
Table-IIA-l:
(cont.)
Failure Mode Qualitative Characteristics
--Injector Failure TvDe (MCC and FPB%
MCC Injector Anomaly
Sample
Indicative
Parameters CRT ExampLe of the Indicative Parameter's Arom[y Cha_e FromSteadyState
HPFT DS Temp
(For MCC
Injector
Failure)
HPOT DS Temp
(For MCC
Injector
Failure)
288(
_..o.
4.8 5
4.5
TIME FROM ENGINE START. SECS
I
;
• i
! "..
! !,.
i i'i_ .
:" !
1
A
.8 7,
S.S 6.5
I
APPROX.
ANOMALY
BEGIN TIME
231 HPFT TUR DS T A
......... i_11... 232 HPFlr TUR DS t B
7.5
;58_
148i
.... ........... . ...... .....
4 5
4.5
TZHIEFROH ENGINE START, SECS
Table-IIA-l:
(cont.)
..'
.;"/
/
.."/
,J /
.."/
I
I
I
J
s.sl s.o _.s
I
APPROX.
ANOMALY
BEGIN TIME
_m 233
......... PJEOR.... 234
.-'°°_
/
HPOT
HPOT
7.5
o
8.5
I
c/o
TIME
:::-;
n_osT_ !i
TUR DS T B"_'_:
I:/
I
I
! : . :.
Failure Mode Qualitative Characteristics
--Injector Failure Type (MCC and FPB)
8.5
I
c/o
TIME
LPOP DS PR
(For MCC
Injector
Failure)
MCC ]n_ector Anomaty/ FPB Iniector Anomaty
Sampte
Indicative
Parameters CRTExampteof the lndiFative Parameter's Anomt¥Char_je FromSteadyStatp
D"
r'"
+!
o:
P,Jll Slg LPCPDSPRESS A
......... PAM .... 218 LPOPOSPIESS B
0
C
4.8 S,
4.5
TIME FROM ENGINE STARt, SECS
i_ AAf
I \f'i vVV
I
5 4 6.5
APPROX.
ANOMALY
BEGIN TIME
.f_ ^ ]
,.8
7.S
0
A
I
I
8.5
I
ClO
TIME
HPFT DS Temp
(For FPB
Injector
Failure)
la_.m
Im.|
11m.l
flu
I,
I
s_ A._ I_I &a_-1%ts% I %
I
I$I.II
IllI,II
F _LmTIIIIH mi _-I _ _m ozs_ _a_ H
/ll.f .... _ITIIIH Pill I(-! @ _ DIStil _ N __
,t
i I
I && I\
% I %1
-__ ;,,_ ,'_
+%t %J s% : I%. • •"V %.; v
t
%s%%
I & I"
V
I
III ,II I II_.ll III. II 114.11
III.II Ill.il ;!_ III.il
I Tll4E IN _ ;_
APPROX.
ANOMALY
BEGIN TIME
,e4.1 ,m._
!
c/o AT
106.6 SEC
Table-IIA-l:
(cont._
Failure Mode Qualitative Characteristics
--InSector Failure Tvme (MCC and FPB_
FPB Iniector Anomaty
Sampte
Indicative
Parameters CRT Exampte of the Indicative Parmeter's A r__ly Change From Steady Star.
HPOT Ds Temp
(For FPB
Inj ector
Failure)
l_.m -
'.% I
%W ¢ I_
m.lll
ocm p MOTml314 HI| liE-| 14PO_ 11.iiqO OlgCI4 TIU, IP N
-iD_il.,,.tr.... A401",,,4OI3H HIO NE-$ HPQTP _ D|SO4 ?'IOqP N
%
Ii
,I
I
I
I
I
1%%
j )_%jI %" $
lll_ ii_" ¢. r%,/
SM.W
TOI.N SliZ.lO
i
APPROX. Tt_ ,.
ANOMALY
BEGIN TIME
IU._ Ik. Im
In.i
i_1 I
I
%,
_4 J.
% I
IU.M
114,1;8 j
c/o AT
106.6 SEC
OPOV ACT
(For FPB
Injector
Failure)
POS
$7.M -
E.M
IM.M
PI_t_T E411*'taB20D Hill 14E-D 01aOV iL'll.lqlCR POSITIOH
_- _ _ £41_ 1410 I,E-| 01oOv N_TI._TCR Is,CGITIQ_
'gl j,%.,
I
I
I
i
IOI,B
IIII .1_APPROX. i
ANOMALY
BEGIN TIME
TIPIE IN
IOII.M 11)4._
IM, r4
A
liE. I
IIN,M
c/o AT I
106.6 SEC
Table-IIA-l:
(cont.)
Failure Mode Qualitative Characteristics
--Injector Failure TVDe [MCC and WD_%
FAILURE MOOE OUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS:
Type of
Incident
Control
:allure
(Erroneous
Sensor,
Lee Jet)
Generic Description of Incident Type and San_ote Indicative Parameters:
The miscontrotted chamber pressure anomaly observed in one test can be characterized as being based
on proper operation of the engine Controller under the two circumstances below.
1. The loss of redundance in chamber pressure sensing.
2. The malfunction of the remaining Controller sensor on chamber pressure.
Operating under errorenous sensor data the Controller causes certain SSME components to exceed their
designed tolerances (all sensor measurements reflect large changes from nominal conditions).
Sample
Indicative
Parameters CRT Example of the Indicative Parameter's Anoe_ly Change from Steady Stste
HPFP Disch Ps -
MCC PC
(For
Control
Failure)
U-.Ca_ 381G gGIBZH4 P41:_-PI63
i
f'l
PIP" "°
K,B=
2.8
2.5
3,
/
°"
*NOMINAL
TEST 901-280
TEST 901-284
I
I
I
[
I\I
h/
J
3.S . S.S S.S
TIME FROM SECS C/O TIME
AT 9.88 SEC
I 4._
ENGINE START,
t
APPROX.
ANOMALY
BEGIN TIME
*NOTE: TEST 901-280'S START AND THRUST PROFILE WAS IDENTICAL TO
TEST 901-284'S FROM START TO 9.88 SECONDS.
Table-IIA-2: Failurei,iMode Qualitative Characteristics
--Control Failure Type
r
:,_
SampLe
Indicative
Parameters CRT Exampteof the Indicative Parameter's AnomatyChangefrom Steady State
MCC PC
(For
Control
Failure)
Z:/u.
- .°°._._
2.8 3
2.5
, !
i i
I _'TEST 901-284I _.
A/__f "N.,_._._...._
TEST 901-280
/0i7 I 'E" T ST 901-280'S STARTANDTHRUSTPROFILE
TEST901-284'S FROMSTARTTO9.88 SECONDS.
I
I
I
TZHE FROH ENGINE START, SECS
3.5 4.5 E.5 S.S
APPROX. C/O TIME
ANOMALY AT 9.88 SEC
_ BEGIN TIME
HPFT DS Temp
(For
Control
Failure)
%.
2.8 3. e
2.5 3.5
TIPE FROH ENGINE START, SECS
Table-IIA-2:
(cont.)
%....... _._
A
,/_T _. *NOMT_AL
/ ' _ TEST 901-280I
I _ ,' TEST 901-284//
I I
*NOTE: TEST 901"280'S START AND THRUST PROFILE WAS [DENT[CAt TO--
TEST 901"284'S FROM START TO 9.88 SECONDS.
I I
I
!
4.5 5.5 8._: /
APPROX. C/O TIME J
ANOMALY AT 9.88 SEC
BEGIN TIME
Failure Mode Qualitative Characteristics
--Control Failure Type
Sampte
Indicative
Parameters
HPOT DS Temp
(For
Control
Failure)
CRT Exampte of the lndicat|ve Parmeter'_; Anemi¥ Chamje From Steady State
..I
,"-7",'---
t/ !
"x,,_
*NOTE: TEST 901"280'S
TEST 901"284'S
2.8
2.5 3.5
TI_ FROM ENGINE START, SECS
4.1
i 4.SAPPROX.
ANOMALY
BEGIN TIME
*NOMINAL
TEST 901-280
TEST 901-284
\
%.
STARTAND THRUST PROFILE WAS IDENTICAL TO
FROMSTART TO 9.88 SECONDS.
--.,,|
8 B
S.S 6.5
C/O TIME
AT 9.88 SEC
LPOP DS PR
(For
Control
Failure)
2.8 4
2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5
•i APPROX. C/O
:_'_ TIME FROM ENGINE START, SECS TIME
,'_ ANOMALY
:' BEGIN TIME AT 9.88
Table-IIA-2: Failure Mode Qualitative Characteristics
(cont.) --Control Failure Type
SEC
SampLe
Indicative
Parameters
OPOV ACT POS
(For
Control
Failure)
CRT Exsmpte of the Indicative Parameter'$ A__r_.._tyChange From Steady Star-
S.S
C/O TIME
AT 9.88 SEC
TII_ FROM ENGINE START, SECS
Table-IIA-2 :
(cont.)
Failure Mode Qualltative Characteristics
--Control Failure Type
FAILURE MOOE QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS:
Type of
Inciden_
Duct#
Manifold,
r Heat
xchange
Failure
Generic Description of Incident Type and Sample Indicative Parameters:
The duct, manifold, or heat exchanger anomalies observed in four previous SSME tests can be
characterized as being initiated from a leakage or restriction of fluid through either of the three
components. The extent and/or rate of damage to other components is dependent on their response to:
(1) the amount of fluid leaked or restricted and (2) the existence or absence of redundancy for
the failed duct, manifold, or heat exchanger.
A leakage of one of several nozzle cooling tubes in Test 901-485 caused Little damage to other
components; the test shutdown when the HPOT (High Pressure Oxidizer Turbine) temperature reached
its redline temperature. The temperature rose 3.95_ from its steady state condition before the cutoff
time in 8.06 seconds. Six days after the test the damage was repaired to the cooling tube and a
520 second program duration test was completed.
A rupture or blockage of a one-of-a-kind duct/manifold have caused major damage to other components
(for three of three tests where these types of failure have occurred). After the initial duct/manifold
failure the sequence below is generally followed:
1. One or more pumps are rapidly driven to extreme off-design conditions, e.g. an increase of
27.7% pump speed from the nominal and cavitation (within .14 and .55 seconds), and/or increased
vibrations in less than .1 seconds.
2. During the drive to pump off-design conditions, other related components are damaged.
3. Subsequent to the above, either the pump(s) and/or the engine system separate from the test
stand (for the cases of an initiating duct or manifold Leak).
Sample
Indicative
Parameters CRT Example of the Indicative Paremeter's Anomaly Change from Steady State
"_AU:3gegPID 395 -rID 163
MCC OX Inlet Ps -
MCC PC
(Duct, Manifold,
or Heat
Exchanger
Failure)
4000
3500
3008
2500
21800
1500
1800
500
C
-500
-1000
-1500
-2000
-2500
-3000
113.5
, , , , -
114.0 114.5 115.0
TIME FROM EMGIHE START, 5ECS
AA
APPROX. TIME
ANOMALY "
BEGIN TIME
Table IIA-3 : Failure Mode Qualitative Characteristics
--Duct, Manifold, or Heat Exchanger Failure
FPB PC -
HCC HG IN PR
(Duct, Manifold,
or Heat
Exchanger
Failure)
Duct, Nanifotd, or Heat Exchar_jer Faiture
Sampte
Indicative
Parameters CRT Exampt e of the Indicative Parameter,s Anomaty Char_je from Steady State
/
/
/
7
I
I
1
1
i
1825- , i
180.8100. 1188,2188. _ 0¢. 4 188.6 188.8 _81 i181188.5 188.7 100. "8181. "2181
I I
' i
I
63 PICC I:'C AUG
JilL.. LG3 1'¢¢ PC AUG
TIME FROM ENGINE START, SECS APPROX.
ANOMALY
BEGIN TIME
101 .S
I
c/o
TIK
MCC PC
(Duct, Manifold,
or Heat
Exchanger
Faiture)
i
i
I
I
I
I
4.8 4.2 4.4 4.G 4.8 5.8 S 5.4 5.6
1
APPROX.
ANOMALY
BEGIN TIME
Failure Mode Qualitative Characteristics
I
i
I
I
;.8 6.8
!:i
TIME WHEN _ TIME FROM ENGIME START, SECS
SCHEDULED :i+_
92X POWER "+
LEVEL #
IS REACHED
Table IIA-3:
(cont.) --Duct, Manifold, or Heat Exchanger Failure
c/o --
TIME
MCC CL DS T
(Duct. Manifold,
or Heat
Exchanger
Failure)
Duct, Manifold, or Heat Exchanger Failure
SampLe
Indicative
Parameters
5088-
4S08.
4008-
3S08.
3808.
2SOB-
2830-
I500-
IO00-
S00-
0-
T13.5
CRT Examp|e of the _ndicat|ve Parameter,s Anomaly Change from Steady State
I
I
I
, • i , , , , , , |
TIME FROM ENCIhE START, 5ECS APPROX. C/O
ANOMALY TIME
BEGIN TIME
HPFP SPEED
(Duct, ManifoLd,
or Heat
Exchanger
Failure)
34 t,
4.8
Table IIA-3:
(cont.)
/
/
/
Qualitative Characteristics
I
4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8 5.8 5.2 5.4 S.G 8
TIMEWHEH C/O
SCHEDULED TIME FROM ENGINE START, SECS APPROX. TIME
92_ POWER ANOMALY
LEVEL BEGIN TIME
IS REACHED
Failure Mode
Manifold, or Heat Exchanger Failure--Duct,
6.8
HPFT DS TEHP
(Duct, Nanifotd
or Heat
Exchat_3er
Failure)
HPOT DS TEMP
(Duct, Manifotd,
or Heat
Exchanger
Faiture)
Duct, Manifotd, or Heat Exchanger Failure
Sample
Indicative
Pmrameters CRT ExRi e of the I_icative Parm_er*_ Ar_ty Change from Steady StmtP
17t
141
I
1
4.8
I
15!
14_
!'
/
if//:
/
/
/
4.8
Table IIA-3:
(cont.)
m 663_ _$71
___ __. 664 hPt. i i)5 Ta
f
J
_o
dj _3 _
I
I
4.2 4.4
1
TIME WHEN
SCHEDULED
92_ POWER
LEVEL
IS REACHED
4.G 4.8 S.0
TIME FROM ENGINE START, 5ECS
/
/ 1
/
/
om_ I
I
I
1
,/I
f-
/
/
/
5.4 5.6 ;.8 6.0
!
C/O
TIME
APPROX.
ANOMALY
BEGIN TIME
I
e, 516_ DS 71
J ----_----. 517HF'O'r DS 1'
I j
/ _ _ "'I'-/ I
" I 1
t
1 l
• I
4.2 4.4 4.G 4.8 5.8 5.2 5.4 5.G ;.8
APPROX. C/O
ANONALY TXME
BEGIN TIME
TIME ;ROP1 ENGINE START, SEC5
Failure Mode Qualitatlve Characteristics
--Duct, Manifold, or Heat Exchanger Failure
4
/I-"
/,,
T
_4
U
14
9
U
D
6.0
LPOP DS PR
(Duct, Manifold,
or Heat
Exchanger
FaiLure)
D_:t, Manifotd, oP Heat Exchanger Fmiture
Sampte
Indicative
Parameters
27
25
288-
175-
1S8-
125-
180-
75"
58-
25"
0-
113.5
_RT _xmpte of the ;ndicative Parameter,s Anomaty Change from Steady State
!
!14.0 I 4.5 115.0
:/0
TIME _eO_ EHCINE START, 5EC5 TIME
APPROX.
ANOMALY
BEGIN TINE
Table IIA-3:
(cont.)
Failure Mode Qualitatlve Characteristics
--Duct, Manifold, or Heat Exchanger Failure
FAILURE MOOE QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS:
Type of
incident
Valve
Failure
Generic Description of incident Type and Sample indicative Paramater_:
The valve anomaties in two previous SSME tests can be characterized as being initiated from a
failure of the main propellant valves (the main fuel or oxidizer valves). In both cases the
failure resulted in:
1. The HPFT (High Pressure Fuel Turbine) discharge temperature rising to its redtine limit in tess
than .1 seconds.
2. Damage to other related engine components.
3, And a fire damaging further system components.
Sample
Indicative
Parameters CRT Example of the Indicative Parameter*s AnomaLy Chan_e from Steady StatP
MCC PC
(Valve
Failure)
83 RCC PC AVO
...._aL_ 169 _ PC AV6
°
_r
q
31 )_
I
mn
!1fi
IJrl
Iill
Ilil
251 . S 252.5 253.5 254.5
TIHE FROH ENGINE START, SEeS c/o
Time
Approx.
Anomaly
Begin Time
Table IIA-4: Failure Mode Qualitative Characteristics
--Valve Failure
SampLe
Indicative
Parameters CRTExompteof the Indicative Parameter'sAnomty Change from Steady State
_.mm
HPFT DS TEMP
(Valve
Failure)
lum.m
IN.N -
l_.W ---
1408.N--
1280.8e--_"
It.Ell
Ir A4SlTIIIIIH 11181 HE-I _ lUq8 DrSlD4 _ 14
J_,SJ .... *_)gTItlIH MEN! PlE-! HF'F13P_ DISO4 _ N''-"
17.N
I
oe.ll II
Approx. C/O
Anomaly
Begin Time Time
HPOT DS TEMP
(Valve
Failure)
Table IIA-4:
(Cont.)
TIME FROM ENGINE START, SEES
Failure Mode Qualitative Characteristics
--Valve Failure
Approx.
Anomaly
Begin Time
c/o
Time
FAILURE MODE QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS:
Type of
Incident
HPOTP
FaiLure
Generic Oescription of Incident Type and SampLe Indicative Paremeterq:
The HPOTP (High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump) anomalies in three previous SSME tests can be
characterized as being initiated fnom either a rubbing, interference, or structural failure of one
or more components of the HPOTP. The latter failure results in LOX (Liquid oxygen) ignition within
.02 to 25. seconds from cutoff (dependent on the failured component0s location).
Sample
Indicative
Parameters CRT ExampLe of the Indicative Paremeter,s AnomaLy Change from Steady Stat_
u_! a34 Hpo'r TUR_ _ 'ImP
HPOT DS T
(HPOTP
Failure)
1472.
1478.
1467.
1465.
1462.
1468.
1457.
1455.
1452..
1
1447
14,
144;
1440.1
168.00
i
Fuel Tank
Vent Begin
Time
188.04 218.88
02 202.88 238.18
I
I I
I !
244. 272.
14
/
286.18
Fuel Tank Approx.
Vent End Anomaly
Time Begin Time
m
u_
u_
.-4
q'4
q-4
u_
u_
m
c/o
Time
TIME FROM ENGINE 5TnRT, SECS
Table IIA-5:
Failure Mode Qualitative Characteristics
--HPOTP Failure
Sampte
Indicative
Parameters CRT_xampte of The Indicative Parameter's AnomaLy Chanqefrom Steady State
121
HPOT PRSL DR T
(HPOTP
Failure)
OP0V ACT POS
(HPOTP
Failure)
11
11
I "I Iv I
168.88
92 188.04 282.86 21G.08 238. lg 244. I;
I
I
!
i
I
M _.J
I
!
I
I
I
272.
14 18
Fuel Tank Fuel Tank Approx.
Vent Begin Vent End Anomaly
Time _ Time Begin Time
6e s
I
I
S
t
0
_._ I
1 i
67. S _. J
I
67. 0:. {
L.... '_
:
67. _" ;l
168.00
174.82
Table IIA-5:
(cont.)
I
I
_""d' _' _f'
1
I
188.84 216.08 244.12 272.16
282.88 238. I O 2C_. t 4
i
!
I ,n
I
'I
3,
I
c/o
Time
TIriE FROR EHGI_ _NTI'. _CS
Failure Mode Qualitative Characteristics
--HPOTP Failure
286.18 98_;2e
QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS:FAILURE MOOE
Type of
Incident
XPFTP
Failure
Generic Description of Incident Type and Sample indicative Parameters:
The HPFT.___.PP(High Pressure Fuel Turbopump) anomalies in eleven (11) previous SSME tests can be
characterized as being initiated by failure of one component of the HPFTP. Subsequent to this
failure one of the following occurs:
1. The engine system rebalances itself (to maintain the thrust level) in response to the initial
HPFTP failure. This new balance lasts between 1.1 to several hundreds of seconds until other
related HPFTP components fail. The engine system again responses by rebalancing itself. This
second new balance lasts from .26 seconds to hundreds of seconds until other engine components suffer
damage and redline cutoff is initiated. The tests which follow this sequence of events are: 901-340,
901-364, 901-436, 902-118, and 902-249.
2. The engine system rebalances itself (to maintain the thrust level) in response to either the
initial HPFTP failure or a combination of the initial failure and subsequent failures to other engine
components. The new balance does not cause redtine limits to be exceeded and lasts several hundreds
of seconds until scheduled cutoff. The teats which follow this sequence of events are: 901-362,
901-363, 901-346, 901-410, and 902-209.
3. The engine system rebalances itself (to maintain the thrust level) in response to a combination
of the initial HPFTP failure and subsequent failure of other engine components. The new balance
exceeds redline limits and cutoff is initiated. Test 902-095 follows this sequence of events.
Sample
Indicative
Parameters CRT Example of the Indicative Parameter's Anematy Change from Steady State
HPFP CL LNR PR-
MCC HG IN PR
(Coolant Liner
Delta-P)
(HPFTP Failure)
I
ENG 0107 _ -I"_'_
901-340 _ I, _e
ed,,VeJ_
I
I
I
I
I
I
!,.r
I
_<
!
z
I BE. SO 296.89
rURB1HE2nd STAGE
PLATFOI_I sEN. FAILS
3.89
SHEET
FAILURE
Ist SHEET
FAILURE
ClO
TIME
Table IIA-6: Failure Mode Qualitative Characterisitcs
--_PFT_ Failure
SampLe
Indicative
Parameters
O00
AT T=+598.5
SEAL STACK
LEAKAGE
HPFT Delta-P
(HPFTP Failure)
CRT Exampte of the Indicative Parameter's Anomty Change from Steady State
U
IE
t.!
2400I
3:1E_)'
a.
Z
ENGINE 0108 TEST 901-436
FPOV OPENING RAPID TURBINE BLADE DETERIORATION
SHEETMETALMOVING _ SHUTDOWN! HPFPINLET RUPTURES
LINER BUCKLiN( !
m m m _ _ VOLUTE
I I it BURN
' " I _ THROUGH
12N & RANDOM'_ t
VIB INCREASES
610.5 611
610.44 61064 610.94 611.1
SECONDS
I!
m
HPFPR_
MsTM
M.-o
_-- 34J00
• ,
_-Y-1
I I
mr611.46"_Itle .34F_o
Ill.3B
1870.
! 860 :
:q
lose! *"
,84,., ---
III,
182C
18"0
; 88C
17gC
; 78C .....
I 8
158
APPROX.
ANOMALY
BEGIN TIME
" _I_1qlW"",
.... '_[e' '
3S8 458
TIME FROM ENGINE START, SECS
c/O
Time at
595 sec.
Table IIA-6: Failure Mode Qualitative Characteristic--'------_
(cont.) --HPFTP Failure
Sample
Indicative
Parameter s
HPOT Delta-P
(HPFTP Failure)
HPFT DS Temp
(HPFTP Failure
CRT _x_npte of the Indicative Parameter's Anomaty Chan_e from Steady State
I" !'.1ll'-'k
284o
2008 ....
Igg8 I.
10_ !08 158 _4 _ 216.88 275.32 333.76
12g. 22 18 66 246.10 304. $4 362. g8
ITIME FROM EI_GINE START, SECS i
/
I On and Off II C/O
_.. Fuet Tank __ _ APPROX. TIME
Vent i ng -- ANOMALY I
I Interim BEGIN TIME
I i
!
! ,
" t j !
! !zaee I i
lgso :i t jk.t'lml f i '
I i -- _. _-,._,-,_
___,-__ a3a _l_rl'DS Till I
I _
!
. l ,J
' _°"i_" I I
1775 " I !
100.88 12g. 22 158.44 187.6_ 2 ! 6.88 246.10 275.32 304. $4 333.76 382. g8
I
E
nJ
t-
o
3g2.20
TIME FROM EHGINE START, SECS
Table IIA-6:
(cont)
Failure Mode Qualitative Characteristics
_-HPFTP Failure
SampLe
Indicative
Parameters
HPFP SPEED
(HPFTP Failure)
HPOT DS TEMP
(HPFTP Failure)
,CRTExampLe of the Indicative Parameter, s AnomaLy Charxje from Steady State
o
.
3
,, ',
, "i 1
" i I
• L
TIME FROM ENGINE START, SEC
I I IAPPROX.
On and Off _1 ANOMALYFuel. Tank BEGIN TIME
Venting / APPROX.
I Interim
ANOMALY
I I BEGIN TIME
I I
. t
I A nl
' rtmKVUt_r "'"
I .
_ 4
_'%1 ElL
t
I_,_
I _0r,
187, B612g. 22
ii
1
158.44
j i
I
I
i
216.88
,., _Lli_
.i...J_,l__lt_'_I_'l
I1' I i
333.78
J
362. g8 392 I" 20
i
c/o
TIME
!
I
141_ OS l"rgD ASmOTOS Tlm_|
!
Itrt _.r I I1'
_2
I
I
f
275.32
246. I e
-t
,_,,_i,,____""_
I
I
L__,,,
I_!1 i gl
333.76 392.28
304.54 3s2.g8
TIME FROM ENGINE START, SECS
SampLe
Indicative
Parameters CRT Example of the Indicative Parameter's Anomty Char_le from Steady State
gl.
98.
90.
FPOV ACT POS
(HPFTP Failure)
87. E,
85.
/
88 158.44 2 ;. 88 275.32
129. 22 187.66 248. !8
I 'ITIME FROM E_GIHE START, 5EC5
Fuel Tank
Vent ing APPROX.
! nter im ANOMALY
•BEGIN TIME
..
j_l i Ul!! UII UL i!1 III
384.54
333.76
362. g8
I
I
C/O
TIME
Table IIA-6:
(cont.)
Failure Mode Qualitative Characteristics
--HPFTP Failure
FAILURE INVESTIGATION SUHHARY FOR EACH TEST:
Type of Test
Incident Number
Injector 901-173
(HCC) (Engine
0002)
oRIGI"NAI] P_G._
OF POOR QU_,LI'I_
Incident and Damage
Description (Comments, if applicable)
Incident: During stable operation st 92% of rated
power level, LOX post 10, row-13 cracked through at
the tip radius between the primary and secondary
facepLates. Hotgas ft_ into the LOX post ignited
and burned out the post. LOX pouring into the face
coolant manifold .caused burn through of the primary
and secondary faceptates, dumping face coolant into
the hotgas manifold. Ejection of burned debris
caused severe nozzle tube rupture (46-tubes). Fuel
Loss to the preburners coupled with engine control
reactions to maintain RCC PC caused the HPFT
discharge tenTx_rature to exceed its redline,
producing a premature cutoff at 201.16 seconds from
start time. (Test com_cted on4 April 1978)
Damage: -Primary and secondary facepiates burned
through. Primary faceplate burned away
in a 2.Sinby 1.Sin area. 18-elements
uere burned away to within l/Sin above
the secondary faceptate. Numerous high
cycle fatigue cracks were found in LOX
post threads in the outer rows.
-HCC showed flame spray and erosion at one
acoustic cavity and upstream, adjacent to
the main injector at the burned out area.
-Nozzle damage included 46-tube ruptures,
primarily from impact damage, and numerous
impact dents. -
-A schematic of the primary faceptate
damage is iLLustrated below.
References: -Rocketdyne date room records.
-Rocketdyne internal letter, #IL-78-C0-3135,
Engine 0002 Rain Injector FaiLure Data
Review, 4 April 19T8.
TIHE LINE FOR INDICATIVE PARAHETERS
p-excursion-'-'1
Time of indicative (psi/sec, Excursion Duration
Chan_e Parameter or de_/sec) Interval lnterva_
200.5...OPB PC - - 90.9 .66 .66
HCC HG IN PR
200.68..Secondary -212.5 .48 .48
feceptate
detta-P
200.68..Hotgas + 93.8 .16 .48
injector
detta-P
200.68..HCC PC -250.0 .48 .48
200.68..Primary -282.3 .48 .48
feceptate
detta-P
200.79..FPB PC- +216.2 .37 .37
MCC HG IN PR
200.8...HPFP DS PR- -500.0 .36 .36
HCC PC
200.8...HPFT 0S T1A +388.9 .36 .36
200.8...HPFT DS T1 g +388.9 .36 .36
200.8...HPOT DS T1 +236.1 .36 .36
200.8...HPOT OS T2 +111.1 .36 .36
200.8...LPOP DS PR - 34.7 .36 .36
201.06..MCCOX IN PR- -350.0 .1 .1
MCC PC
..,HCC CLNT DS T (Sensor does not exist)
f
LOCATIONOFCRACKEDLOXPOSTSANDBURNOUTAREA
INJECTORSIN .(X_IENGINE0002
FP8
\
Table IIB-I: Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test 901-173)
FAILURE INVESTIGATION SUHHARY FOR EACH TEST:
Type of Test
incident Nu1_oer
Injector " 901-331
(MCC) (Engine
2108)
C-+_-+_' PXGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY.
Incident and Damage
Description (Comments, if appLicabLe}
Incident: During stable operation at IOOX of rated
power leveL, LOX post 79, rou-13 failed in the 316L
material at the inertial uetd (which joins a 3161.
post to an INC0718 interporpettant plate stub).
Test data analysis reveals that the LOX post failure
occurred first, and subsequently did major damage to
the injector. Once the injector was damaged, a toss
in C-star efficiency resulted and caused a reduction
in MCC PC. The engine control system responded by
increasing the OPOV (Oxidizer Preburner Oxidizer
VaLve) open position. The increased LOX ftowrate
necessary to maintain the 100_ rated power Level
caused the HPOT discharge temperature to exceed its
redtine (1760 deg-R). The test was thus cutoff
prematurely at 233.14 seconds from start time.
(Test conducted on 15 JuLy 1981).
Damage: -Primary and secondary faceptates burned
through. 169 LOX posts were either
eroded off above the secondary faceptate,
or eroded into or part of the inter-
propeLLant faceptate.
-HC__Cacoustic cavity suffered erosion
damage. The HCC Liner had 10 gouges from
1/8in to 3/4in tong and had minor stag on
15% of the convergent section.
-Nozzt_ damage included approximately 60-tubes
from shrapneL.
-HPO___!.Tsheet metal burned through and inlet
(struts burned white).
-A schematic of some of the above cited
damage is illustrated below.
References:
-Rocketdyne data room records.
-NASA Harshatt Investigation Board Report
#2108 Main Inj_tor FaiLure, Test Stand
A1, Part I, 15 JuLy 1981.
TIHE LINE FOR INDICATIVE PARAHETERS
_l--Excurs ion
-- T I ._Lnt_
---
/ Rate of
/ Change
Tim_ of indicative (psi/sec, Excursion Duration
Change Parameter or de_l/sec) Interval Interva____._!
232.19..Secondary -625.0 .12 .95
faceptate
detta-P
2_32.2...Primary -146.7 .15 .94
faceptate
detta-P
232.2...Hotgas +375.0 .12 .94
injector
detta-P
?.32.25..HPFP DS PR- -500.0 .I .89
MCC PC
?.32.25..0Pg PC - -1000.0 .1 .89
HCC HG IN PR
232.25..LPOP DS PR +170.0 .1 .89
?.32.28..MCC CLNT DS T + 89.3 .56 .86
?.32.29..FPB PC " -600.0 .1 .85
MCC HG IN PR
232.3...MCC OX IN PR- +200.0 .7 .84
MCC PC
232.3...HPFT DS T1A +566.7 .3 .84
?.32.3...HPFT DS T1B +583.3 .3 .84
232.32..MCC+PC -1000.0 .11 .82
232.39..HPOT DS T2 +706.7 .75 .75
?.32.40..HPOT DS T1 +743.2 .74 .74
Fuel Preburner (Ref)
Crack thru found
at inertial weld RI3,
Table IIB-2:
P79.
Failure InvestJ
(Test 901-331T
.on Summary for Each Test
FAILURE INVESTIGATION SUHMARY FOR EACH TEST:
OE tK)OR QUALITY
Type of
Incident
Injector
(MCC)
Test
Number"
750--148
(Engine
0110)
Incident and Damage
Description (Comments . if applicable)
l_ncident: During stable operation at 105% of rated
power level, LOX post 12, row-13 failed at the
inertial weld. Test data analysis reveals that the
LOX post failure occurred first, and subsequently
did major damage to the injector. The toss in
combustion efficiency (due to damage in the injector
area), combined with a sudden toss of fuel frommny
nozzle tube ruptures (due to injector debris) caused
the controtler to command the OPOV open to the limit
value in an attempt to maintain the required chamber
pressure. The OPOV opening with the fuel toss to
the oxidizer pneburner, caused the HPOTP turbine
discharge tenT)stature to exceed its redline value at
16 seconds from start time. (Test conducted on
2 September 1981).
Damage: -Primary a.nd secondarylfaceplates burned
through. 149 LOX posts burned through.
Erosion evident in the interpropeltant
plate, severe erosion in MCC injector.
-MCC erosion downstream of one acoustic
cavity, 1-three channel wide erosion
through the hotgas _all in the con-
vergent section, 50-dings or nicks, stag
deposits.
-Nozzle damage included approximately 150
tube ruptures.
TIME LINE FOR INDICATIVE PARAMETERS
p-Excursion_
-----Duretion Intervel._c/o Time
Rate of
Change
Time'of Indicative (psi/sac, Excursion Duration
Chan_e Parameter or deg/sec) Interval Interval
15.37..0Pg PC - -533.3 .15 .63
HCC HG IN PR
15.4...HPFP DS PR- -1500.0 .2 .6
HCC PC
15.4...FPB PC - -750.0 .1 .6
MCC HG IN PR
1$.4...LPOP DS PR +72.2 .18 .6
15.42..Notgas +562.5 .08 .58
injector
delta-P
15.45..Secondaw -666.7 .18 .55
injector
detta-P
15.45..Primary -589.3 .28 .55
injector
detta-P
15.48..MCC CLNT DS T +101.9 .52 .52
i5.5...MCC OX IN PR- -862.5 .08 .5
MCC PC
15.5...HPFT DS T1A +1000.0 .5 .5
15.52..MCC PC -425.0 .48 .48
15.54..NPOT DS T1 +978.0 .46 .46
15.54..HPOT OS T2 +1169.6 .46 .46
...HPFT DS TI g (Sensor malfunction)
References:
-Rocketd_e data room records.
-NASA Marsha[[ Investigation Board Report
SSME 0110 Main Injector Failure Test
Stand A-3, Part I, 2 september 1981.
Table IIB-3 : Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test 750-148)
FAILURE INVESTIGATION SUMMARY FOR EACH TEST:
_-i.,,-_._, T T'.k-i,"_
PE POOR QUALITY.
Type of
Incident
Injector
(MCC)
Test
Numbe__c
901-183
(Engine
0005)
Incident and Damage
Description (Comments, if applicable)
Incident: During stable operation at 92% of rated
power LeveL, LOX post 76, row-13 had a thread root
fatigue crack (due to high cycle fatigue). The
condition appears to have Limited itself; cutoff
was initiated by an erronenous HPFP rediat
acceterameter redtine at 51.1 seconds from start
time. (Test conducted on 5 June 1978).
Damage:
-Primary facepLate burned through. 15-LOX
posts eroded back to the secondary face-"
plate; secondary faceptate has not burned
through.
'MCC hotgas waLL received minor scalding.
-NozzLe had a failed saddle patch at
tube #246.
-A schematic of some of the above cited
damage is iLLustrated below.
Reference: -Rocketdyne data room records.
TIME LINE FOR INDICATIVE PARAMETER_
J..excursion--.I
- t"
0 at,on I r t--p/o Time
J RC_:r ;:
Time of Indicative (psi/sec, Excursion Duration
Chan_e Parameter or deg/sec) Interva ! Interval
24.0...Secondary
faceptate
detta-P
24.1...HPFP DS PR-
MCC PC
24.2...MCC OX IN PR-
MCC PC
24.21..MCC PC
24.3...Primary
injector
detta-P
24.5...HPFT DS T1A
24.5...HPFT DS T1B
24.5...NPOT DS T1
24.5...HPOT DS T2
24.6...Hotgas
injector
detta-P
24.6...MCC CLNT DS T
...FPB PC -
MCC HG IN PR
...OPB PC -
MCC HG IN PR
...LPOP D$ PR
-5.7 4.80 27.1
-33.3 .60 27.0
+3.9 2.20 26.9
-39.5 .19 26.89
-8.4 3.50 26.8
+260.0 .10 26.6
+146.7 .15 26.6
+24.0 .25 26.6
+12.0 .25 26.6
-10.3 .68 26.5
+1.5 3.20 26.5
(No change is strikingly
indicated)
(No change is strikingly
indicated)
(No change is strikingly
indicated)
LOCATIONOFCRACKEDLOXPOSTSANDBURNOUTAREA
INJECTORSIN20031ENGINE0005
I
FPB
\
_ OPO
Table IIB-4: Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test 901-183)
FAILURE INVESTIGATION SUMMARY FOR EACH TEST:
OF Poor QUALITY
Type of
Incident
Injector
(NCC)
Test
Number
902-198
(Engine
2004)
Incident and Damage
Description (Comments, if applicable)
Incident: During stable operation at 102_ of rated
power Level, LOX post 61, row-12 cracked through
between the primary end secondary faceptetes. Test
data analysis reveals that the LOX post failure
occurred first, end subsequently did major damage
to the injector. The toss of fuel through the
primary faceptate and from the ruptured nozzle tubes
resulted in a oxidizer rich condition in the
oxidizer preburner and Led to a HPOT discharge
temperature redtine cutoff at 8_5 seconds from start
time. (Test conducted on 23 July 1980).
D8_: -Primary faceplate burned through between
rows 5 and 13. Minor erosion of the
secondary faceplate; burn through of 56-
LOX posts; the interpropellent plate and
most of the basic injector reusable.
-MCC minor erosion in acoustic cavity and
to coolant channels.
-Nozzle damage included 38 tube damage
from injector shrapnel; holes found in
11 tubes and dents in 27 tubes.
TINE LINE FOR INDICATIVE PARAMETERS
i p- Excursi on---i-I
._._ Duration Interval-_=_c/o TimeRate of
Change
Time of Indicative (psi/sec, Excursion Duration
Chan_e Perameter or deq/sec) Interval Interva.__.._L
5.5...Secondary -200.0 .25 3.0
fecepiate
detta-P
5.5...Primary -266.0 .30 3.0
fecepLate
detta-P
5.5...HPFP 0S PR- -300.0 .20 3.0
MCC PC
5.5...OPB PC - +92.3 1.30 3.0
MCC HG IN PR
5.5...HCC PC -213.6 .22 3.0
5.5...HPOT OS T1 +1620.0 .25 3.0
5.5...HPOT DS T2 +1560.0 .25 3.0
5.6...HPFT DS T1A +3625.0 .40 2.9
5.6...HPFT DS T1B +2]7.5 .40 2.9
5.6...LPOP DS PR -66.8 .25 2.9
5.66..MCC CLNT DS T +23.5 2.34 2.84
5.7...Hotgas -44.1 1.45 2.8
injector
delta-P
5.75..FPB PC - +120.0 .5 2.75
MCC HG IN PR
...MCC OX IN PR- (Sensor does not exist)
MCC PC
-A schematic of some of the above cited
damage is illustrated below.
References:
-Rocketdyne data room records.
-NASA Marshall Investigation Board Report
SSME #2004 Hain Combustion Chamber
Failure Test Stand A-2, National Space
Technology Laboratory, 22 August 1980.
Fuel Preburner
Table
(Ref)
IIB-5 :
Failure Investigation Summary for Each
(Test 902-198)
Test
FAILURE INVESTIGATION SUMMARY FOR EACH TEST:
Type of Test
Incident Number
Injector 901-307
(FPB) (Engine
0009)
OR!C_qAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
Incident and Damage
Description (Comments, if applicable)
Incident: This test was one of several designed to
determine the minimum LOX level upstream of the LPOP
(i.e. minimum HPSH) with which the pump could
operate without overspeed. The test terminated as
designed with a redtine cutoff at the etevation-J
level of the LPOP inlet duct. During operation at
109"k rated power Level a High Cycle Fatigue (HCF)
through crack developed at the fuel preburner's
injector LOX post/element C-8. The fuel mixed with
the LOX through this crack, ignited and burned the
LOX post tip. Additional damage followed to the fuel
sleeve and faceptate. After cutoff initiation, the
GH2 backftowed and ignited the residual LOX within
the dome, causing the remaining damage. (Test
conducted on 28 January 1981)
Damage: -Fuel preburner injector had an eroded area
from n_r-1 baffle out past number 5,
and from row B thru row G. The average
depth of the erosion was .02 inches with
4-holes burned through the fuel sleeve.
There was severe face and post damage.
Only one LOX post/elmnt had crack damage.
Slag buildup was found on the inside
diamater of the LOX posts (40 of 250 posts).
-HPFT inlet burned completely through at the
I o'clock position; mask Ist stage_turbine
blades had heavy spoiling and appeared to
have cracks at the root; turbine seals had
moderate erosion.
-The schematic below illustrates one area
of damage descril:¢,<labove.
TIME LIN E FOR INDICATIV E PARAMETERS
_ Excursion --_
./_ Duration Interval-P_c/o Time
Rate of
Change
(psi/sec,
Tima of Indicative pos/sec, Excursion Duration
Change Parameter or de_l/sec) Interval Interval
31.03..HPFT OS TI B -1.10 44.0 44.0
38.03..OPOV ACT POS -.20 9.0 37.0
_.03..LPOP DS PR -.71 31.0 31,0
47.03..MCC OX IN PR- -.89 28.0 28.0
MCC PC
47.03..HPOT DS T2 -1.75 28.0 28.0
49.03..HPOT DS T1 -1.80 26.0 26.0
54.73..HPFP CL L PR- -60.00 .5 20.3
MCC HG IN PR
61.03..HPFT DS T1A -17.40 3.5 14.0
References: -Rocketdyne data rooF, records.
-Rocketdyne's Fuel Turbomachinery Post Test Report, Engine 0009, 29 January 1981.
-Unsatisfactory Condition Report (UCR), FPB Injector Assy, 29 January 1981.
-Rocketdyne report R5S-8595-24, SSME Accident/Incident Report, Engine 0009/0204,
22 December 1981, NAS8-27980.
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Table IIB-6:
S_G DEPOSI1
Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
!Test901-307 )
FAILURE INVESTIGATION SUHHARY FOR EACH TEST:
OF POOR QUAL1T_
Type of
Incident
ilnjector
(FPB)
Test
Number
SFIO-01
(Engine
0006)
Incident and Damage
Description (Co,rents, if applicable)
Incident: During 102% rated power Level operation
this test terminated when fire detectors and
hazardous gas detectors triggered in the aft fuse-
lage. Based on a review of the movie films, the
digital data, pre-test and post-test hardware
inspections, and on previous experience the most
probable cause of the failure was an erosion of the
fuel preburner injector element H-13 during the
start transient followed by slag deposits in the
fuel annulus in the sector adjacent to the liner
watt. The resultant higher mixture ratio in the
outer zone in con_ination with the large (.042 to
.045 inches) liner end cap gap for this preburner
(allowing hot con_ustion gas to flow behind the
liner diluting the coolant gas), then caused the
burnthrough of the liner and subsequently the
preburner body. Whether or not contamination played
a role in the initiation of the erosion has to be
conjectured. However, the deflection of the face-
plate created a fuel annulus gap which was smaller
than the fuel eten_nt orifices (.018in) designed to
protect the annulus from contamination.
TIME LINE FOR INDICATIVE PARAHETERS,
I'tExcursi°n _
m Interval I
--T-- ! - _
Ch_ng_
_ Duration Intenva_c/o Time
Time'iof Indicative
Rate of
Change
(psi/sec
pos/sec, Excursion
Chanqe Parameter or deg/sec) Interval
101.4...HPOT DS T1 +25.00 3.20
101.4...HPOT DS T2 +26.60 3.20
101.4...OPOV ACT POS +.88 2.50
101.45..HPFT DS T1A +324.00 .25
i01.45..HPFT DS T1 g +413.00 .15
...HPFP CL L PR -
HCC HG IN PR (Sensor does not exist)
...HCC OX IN PR -
MCC PC (Sensor does not exist)
...LPOP DS PR (Sensor does not exist)
Duration
Interval
5.20
5.20
5.20
5.15
5.15
Da_ge: -Fuel preburner had an eroded hole through
the liner and outer watt approximately 1.5"
x .5", located 2" below the fuel manifold;
outboard side of one injector element (13)
ereded--some melting of tip, eroded faceptate
area around #12, 13, & 14 elements.
-HPFT blades had moderate to heaw/ spalling
Zr costing.
-A schematic of some of the damage cited above
is illustrated below.
References:
-Rocketdyne data room records.
-NASA Marshall Investigation Board Report, SSHE Engine 0006, HPTA Test Stand,
12 July 1980, Part If.
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Table IIB-7: Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(SFI0-0I)
I III
F._AAILUREINVESTIGATION SUNMARY FOR EACH TEST:
Type of Test
Incident Number
Control 901-284
Failure (Engine
(Erroneous! 0010)
Sensor,
Lee Jet) !
TINE LINE FOR INDICATIV E PARAMETERS
i _-.-Excursi on
T-i
._ Duration InCer'val-g_,,c/o Time
/ Rate of
Change
Incident and Damage Time of
Description (Comnents, if applicable) Chan_e
Incident: Near the close of a nominal start the 3.85.
following major events occurred:
1. Channel B of the Controller cut itself off 3.85.
at 3.25 seconds (under launch conditions this would
have resulted in engine shutdown due to '*Major 3.85.
Component FaiL"). The Channel B shutdown was caused 3.87.
by a failure of electronic components in the facility 4.00.
power supply. 4.12.
2. At approximately 3.9 seconds the Lee Jet orifice
(psi/sec,
Indicative pos/sec, Excursion Duration
Parameter or deq/sec) Interval Interval
..HPFP DS PR- -2961.5 .65 6.03
NCC PC
delta-P
..NCC PC +18000.0 .05 6.03
..OPOV ACT POS -71.4 .28 6.03
..HPFT DS T1A -394.65 35 6.01
..HPOT DS TI "495.0 2.0 5.88
..LPOP DS PR +500.0 .2 5.76
(used to purge the Channel A PC transducer passage) became dislodged and caused the PC transducer to sense
the HCC coolant flow pressure instead of chamber pressure (see the schematic below). This erroneous
reading (3800 psi) caused the Controller to close the OPOV to reduce PC to the desired 3012 psi level. A
few milliseconds tater, the Controller calculated a mixture ratio of 9.0 and commanded the FPOV full open
in an attempt to reduce the mixture ratio to 6.0.
a. The immediate result of the Controller's act{ors (based on an erroneous PC) was operation in an
abnormal mode, characterized by high fuel flow and low turbine inlet temperatures of the
oxidizer and fuel preburnen. In fact, the oxidizer preburner turbine inlet temperature fell
quickly to about 440 deg-R which assured freezing of the water which makes up about IOX of the
total flowrate of 40 lbs/sec.
b. The ultimate result of the Controtter*s actions was a fire in the HPOTP at about 9.7 seconds
due to rubbing in the area of the LOX primary seal stinger. The rubbing was caused by a high
axial toad which displaced the rotor assembly toward the pump end of the HPOTP housing. This
high axial toad was caused by ice formation in the cavity betk_en the housing and the second
stage turbine wheel which resulted in reduction in the cavity pressure from about 2500 psi to
near ambient. This reduced pressure on one side of the turbine wheel caused an estimated increase
in rotor axial force of about 31000 Ibs which far exceeded the control capability of the
balance pistons to control the position of the rotor.
3. At 9.88 seconds the test was terminated when the high pressure oxidizer preburner pump
radial eccelerometer exceeded the lOg redline. (Test conducted on 30 July 1980)..
Damage: Post test inspection of the facility and the engine revealed extensive fire damage to the
high pressure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP), the engine Controller, and harnesses and ducting
in the vicinity of the HPOTP. The major facility damage was limited to instrumentation,
electrical cables, and photo equipment.
References: -Rocketdyne Incident Report (RSS-8595-22), Engine 0010 Test 901-284, dated 15 January 1981.
-NASA Failure Investigation Team Report SSNE 0010, Test 901-28_, Part I & ]I, 30 July 1980.
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Table IIB-8: Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test 901-284)
FAILURE INVESTIGATION SUMMARY FOR EACH TEST:
Type of Test
ncident Humber
Duct, 750-259
Manifold, (Engine
or Heat 2508)
Exchange
Failure
(HCC Outlet
Manifold
Neck FaiLure)
Incident and Damage
Description (Comn_nts, if applicable)
Incident: During stable operation at 109_ of rated
power level a small fuel leak developed in the HCC
outlet neck as determined by film review. The leak
caused less than .25X change in nominal values for
e.g. the LPFP speed, discharge pressure and OPOV
position. The fuel leak remained essentially
constant until approximately 200 milliseconds prior
to cutoff at which time a major fuel leak occurred
at apparently the same location based on both data
and film review. In response to the rupture, the
LPFP rapidly decayed in speed. This speed drop
TIME L|NE FOR INDICATIVE PARAMETER,S
I_ Excursi
Change
. ._
/_4-- Duration Intervat_.c/o Time
Rate of
.. . Change
Time of Indicative (psi/sac, Excursion Duration
Change Parameter or deq/sec) !ntervat interval
101.28..FPB PC - +888.9
HCC HG IN PR
101.31..HCC PC -673.7
101.31..HCC CL DS T -15714.
101.31..HPFT DS T1A -6714.3
I01.]I..HPOT DS TI -3_.9
101.31..LPOP DS PR -1000.0
101.34..HCC OX IN PR" -3625.0
HCC PC
101.34..0PB PC" +3833.3
HCC HG %N PR
101.36,.HPFP SPEED +¢_#t20.0
101.38..HPFT DS T1B +2000.0
101.40..HPOT DS T2 +600.0
reduced the pump's discharge pressure and the high
pressure fuel pump (HPFP) went into deep cavitation. 101.34..HCC HG IN PR- -4281.3
As a consequence, the HPFP speed (PID-261) exceeded its HCC PC
nominal speed by approximately 10000 rpm. The off-
nominal condition led the pump to exceed its
vibration redline and ted to a cutoff command.
Fol|owing cutoff, the fuel caviation condition
resulted in: reduced engine fuel flow, a severe
oxygen-rich condition, burnout of the turbines,
burn-through of the hotgas manifold, severe
erosion of the gindoal bearing, and eventual
separation of the engine below the tow pressure pumps.
(Test conducted on Z7 March 1985, c/o time- 101.5 sac.)
DamaQe: The engine sustained extensive internal and
external damage as a result of the failure
and subsequent impact with the flame
deflector and spillway.
References: -Rocketdyne data room records.
-Rocketdyne SSME Accident/%ncident Report,
SSFL Test 750-259, Engine 7..308, HCC
Outlet Manifold Neck Failure, 25 July 1985.
.09 .22
.19 .19
.07 .19
.07 .19
.09 .19
.19 .19
.16 .16
.16 .16
.03 .16
.14 .14
.12 .12
.10 .10
Table IIB-9: Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test 750-259)
FAILURE INV_$TIGATION SUNDRY FOR EACH TEST:
Type of Test
Humber
Duct,
Manifold,
or Heat
Exchanger
Fai lure
(Nozzle
Tube
Rupture)
901-485
(Engine
2105)
incident and Damage
Description {Comments, if applicable)
Incident: During stable operation at 10_ of rated
power level nozzle tube number 99 was ruptured on
the hot-watt side. The rupture caused the high
pressure oxidizer turbine HPOT to exceed its redtine
value. This led to a cutoff at 28.56 seconds from
start. The test was conducted on 24 July 1985;
six days tater the damage was repaired (MRD #290206)
and a 520 second program duration test was completed.
Damage: The rupture was l/4 in. long x t/8 in.
wide, located 14.5 in. aft of G15. A Class ll
and Class ] nozzte cold-watt side leakage were
noted (and also repaired).
References:
-Rocketdyne Test 901-486 Pretest
Readiness Review, Engine 2105, 26 July
1985, Briefing Charts, 5 August 1985.
-Material Review Disposition (MRD)
NO. 290206, Nozzle Assembly,
6pp.
TIME LINE FOR INDICATIVE PARAMETERS
p-Sxcursion-"_l
-- T" _ Interval
---/
/_Duration Interval_l-c/o Time
Rate of
_" .. . Change
Time of indicative (psi/sec, Excursion Duration
Chanqe Parameter or de_/sec) Interval Interval
20.5...HPOT 0S T1
20.56..HPOT 0S T2
...FPB PC -
MCC HG IN PR
...MCC PC
...MCC CL DS T
...HPFT DS T1A
...HPFT DS T1 g
...LPOP DS PR
...HCC HG IN PR-
MCC PC
...MCC OX IN PR-
MCC PC
...OPB PC -
NCC HG IN PR
+7.0 8.06 8.06
+6.25 8.00 8.00
(No change is strikingly
indicated)
(No change Is strikingly
indicated)
(No change is strikingly
indicated)
(No change is strikingly
indicated)
(No change is strikingly
indicated)
(No change is strikingly
indicated)
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly
indicated)
(No change is strikingty
indicated)
(No change is strikingly
indicated)
...HPFP Speed
Table IIB-10: Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
.(Test 901-485)
FA]_RE INVESTIGATION SUMMARY FOR. EACH TEST:
.ORIGINAL PAGE IS
_0]_ I_)OR QUALITY
Type of Test
Z_ident Numbe_____r
Duct, 750-175
Nenifotd, (Engine
or Heat 2208)
Exchange
Failure
(Catestropic
Structural:
High Cyc(e
Fatigue in
High Pressure
Oxidizer
Duct)
Incident and Damage
Description (Comments, if applicable)
Incident: During stable operation at 111_ of rmted
power level a specially developed high pressure
oxidizer duct failed. The system location of the
duct is shown below. The special development
consisted of ten ultrasonic flow transducer blocks
mounted on the duct exterior. The failure initiated
by a 2.5 inch tong High-Cycle Fatigue (HCF) crack
adjacent to ultrasonic flo_meter block No. 9-10.
The HCF crack was caused by a combination of
thinning the duct wall to install the transducer
blocks, physically adding the block messes to the
duct, and the increased local stresses brought
about by brazing the blocks to the duct wall.
The ruptured duct e.g. resulted in a drop in
system presc, uc¢&_¢t increase in vibrations in
less than 100 msec. (Test conducted on 27 August
1982, c/o time- 115.6 soc due to a preburner
oxidizer pump aceeterometer redtine).
Damage: The preburner oxidizer pump separated
from the engine, and the oxidizer preburner section
of the hot-gas manifold and the oxidizer system
were damaged extensively. The first-stage turbine
disk failured. Both the engine and the facility
test stand (A-3) sustained damage.
References:
-Rocketdyne data room Pecords. -
-Rocketdyne SSHE Accident Incident Report,
SSFL Test 750-175, 27 August 1982,
Engine 2208, High Pressure Oxidizer
Duct Failure, 15 December 198:3.
TIME LINE FOR INDICkT|VE PARAMETERS
Duration
Rate of
Change
Time'_f Indicative (psi/sec,
Change Parameter or deg/sec)
I
.c/o Time
Excursion Duration
Interval Interval
115.53..NCCOX IM PR- -45000. .07 .07
NCC PC
115.54..HPFP SPEED -66667. .03 .06
115.55..NCC CL DS T -2300. .05 .05
115.55..HPFT DS T1 A -47000. .05 .05
115.55..HPFT DS T1 B -11800. .05 .05
115.55..LPOP DS PR -2800. .05 .05
115.57..HPOT DS T1 -16667. .03 .03
115.57..HPOT DS T2 -16667. .03 .03
.._7,C HG IN PR"
NCC PC
..FPB PC -
RCC HG IN PR
..OPB PC "
NCC H6 IN PR
..NCC PC
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly
indicated)
DISC
PUMP
• PREIIURNER PUMP
HIGH PRESSUIE OXIOIZJER DUCT
Table IIB-II: Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test 750-175)
I FAILURE INVESTIGATION SUMMARY FOR EACH TEST:
Type of Test
Incident Number
Duct.
Nemifotd,
or Heat
Exchange
Failure
(Solidified
Nitrogen
Blockage of
Fuel Pump
Inlet)
902-112
(Engine
0101 )
Incident and Damage
Description (Comments, if applicable)
Incident: During stable operation at 92_ of rated
power Level cutoff was initiated by the High
Pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP) speed when the
values exceeded the maximum redline setting (at
5.75 seconds from start time). The incident was
caused when the facility fuel inlet Frantz-screen
was partially blocked by solidified nitrogen.
Nitrogen was inadvertently introduced into the
tank during chill. Cavitation of both the high
and low pressure fuel pump occurred when the
LPFP (low pressure fuel pump) inlet pressure
dropped below zero psig. (Test conducted on
10 June 1978).
Damage: As a consequence of the excessive pump
speed and cavitation both the LPFP and high pressure
fuel pump (HPFP) were damaged; the LPFP would not
rotate; the HPFP shaft was stuck in the upward
position, and the turbine tip seal separated.
Damage also occurred in the HPOP (High Pressure
Oxidizer Pump), it would not rotate. Seven (7)
main injector baffle elements were eroded.
References: -Rocketdyne data room records.
-Rocketdyne SSHE Accident/Incident Report,
Test 902-112 Fuel Inlet BLocked by
Nitrogen, RSS-8595-14, June 1978.
TINE LINE FOR INDICATIVE PARANETERS
I._.Excursion_
---Ourat|on Intervat-_clo Time
Rate of
Tlmeof_indicativ e (C_:::, Excursion Duration
Chan_e Parameter or de_/sec) interval Interval
5.20..NCC PC -163.6 .55 .55
5.20..HPFT DS T1A +690.9 .55 .55
5.25..FPB PC -
HCC HG IN PR +200.0 .50 .50
5.28..HPOT DS T1 +234.0 .47 .47
5.28..HPOT DS T2 +382.9 .47 .47
5.30..HPFP SPEED +8000.0 .45 .45
5.58..HPFT DS TI B +1882.4 .17 .17
5.58..LPOP DS PR
..NCC HG IN PR-
MCC PC
..NCC OX IN PR-
HCC PC
..OPB PC -
HCC HG IN PR
..NCC CL DS T
-97.1 .17 .17
(No change is strikingly
indicated)
(No change is strikingly
indicated)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Senson does not exist)
Table IIB-12:
Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test 902-112)
FA,[LURE INVESTIGATION SUMMARY FOR EACH TEST:
OF POOR QIJA[ATY
Type of Test
ncident Number
Valve
Fsi Lure
(Main
Fuel
Valve:
St ructura [,
Fuel
Leak)
SF6-01
(Engine
2002,
HE-l)
Incident and Damage
Description (Comments, if applicable)
Incident: During stable operation at 100_ of rated
pouer Level the Main Fuel Valve (HFV) on Main
Engine-1 (HE-l), engine 2002 developed a cracked
housing (see the photo below) allowing hydrogen to
Leak into the boattai[ area. The toss of hydrogen
caused the high pressure fuel turbine discharge
temperature to rise above its redtine and a shutdown
was initiated. The failure occurred due to fatigue,
initiating at small surface defects caused by either"
salt stress corrosion, surface oxidation, or
hydrogen embrittLement. (Test conducted on
2 July 1979, c/o time- 18.58 seconds).
Damage: -Gasification of Liquid hydrogen in the
boattai[ area caused an over pressure
condition which blew off heat shields from
the test article and resulted in major
structural damage to the aft section of
the HPTA (Hain Propulsion Test Article).
Fire external to the boattait ensued
causing minor damage to external equip-
ment, primarily instrumentation wiring.
There was no fire damage inside the boat-
tail area.
References: -Rocketdyne SSHE Accident/Incident Report,
MPTA Static Firing Test SF6-01, _FV
Failure, 7 January 1981.
-NASA'Marshall Investigation Board Report,
S_E S/N 2002, MPTA Test Stand, NSTL,
2 July 1979.
Time of Indicative
Change Parameter
18.46...NCC PC
TIME LINE FOR |NDICATIVE PARAMETERS
I r- Excursion
-- _ _ 'atervat
 --Durstion,ntervaL ,oTima
Rate of
Change(psi/sec,
rpm/sec, Excursion Ouratior
or de.q/sec) Interval Interval
-3750 .04 .12
18.50...HPFT DS T1A +4875 .08 .08
18.50...HPFT DS T1B +4500 .08 .08
18.50...HPOT DS T1 +4000 .08 .08
18.50...HPOT DS T2 +4000 .08 .08
...HPFP SPEED
...Primary
faceptate
detta-P
(Sensor not sufficiently
settled to steady state)
(Sensor does not exist)
...MCC OX IN PR- (Sensor does not exist)
MCC PC
1SH65-7/5/79-C].k
Cracked Main Fuel Valve Housing With Actuator
Table IIB-13: Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test SF6-OI)
FAILURE |NVEST|GATION SUMHARY F,OR EACH TEST:
ORIGINAl] PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
Valve
Failure
(Nain
Oxidizer
Valve:
Heat
Addition to
Liquid
Oxygen
(LOX))
901-225
(Engine
2001)
incident and Damage
Description (Con_ents, if applicable)
Incident: During stable operation at 100_ of rated
powen level the Voting Logic Cutoff Device initiated
a shutdown when the Nigh Pressure Fuel Turbine
(HPFT) discharge temperature redtine was exceeded.
Failure analysis indicates the incident was caused
by fretting at the main oxidizer valve (NOV) inlet
sleeve-to-bellows flanged joint _d_ich resulted in
the initiation of a fire within the MOV. Flow
oscillations at four times the high pressure
oxidizer turl_ speed caused sufficient
excitation of the HOV sleeve to overcome the
retention screw preloed and attoued fretting between
the bello,s mating surfaces and shims (see the
schmtic 1:el_). The heat generated by fretting
produced ignition of the LOX environment.
Netal c=stion of the MOV caused an over pres_rd
at the valve which increased the initial LOX ft_
to the main injector and raised the back pressure
to the high pressure oxidizer+tur_ (HPOTP).
The back pressure increase _rated the HPOTP
turbine l:_),erand resulted in an increase of l_
to the fuel prel_Jrner causing the HPFT discharge
temperature to exceed its redline. (Test conducted
27 December 1978, c/o time- 255.63 seconds.]
TINS LINE FOR INDICATIV_ PARANETERS
! t Excurs i onInterval . ---t-U- -
Rate of
_" Change
(psi/sac,
Time of Indicative rpm/sec, Excursion Duratic_
Chancje Parameter or de_/sec)
255.49..HCC PC +9000
255.53..HPFT DS TI A +2750
255.53..HPFT DS TI B +2750
255.53..Primry -1000
faceptate
delta-P
255.53..HCC OX IN PR- +7000
RCC PC
255.55..HPOT DS T1 +2000
255.55..NPOT OS T2 +2000
255.58..HPFP SPEED +30000
Interval Interval
.02 .14
.10 .10
.I0 .I0
.04 .I0
.04 .10
.08 .08
.08 .08
.05 .05
Damage: The heat and overpressure generated I_ the
fire caused failure of the high pressure
oxidizer duct (see Table liB-11 for a
schematic), the to, pressure oxidizer turbo-
pump, main injector oxidizer inlet, and
othen extensive engine and electrical
facility damage.
References: -Rocketdyne SSME Accident/Incident Report,
SSME Test 901-225, NOV Fire, RSS-859S-
18, I August 1979.
-NASA Marshall Investigation Board Report,
SSRE S/M 2001 Oxygen System Fire, Test Stand
A-l, NSTL, 27 December 27, 1978, Part 1.
Identl fl ¢e¢ Ion NO. N_wn¢liture
1
2
3
5
6
7
8
9
I0
II
12
i)
15
Inlet Sleeve to kllow$
Inlet Sleeve Scrw
Inlet Sleeve to Bellw$ Shim
CAM Follower to lklllov_ Interface
CAM Follower to Housing Interface
Follower Guide
Bellows Guide
Oc_mstrlam $$eeve Screws
Oc_nstream Sleeve Shim
Sleeve to Rousing Interface
Inlet Sleeve
Bellows "Stop
Shift Axial Adjuscment Shim
Sell Plite
Sell Ptite Screw
Table IIB-14: Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test 901-225)
FAILURE INVESTIGATION S:UI,NARY FOR EACH TEST:
Type of Test
Incident Number
IPOTP 901-110
Failure (Engine
[Rotor/ 0003)
Sell
_rt:
_nt
Addition to
Liquid
_en
(LOX))
SIDE
ORIGINAL PAGE r3
OF POOR QUALITy
Incident and Damage
Description (Comments, if applicable}
TIRE L]NE FOR INDICATIVE PARAMETER__
J-*-exoursion----,._
. g__ ,o,...,1o,o,,.
Rate of
/ Change
Time of Indicative (pos/sec, Excursion Durationi
Change parameter or de_/sec) Interval Interval
Incident: During stable operation at 75_ of rated
power Level, the engine controller issued a cutoff
command when a fire occurred in the Nigh Pressure
Oxidizer Turbopump (HPOTP). The fire started in the
LOX primary seal drain cavity. The exact cause of
the fire could not be positively determined, however
nine sources were determined to have the potential
of causing the ignition. These are Listed below=
55.5...OPOV ACT POS +.21 1.4 18.5
56.2...HPOT PRSL DR T -370. 1.0 17.8
(PID #1186)
57.7...HPOT DS T1 +31.4 .7 16.3
57.7...HPOT DS T2 +28.6 .7 16.3
1. Loss of hydrodynamic Lift resulting in rubbing of the primary oxidizer seal against the mating ring,
creating enough heat to initiate burning.
2. Prima W oxidizer seal betto_s weld failure allowing oxygen Leakage.
3. Ignition at the interface of the bettous and its vibration damper as a result of friction.
4. Contamination in the primary oxidizer seat area.
5. Rubbing of the primary oxidizer seal due to changing phase (Liquid to gas).
6. Effects of hotgas Leakage past the intermediate seat into the primary oxidizer seat cavity.
7. Rubbing of the primary oxidizer seat against the mating rating due to mating ring vibration.
8. Leakage of hotgas containing hydrogen past the intermediate seat into the primary oxidizer
seat cavity creating a combustible mixture.
9. Other Leak paths allowing communication between the drain systems.
(Test conducted on 24 Harch 1977, cutoff time- 74 seconds).
Damage: Hajor damage occurred in the HPOTP, Low pressure oxidizer turbopunp discharge duct, engine
controller simulator and control harnesses, main combustion chamber fuel inlet manifold,
fuel system insulation, and the facility instrumentation systems.
References:
-Rocketdyne SSNE Accident/lnciden; Report, Test 901-110 High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump Fire,
(24 Hatch 1977), RSS-8595-11, dated30 June 1977.
-NASA NarshaLt Investigation Report SSME 0003 Oxygen Fire on Test Stand A-l, NSTL 24 Narch
1977, Part ! and I%, dated 17 Nay 1977.
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PACKAGE Table IIB-15 : Failure Investigation Summary
(Test 901-110)
for Each Testi
, |
FAILUR E INVESTIGATION SUMMARY FOR EACH TEST:
]iT e° 
Fai Lure
(Rotor/
Seal
Support)
Test
Numbe___r
901-136
(Engine
0004)
_GINAL PA-GF, 1_.
_)E POOR nTT ALtTY
Incident and Damage
Description (Comments, if applicable)
Incident: During stable operation at 90X of rated
power Level the engine controller initiated a shut-
down because of toss of engine etctricat control.
Simultaneously, a fire was observed in the area of
the High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump (HPOTP) due to
bearing failure. The failure resulted from three
root causes acting in combination: poor toad
TIME LINE FOR INDICATIVE PARAMETERS
•  - -Duratio Inte a c/oTi--
Rate of
Change
Time_f Indicative (pos/ses, Excursion Duration
Cha_e Parameter or de_/sec) Interval Interval
275.2...HPOT DS T1 +2.27 10.98 25.
273.2...HPOT DS T2 +2.73 10.98 25.
273.2...OPOV ACT POS +.08 25.00 25,
286.2...HPOT PRSL DR T +1.46 10.30 14.
sharing of pump-end and turbine-end bearings,
insufficient cooling of the turbine-end bearings, end Large unbalance of the rotor-excessive bearing Loads.
The most probable failure sequence is as follows:
1. The coolant ftou at the pump-end bearings caused pressure induced toads that were sufficient to
radially clamp and axially unload the No. 1 bearing (BRG) and increase the axial toad on the No. 2 bearing
(BRG) which was forced to carry 90Z or more of the rotor radial Loads. This, combined with the smart
tength/diameter ratio cartridge pilot, allowed considerable radial motion and nutation of the bearing
carrier, and resulted in the effective spring rate of the preburner bearing package to deteriorate. The
increased radial motion increased the effective rotor unbalance uhich resulted in increased radial Loads
on both the pump end" and turbine end bearings and increased overhung rotor deflections at the turbine seal.
2. The coolant flow at the turbine-end bearings was insufficient to prevent bearing degr.adation
with the increased radial toads and heat generation. Coolant flow induced axial Loads on the turbine end
bearings and cartridge, decreased the axial pretoad on the No. 4 bearing and increased the axial pretoad
on the No. 3 bearing, causing the No. 3 bearing to carry most of the rotor radial Loads.
3. As toads at the bearings _itt up, shaft deflections increased until there was
interference and a fire.
Internal rubbing apparently began during fuel tank venting (at t: +185 seconds). Approximately
24-seconds after venting was complete (i.e. at t= +275.2 seconds) analysis indicates the HPOTP
began to loose its performance, pump vibration increased, and LOX heating due to internal rubbing
increased. (Test conducted on 8 September 1977, c/o time- 300.2 seconds).
Da_ge: The HPOTP was extensively damaged, the following ducts were eroded: the preburner supply and
discharge duct, HPOTP drain tines, LPOTP turbine drive duct, fuel and oxidizer preburner supply
Line, head exchanger supply and discharge Lines. The oxidizer preburner LOX supply inlet
duct ruptured do_mstream of the OPOV (oxidizer preburner oxidizer valve). The controller
simulator, and facility instrmentetion received extensive fire damage.
References: -Rooketdyne SSNE Accident/Incident Report, Test 901-1_ High Pressure Oxidizer
Turbopump Fire, (8 September 1977), RSS-8595-13, 20 March 1978.
-NASA MarshaLL Board of Investigation Report, SSNE 0004 Oxygen Fire on Test
Stand A-l, NSTL, 8 September 1977, dated 14 November 1977.
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Table IIB-16:
,010 INATSPEED
Failure Investigation summary for Each Test
(Test 901-136)
FAILURE INVESTIGATION SUMMARY FOR EACH TEST:
C_
OF, POOR QUALITy
HPOTP
Fai Lure
(Heat
Addition
to COX)
Test
Number
902-120
(Engine
0101)
Incident and Damage
Description (Comments, if appLicabLe)
]ncident: During stable operation at 100[ of rated
power Level the test was prematurely shutdown
by a High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump (HPOTP) radial
acceLercwneter radtine, almost simultaneously the
engine was partially enveloped in an external fire.
The failure centered around a capacitance device
which was designed to determined HPOTP shaft, bearing,
and bearing cartridge movement. Analysis and damage
evidence indicates heat addition to LOX was due to
rubbing, interference, or structural failure of
the stationary capacitance device pick-off plates
and the rotating speed nut. (Test concluctadon
18 July 1976, c/o time- 41.81 seconds).
TIHE _INE FOR INDICATIVE PARAMETERS
_-Excursion--_
: Interval _ .
"-_ange_"_ J n
D lion ! tervat-p_c_o Time
Rate of
Change
Time of Indicative (pos/sec, Excursion Duration
Charge Parameter or de_/sec) Interva{ Interval
41.79...OPOVACT POS +100. .02 .02
..HPOT DS T1 (No change is strikingly
indicated)
..HPOT DS T2 (No change is strikingly
indicated)
..HPOT PRSL DR T (No change is strikingly
indicated)
Damage: As a result of the fire, major damage occurred
in the following areas:
1. HPOTP - severe erosion.
2. Low-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump (LPOTP)- housing broken.
3. LPOTP discharge duct broken.
6. Engine controller simulator and control harnesses- erosion.
5. Facility instrumentation systems- burned.
References:
-Rocketdyne SSHE Accident/Incident Report, Test 902-120 High Pressure Oxidizer
Turbopump Fire, (18 July 1978), RSS-8595-15, 12 February 1979.
-NASA Nsrshat[ Board of Investigation Report, SSHE 0101 Oxygen Fire on Test
Stand A-Z, NSTL, 18July 1978, dated 31 August 1978, Part % and II.
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Table IIB-17: Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test 902-120)
FAILURE INVESTIGATION SUNMARY FOR EACH TEST:
ORICrNAE P/fGE IS
OF POOR QUALITy
Type of Test
l___ident Numbe_
HPFTP 901-340
Fai lure (Engine
(Turn 0107)
Around
Duct
Cracked/
Torn)
incident and Damage
Description (Comments, if appticabte)
Incident: During stabte operation at 109"k of rated
power revel the fottouing series of events occurred
within the High Pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP):
(1) the 2nd rotor ptatform seal and the T/A (Turn
Around) duct inner watt fractures at t=+20.6 seconds
from start, (2) the nut erodes, the 2nd rotor exit
straightening vane breaks out and the T/A duct inner
walt fractures propagate at t= +277 seconds, (3) the"
washer todges on the nozzle vane and T/A duct sheet
metat deftocts at t= +280 seconds, (4) major
ruptures occur in the T/A duct at t= +290 seconds.
and (5) the T/A duct sheet metal ftap breaks toose
at t= +357 seconds. At t= +405.5 seconds the test
was shutdown due to a High Pressure Fuel Turbine
(HPFT) discharge temperature redline. (Test
conducted on 15 October 1981).
TII41_ LINI_ FOR INDICATIVE PARAHETERS
xcursionH
_'_Intervat I _-_
!\
• ChTge_ Duration lnterva_c/o Time
/I Rate of
Change
(pos/sec,
/ __ . rpm/sec, _ . .
Time of Indicative psi/sec, Excursion uuratlon
Charge Paraneter or deq/sec) Interval Interval
20.6 .... HPFP CL LNR PR +27.7 9.5 384.9
- NCC HG IN PR
20.6 .... HPFT DS T1A -1300. .1 384.9
20.6 .... HPFT DS T1B +16.7 3.6 384.9
279.0 .... FPOV ACT POS +.29 5.5 126.5
280.6 .... HPOT DS TI -6,1 12.I 124.9
282.5 .... HPOT DS T2 -6.8 9.5 123.0
290.0 .... HPFT DeLta-P +150. .7 115.5
290.0 .... HPOT Oeita-P +100. .7 115.5
290.0 .... HPFP SPEED -2525. .2 115.5
Osmage: HPFTP damages are summarized in the betou schematic. Damage to other engine components are as
follows: main injector- dent in post 76/77 flow shield, erosion of six face nuts, 21 hot gas
fitters broken, nozzle- damage to nozzle betty bend and jacket, and fuel preburner-
-movement in 59 LOX post pin etements.
References: -Rocketdyne data room_ecords.
C] Good
0 Inner Shroud "Neld
CrJcluKI
@ Bent & Inner Shroud
Weld Cracked
III Nlsstng
mtor_
Table IIB-18 : Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test 901-340)
FAILUR E INVEST|GATION SUMMARY FOR EACH TEST:
Type of Test
[r_ident Number
HPFTP 901-363
Failure (Engine
(Turn 2013)
Around
Duct
Cracke<I/
Torn)
TZME LINE FOR INDICATIVE PARANETERS
e-Excursion--.I
Interval[_
:.T.r - 7-'-1 ,\
4ion lnterva c/oT'_lme
Rate of
Change
(pos/sec,
rpm/sec,
incident and Damage Time of Indicative psi/sec,
Description (Comments, if applicable) Chancje Parameter or deq/sec)
_ncident: At the conclusion of this program 85.0 .... HPFP CL LNR PR +2.0
duration test (250 seconds) fourteen (14) cracks - MCC HG IN PR
were found in the HPFTP (Hight Pressure Fuel 85.0 .... HPFT DS T1A +1.25
Turbopump) turn around duct sheet metal. The
|ocation of the turn eround (T/A) duct is presented 135.5 .... HPOT Delte-P +17.1
in Table IIS-18_s schematic. (Test conducted on
30 March 1982; e week later Test 901-364 was 135.5 .... HPFP SPEED +110.0
conducted).
136.2 .... FPOV ACT POS -._
Da_ge: Engine dama;e was confined to the area
cited above. 136.4 .... HPFT DS T1S -4.92
Excursion Duration
_ntervat lntervat
15.0 165.0
20.0 165.0
1.4 114.5
1.0 114.5
1.1 113.8
7.1 113.6
Reference: Rocketctyne data room records. 136.7 .... HPOT OS T1 +11.4 .7 113.3
137.3 .... HPFT Delta-P -16.0 1.0 112.7
117.4 .... HPOT DS T2 +11.7 .9 112.6
Table IIB-19: Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test 901-363)
FAILURE INVESTIGAT|0N SI._HARY FOR EACH TEST:
ORIGINAl5 PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
Type of
Incident
HPFTP
Fai lure
(Turn
Around
Duct
Cracked/
Torn)
Test
Numbe_
902-118
(Engine
0101)
Incident and Damage
Description (Comments, if appticabte)
Incident: During stable operation at 92Z of rated
power level the following series of events occurred
within the High Pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP):
(1) the coolant liner buckles at approximately
t= +5.5 seconds from start and (2) the T/A (Turn
Around) duct sheet metal partially collapses at
t= +6.6 seconds. The location of the T/A duct may
be seen in Table IIB-18. At t= +6.84 seconds the
test was shutdown due to a High Pressure Fuel Turbine
(HPFT) discharge temperature redline. (Test conducted
on 21 July 1978).
Damage: HPFTP T/A duct damages inct_ five (5)
major bulges in beth the inner and outer dieter
sheet metal and an approximate 1.5 inch tear in the
inner diameter sheet metal. HCC damages included
twenty-six (26) heat shield retainers either missing
or partially failed.
References: -Rocketdyne data room records.
TIME LINE FOR INDICATIV_ PARAMETERS
_t.Excursien.._
/Interval j._
- Ou.,+on
Rate of
Change
(pos/sec,
rpm/sec w
Time of Indicative psi/sec, Excursion Duration
Channe Parameter or deg/sec) Interval Interva..__[
5.0 .... HPFT DS T1A +130.4 1.84 1.84
5.0 .... HPFT DS T1 g +108.7 1.84 1.84
5.5 .... HPFT Detta-P +108.3 1.20 1.34
5.5 .... HPOT Delta-P +58.3 1.20 1.34
5.5 .... HPOT OS T1 -22.4 1.34 1.34
5.5 .... HPOT DS T2 -22.4 1.34 1.34
5.5 .... HPFP CL LNR +54.5 1.10 1.34
PR - MCC HG IN PR
6.12...FPOVACTPOS +4.4 .50 .72
6.65...HPFP SPEED -2000.0 .15 .19
Table IIB-20 :
Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test 902-118)
FAILUR E INVESTIGATION SUMMARY FOR EACH TEST:
Type of Test
j__ .umbe____C
HPFTP 901-436
Failure (Engine
(Coolant 0108)
Liner
Buckle)
::.... ..'_,_L, PACE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
Incident and Damage
Description {Comments, if appLicabLe)
Incident: During stable operation at 109_ of rated
power level the following series of events occurred
within the High Pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP):
(1) pieces from the interstage seal pass through
the 2nd stage platform gap, decreasing the 2nd disc
cavity pressure and increasing the seal stack
Leakage into the coolant Liner st approximately
t= +598.5 seconds from start, (2) an interstsge
seat piece Lodges in the 2nd stage shank increasing
the 2rid platform seat gap and exciting 12 stiffener
vanes per revolution at t= +607 seconds,
(3) the coolant liner begins to buckle at t= +610.36
seconds, and (4) the T/A (turn around) sheet metal
begins movement, reducing the flow area at t= +610.44
seconds. The Location of some of the above
components are presented in Table IIS-18's schematic.
At t= +611.06 seconds the test was shutdown due to
a High Pressure Fuel Turbine (HPFT) discharge
temperature redline.
TIME LINE FOR INDICATIVE PARAHETERS
i _-excursion I_1
-- t- i"teFva---[_ _ _ _
/ Rate of
Change
(pos/sec,
rpm/sec,
Time of Indicative psi/sec, Excursion Duration
Change Parameter or de_/sec) Interval Interval
598.5 .... HPFP CL LNR PR +55.5 4.50 12.56
- MCC HG IN PR
610.44...HPFT Detta-P +467.7 .62 .62
610.44...HPOT Detta-P +161.3 .62 .02
610.55...NPFT DS T1A +686.3 .51 .51
610,55...HPFT DS T1 g +764.7 .51 .51
610.55...FPOV ACT POR +19.0 .51 .51
610.59...HPFP SPEED "4255.3 .47 ,47
610.90...HPOT DS TI +237.5 .16 .16
610._...HPOT DS T2 +200.0 .11 .11
(Test conducted on 14 February 1984).
Damage: The HPFTP was massively damaged. The engine was totally gutted due to a oxidizer rich shutdown;
the high pressure fuel pump inlet duct failed (due to over pressure caused by turbine
erosion and the HPFTP seizure). The engine was retired.
References: -Rocketdyne data room records. -
-Rocketdyne Internal Letter #525-107, SSME-84-0787, Engine 0108 Failure investigation-
Engine Systems ContriUution to Final Report, 5 June 1984.
Table IIB-21: Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test 901-436)
FAI_UR_ [NV_ST|GATIOM SlJ_ARY FOR [ACH TEST:
Type of Test
Incident Numb, C
HPFTP 901-364
Failure (Engine
(Hotgas 2013)
Intrusion
to Rotor
Cooling)
ORIGINAl; P._GE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
Incident and Damage
Description (Comments, if appticabte)
Incident: During stable operation at 109_ of rated
power Level the test shutdown prematurely due to
a LOX (Liquid Oxygen) preburner pump radial
acceleron_ten redline. The probable cause of the
failure was a new HPFTP (High Pressure Fuel Turbo-
pump) thermal shield retainer nut assembly used for
the first time on this test, see the schematic
below. The geometry of the nut allowed a direct
leak path through the heat shield for the high
temperature ASI gas which produced t_o jets
impinging directly on the turbine end cap (Kaiser
helmet) and reducing n_ateriat properties in the
impingement zone. The sequence of failure follows:
I. A breach in the Kaisen helmet occurs from a
c_ination of heat shield-vibration-i_ced loads,
pressure differential across the thickness of the
Kaiser helmet and material degradation and fatigue.
T_R_ _|N_ FOR ]NOICAT_VE PARANI_T[RS
l p, Excursion---_l =
_.,_,_Ouration Interval.e_/o Time
._ Rate of
Change
(pas/sec,rp01/sec,
Time of Indicative psi/sec, Excursion Duration
Charge Parameter or decj/sec) Interval Interval
205.95...HPFP CL LNR PR -.50 40.15 186.20
- NCC HG IN PR
205.95...HPOT Detta-P -.91 69.32 186.20
207.95...NPOT DS T1 -1.04 67.32 184.20
207.95...HPOT DS T2 -1.30 67.32 184.20
209.95...FPOVACT POS +.04 65.32 182.20
275.15...HPFT Delta-P +1.00 87.66 117.00
384.95...NPFT DS T1A +112.50 .40 7.20
384._J...NPFT DS T1B +145.00 .40 7.20
_.95...NPFP SPEED +375.00 .40 7.20
2. The hot gas interrupts coolant flow to and heats the turbine end bearings.
3. Heating produces an increase in bearing stiffness uhich causes increasing synchronous vibrations.
4. Synchronous vibration continues to build up until bearing failure occurs followed by Large rotor
displacement, severe blade rubbing and eventual blade breakage, turbine seizing, fuel flow stoppage,
rupture of the pump inlet volute, and finally a severe fire caused by the resulting LOX-rich shutdown.
(Test conducted on 7 April 1982, c/o time- 392.15 seconds)
Damaqe: During the failure most of the engine separated from the test stand and broke apart; the major
engine parts came to rest on the concrete spillway; the engine was retired. Damage to the
facility was tight to moderate.
References:
-Rocketdyne SSME Accident/Incident Report, RSS-8595-28, NSTL Test 901-364, 7 April 1982,
Engine 2013, Nigh Pressure Fuel Turbopump Kaiser Hetmat Failure, dated 14 JLEy 1982.
-NASA Marshall Investigation Board Report, Certification Engine Failure, 7 April 1982,
SSHE S/N 2013, Test Stand A-l, Test 901-364, NSTL, Part I & II, 1 July 1982.
47501_1A
1EOR Heat Shield
3700 PSIA
1800 R
Turbine End
Cap (Kaiser
Helmet)
I
HPFTP Turbine OperaCtnl CondicJons Coolant Clrcutt
Table IIB-22:
I J
Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test 901-364)
FAILURE INVESTIGATION SUMMARY FOR EACH TEST:
Type of Test
.umber
HPFTP 902-209
:aiture (Engine
(Hotgas 2008)
Intrusion
to Rotor
Cooting)
Incident and Damage
Description (Coew_nts, if appticabte)
Incident: At the conctusion of this program
duration test (823 seconds) the nut of the turbine
end dome and rock tab was found missing in the HPFT
(High Pressure Fuet Turbine) and minor inner
baffte tip erosion discovered in the fuel preburner
injector. (Test conducted on 16 November 1980).
Da_e: Engine damage was confined to the areas
cited ebove.
Reference: Rocketdyne data room.
TIME LINE FOR INDICATIVE PARAMETERS
_Excursion-----_
"1" --Intervat I
_a_e'J _ 7_ ][_
kDuration lntervat_c/o Time
Rate of
Change
_/ (pos/se¢,
/" rWse¢ ,
Time of Indicative psi/sec, Excursion Duration
Charge Parameter or de_/sec) _nterva[ lntervat
619.9 .... HPFP SPEED -.097 1.6 203.1
619.9 .... HPOT DS T1 +9.33 3.0 203.1
620.0 .... HPFT OS T1A +.78 25.0 203.0
620.0 .... HPOT OS T2 +7.32 3.0 203.0
621.0 .... FPOV ACT POS +.09 3.0 202.0
...HPFP CL LNR PR- (Sensor does not exist)
MCC HG IN PR
...HPFT DeLta-P (Sensor does not eixst)
...HPOT Oelta-P (Sensor does not exist)
...HPFT DS T1B (Sensor malfunction)
Table IIB-23 : Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test 902-209)
FAILURE INVESTIGATION SUHHARY FOR EACH TEST:
ORIGINAl7 KKGE IS
Type of Test
Nu.be____C
HPFTP 902-249
Failure (Engine
(Power 0204)
Transfer
Failure,
Turbine
Blades)
OF POOR QUALITY
Incident and Damage
Description (Comments, if applicable)
incident: During stable operation at I(FF_ of rated
power level the test shutdoun prematurely due to •
HPFTP accelerometer redline and associated massive
failure of the HPFT (High Pressure Fuel Turbine)
first stage turbine blade. The sequence of events
leading to the blade failure follows:
1. Initial turbine damage st t= +3.0 seconds.
The FPB (Fuel Preburnen) injector's nonuniform
flow condition experienced in at least two previous
tests may have persisted (despite rework) and
worsened.
2. Engine fuel inlet temperature increases and
the high pressure fuel pump begins to cavitate at
t= 108.0 seconds. The temperature increase was
brought about by propellant transfer. The increase
towers the fuel density causing an increase in HPFP
volumetric ftowrate, speed, and power necessary to
TIHE LINE FOR INDICATIVE PARAHETERS
_Excursion------_
__..Interval _
_-_ Duration Intervat4=_c/o Time
/" Rate of
Change
(pos/sec,
/ rl=_/sec,
Time of Indicative psi/sec,
Change Parameter or de_/sec)
320.O...HPFT OS T1A +2.22
320.O...HPFT OS T1B +1.00
320.O...HPFP SPEED +8.37
_9.6...FPOV ACT _ +.07
375.0...HPOT DS T1
375.0...HPOT OS T2
...HPFP CL LNR PR"
NCC HG IN PR
...HPFT Oelte-P
...HPOT Delta-P
Excursion Duration
Interval Interval
130.6 130.6
90.0 130.6
130.6 130.6
92.0 101.0
+1.75 40.0 75.58
+1.50 40.0 75.58
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
hold thrust constant. As the flow and speed
increase, the HPFP approaches the'conditions at _hich the sunction capability of the herduare is exceeded
and cavitation starts. Once cavitation is initiated the efficiency of the pump degrades, causing speed
to increase to maintain pump output to hold _hrust constant, causing ,orsening cavitation conditions
and causing an increase in HPFT inlet temperature.
3. Kel-F rub ring flexes and melts at t= +374 seconds. The released Kel-F particles plug nozzle
tubes causing them to rupture, contributing to the HPFT inlet temperature increase.
4. The first stage turbine blade failures at t= +450.52 seconds.
(Test conducted on 21 September 1981, c/o time- 450.58 seconds)
Damage:
Refereces:
Post firing inspection of the facility and engine revealed severe damage to the main coffLx_tion
chamber including the injector and side-watts, extensive burn through damage to the nozzle,
substantial damage to the HPFTP first and second stage turbines, and an approximately 12 inch
long section of the HPFP inlet volute missing. This "bLown out" portion of the inlet votive
caused a toss of fuel to the engine precipitating an oxygen rich engine shutdown condition. There
was no significant damage to the facility.
-Rocketclyne data room records.
.-NASA Harshalt investigation Board Report SSHE SIN 0204, Test Stand A-2 NSTL, Part I a_d II,
14 December 1981.
Table IIB-24: Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test 902-249)
FAILURE INVESTIGATION SUNNARY FOR EACH TEST:
Type of Test
Incident Number
HPFTP 902-095
Failure (Engine
(Power 0002)
Transfer
Failure,
Turbine
Blades)
Incident and Damage
Description (Comments, if applicable)
Inciden[: During stable operation at 95Z rated
power Level, the test was shutdown prematuretydue
to e preburner pump radial ecceterometer redt|ne.
(Test conducted on 17 November 1977, c/o time-
51.09 seconds)
Damage: Post-test hardware inspection revealed:
extensive turbine damage, eight (8) main injector
LOX posts eroded and 15- NCC face nuts eroded.
Reference: Rocketdyne data room records.
TINE LINE FOR INDICATIV E PARANETERS
|+Excursion
Change I
Duration Intervat_._
Rate of
Change
(pos/sec,
c/o Time
rpm/sec,
Time of Indicative
Chan_e Parameter
...HPFP SPEED
...HPOT 0S T1
...HPFT DS T1 A
...HPOT DS T2
...FPOV ACT POS
...HPFP CL LNR PR-
MCC HG IN PR
...HPFT Detta-P
...HPOT Detta-P
...HPFT DS TI B
• ps|/sec, Excursion Duration
or de_/sec) Interval Interval
(No change indicated)
(No change indicated)
(No change indicated)
(No change indicated)
(No change ind|cated)
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change indicated)
(No change indicated)
(Sensormatfunction)
Table IIB-25: Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test 902-095)
FAILURE INVESTIGATION SUI4HAR¥ FOR EACH TEST:
Type of Test
Numbe____r
HPFTP 901-346
Failure (Engine
(LocaLized: 0107)
Turbine
glades)
Incident and Damage
Description (Comments, if appLicabLe)
%ncideJ: At the conclusion of this program
duration test (500 seconds), damage was found in
the HPFT (High Pressure Fuel Turbine) and NCC
Liner. (Test conducted on 19 November 1981)
Engine damage was confined to the areas
cited above, to be specific: HPFT-
fishmouth seal dropped 1/16 inch, 180 dog
around, the first stage turbine blade
had shanks under cut approximately
.02 inches; HCC Liner had a new crack
at etement 85.
Reference: Rocketdyne data room records.
TIME LINE FOR INDICATIVE PARAMETERS
_  angel a
_ Duration Interva_c/o Time
Rate of
Change
(pos/sec,
rpm/sec,
Time of Indicative psi/sec, Excursion Duration
Cha_e Parameter or de_/sec) Interval Interval
100 .... HPFP CL -23.00 222. 400.
LNR PR- NCC HG %N PR
100 .... HPFP SPEED +.50 400. 400.
300 .... HPOT DS T1 +.42 190. 200.
300 .... HPOT DS T2 +.18 190. 200.
375 .... HPFT DS T1A -.82 45. 125.
375 .... NPFT DS T1B -1.33 45. 125.
380 .... FPOV ACT POS -.11 30. 120.
...HPFT Detta-P (No change indicated)
...HPOT Oetta-P (No change indicated)
Table IIB-26 : Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test 901-346)
FAILURE INVESTIGATION SUMHARY FOR EACH TEST:
Type of Test
incident Numbe._C
NPFTP 901-362
Failure (Engine
(Power 2013)
Transfer
FaiLure)
Incident and Damage
Description (Comments, if appticabte)
Incident: At the conctusion of this progrm
duration test (500 seconds) the fottowing damage
was noted: HPOT- first stage btede, outer shroud
reading edge was broken off, HPFT- the savereisen
was gone out of the butt nose nut.
(Test conducted on 27 March 1982)
Oama_e: Engine damage was confined to the areas
citedsbove.
Reference: Rocketdyne data room records.
TIN_ LINE FOR INDICATIVE PARAHETERS
I,_-Excursion----_
l-f-
., Cpnge _=..__ on i nt erva l._c/o_T i me
Tfme of Indicative psi/sec, Excursion Duration
Chanqe Parameter or de_/sec) Intervat interva
234.0 .... HPFT DS T1 A +5.30 4.3 266.0
239.5 .... HPFP SPEED +240.00 .5 260.5
240.0 .... HPFT Detta-P -.59 92.0 260.0
240.0 .... FPOVACT POS -.47 1.8 260.0
241.5 .... HPFT DS T1 B -10.00 1.5 258.5
...HPFP CL LNR PR-
MCC HG IN PR
...HPOT Delta-P
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change indicated)
...HPOT DS T1 (No change indicated)
...HPOT DS T2 (No change indicated)
Table IIB-27: Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test 901-362)
FA,ILURE INVESTIGATION SUNHARY FOR EACH TEST:
Type of Test
Incident Number
NPFTP 901-410
Faiture (Engine
(Power 2014)
Transfer
Fafture)
Incident and Damage
Description (Comn_nts, if appticabte)
Incident: At the conclusion of this program
duration test (595 seconds) one damper was found
missing from the 2nd stage turbine, impact damage
was evident to the 1st stage blades/tip seats, and
the HPFP (Nigh Pressure Fuet Pump) disc scrott had
a .75 sq. inch area missing, 12 inches from F4.
(Test conducted 20 Ray 1983)
Damage: Engine damage was confined to the areas
cited above.
Reference: Rocketdyne data room records.
TIRE LINE FOR INDICATIVE PARAMETERS
7 Rate of
/ Change
Time of Indicative psi/sec, Excursion Duration
_a_Je Parameter or deg/sec) Interval ]ntenvat
100.0 .... HPFT DS T1A +.17 200. 495.
100.0 .... HPFT Detta-P -.53 200. 495.
110.0 .... NPFP SPEED +.47 340. 485.0
110.0 .... HPOT DS T1 -.17 140. 485.0
110.0 .... HPOT DS T2 -.22 140. 485.0
250.0 .... FPOV ACT POS +.003 200. 345.0
250.0 .... HPOT DS T2 +.08 210. 345.0
505.0 .... HPFP CL LR PR- +4.6 27. 90.0
NCC HG IN PR
.... HPOT Dette-P (No change indicated)
Table IIB-28: Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test 901-410)
FAILURE INVESTIGATION SUMMARY FOR EACH TEST:
Type of Test
_ncid_t Number
Incident and Damage
Oescription (Comments, if applicable)
incident Occurrin 9 Durin 9 A Transient:
Duct r
Nanifn!d,
or Heat
Exchanger
Failure
(Heat
Exchanger,
Weld)
901-222
(Engine
0007)
Incident: At the close of engine start the (Data entries for this anomaly should
test was terminated (4._#+ seconds) by the be determined in another study)
heat exchanger outlet pressure minimum redline.
It was concluded from the test data that the
incident was caused by a leak in the heat exchanger coil. The leak occurred pnior to or during the
early part of the start, as evidenced by the excessive coil pressure drop. The high pressure drop
indicates increased mass flow. The coil failure was located near the heat exchanger inlet and
and discharge area, as shown by the hardware damage. Oxygen from the leak became entrained in the
fuel-rich pneburner coetxJStion gas. The mixed gases were ignited when the turbine discharge gas
reached a high enough temperature during the thrust build-up ramp. The radial accelerometen spike
at ].54 seconds indicates that ignition occurred as a detonation, and was near the heat exchanger
inlet/outlet area. The resulting continued combustion of the hydrogen-rich pneburner combustion
products and leaking oxygen caused burning of the coil; the change in nozzle flame pattern at
3.58 seconds shows evidence of metal burning. The heat exchanger coil pressure decayed to below
the hot-gas manifold pressure at 3.71 seconds, indicating that the heat exchanger coils were
completely severed, with extensive convnunication occurring between the coil and hot-gas. Hot-gas
flowing into the discharge end of the severed coil combusted in the discharge tire, with oxygen
from the bypass system. The discharge line burned through (4.185 seconds in the motion pictures)
causing a rapid decay in discharge pressure at 4.212 seconds.
Possible causes:
1. Undetected internal mechanical damage to the heat exchanger inlet tube may have
occurred during reaming of the inlet for removal of weld drop-through. The damage
may have been aggravated by a later readjustment of the inlet tube position.
2. Damage to the heat exchanger may have occurred during an arc-welding rework operation on a
coil support bracket.
(Test conducted on 6 December 1978)
Damage: Extensive damage occurred to the heat exchanger coil, oxidizer turbine discharge area
of the hot-gas manifold, main injector and heat exchanger discharge line.
References:
-Rocketdyne accident/incident report, Test 901-222 Engine 0007, Heat Exchanger
Fire, RSS-8595-17, October 1979.
-NASA Investigation Board Report, Part If.
Table IIB-29: Failure Investigation summary for Each Test
(Test 901-222)
FAILURE INVESTIGATION SUMMARY FOR EACH TEST:
Type of Test
Incident Number
Incident and Damage
Description (Comments, if applicable)
Incident OccurrinR During A Transient:
Control 902-132
Fai lure (Engine
(MOV 0006)
Mis-
Indexed)
Incident: During the start transient the HPFP (Data entries for this anomaly should
(High Pressure Fuel Pump) and LPFP (Low Pressure be determined in another study)
Fuel Pump) boiled out, resulting in a LOX (Liquid
Oxygen) rich cutoff. The LPFP and HPFP boil out
was attributed to the Late HPFTP break away (.07 seconds)
and an early main LOX dome prime (approximately 1.5 seconds). The early prime was caused by a
mis-ctocking of the NOV (Main Oxidizer Valve) resulting in the NOV being ].5Z more open than
indicated. Cutoff was initiated at 2.36 seconds from start time by low main combustion chamber
pressure at ignition confirm and high pressure fuel turbine discharge temperature redtine.
(Test conducted on 3 October 1978).
Da_ge: High pressure oxidizer and fuel turbine erosion; 136 main injector elements eroded between
faceplates; and the hot-gas manifold Liner eroded on the fuel preburner side.
Reference: Rocketdyne data roem recordsr
Table IIB-30: Failure Investigation
(Test 902-132)
Summary for Each Test-
FAILURE INVESTIGATION SUMMARY FOR EACH TEST:
Type of Test Incident end Damage
Incident Number Description {Comments, if applicable)
Incident Occurring During A Transient:
Injector 750-160
Failure (Engine
(Fuel 0110F)
Blockage)
Incident: The test was prematurely terminated (Data entries for this anomaly should
at 3.16 seconds (from start time) by a HPFT be determined in another study)
(High Pressure Fuel Turbine) discharge ten_oerature
redline. Data analysis, hardware condition and
supoorting laboratory tests identified the cause of the incident as EDM (Electrical Discharge
Machining) water contamination of the fuel system upstream of the fuel preburner. The formation
of ice during engine start resulted in fuel flow restriction in some fuel preburner elements.
This restriction produced one or more abnormal high ten_erature combustion gas zones which caused
turbine blade erosion and/or failure. The resulting decay in fuel flow to the engine preduced
excessive co_d_Jstion gas mixture ratio and subsequent erosion damage.
(Test conducted on 12 February 1982.)
_: Post-test hardware inspection revealed severe erosion damage to the high pressure fuel and
oxidizer turbines, main injector, main conW_Jstion chan*>er, nozzle, arw:_ hot-gas manifold.
References: -Rocketdyne SSME Accident/Incident Report, Engine 0110F, Fuel Preburner Ice
Incident, Test 750-160, RS$-8595-27, 17 May 1982.
-NASA Investigation Report, SSME S/N 0110F, Part l, 23 July 1982.
Table IIB-31 : Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test
(Test 750-160)
FAILURE INVESTIGATION SUMMARY FOR EACH TEST:
Type of Test
Incident Number
Incident and Damage
Description (Cor_ents, if applicable)
Incident Occurrinfl Ourin 9 A Transient:
HPFTP 901-147
Failure (Engine
(Power 0103)
Transfer
Failure)
Incident: During throttle up from 70% rated (Data entries for this anomaly should
power level (RPL) to 95% RPL, the HPFTP seized, be determined in another study)
causing speed and discharge pressure drops,
and high pressure fuel and oxidizer turbine
temperature rises. Cutoff was initiated due to a preburner boost pump accelerometer redline,
at 31.36 seconds from start time.
(Test conducted on I December 1977).
Damaqe: Extensive engine damage due to LOX
rich shutdown; the main combustion
chamber, main injector, and nozzle
were eroded.
Reference: Rocketch/ne data room records.
Table IIB-32: Failure Investigation Summary for Each Test "
(Test 901-147)
_;mmary 9f Sensor Standard Devtattor_..:
LEGEND:
STD1 ...... Standard Deviation of envetopes (test-to-test)
S702 ...... Standard Deviation of envetopes (test-to-test)
S703 ...... Standard Oeviation of data from average steady
I0 ...... Insufficient data for comptete derivation.
* ...... VaLue could be tar$er if more test data is
measured 2-sac before the anomty (See Tabte 111-2 for envetopes)
measured lO-sec before the anomaly (See Tabte %%I-2 for envetobes)
state value (See Tabte Ill-3).
added to the appropriate data bash.
rID NO.(S) PARAMETER
366-371 (INJ CLNT PR) -(NCC HG IN PR)
366-383 (INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC PC)
371-383 (HCC HG IN PR) -(HCC PC)
395-383 (HCC OX ]NJ PR) -(HCC PC)
940-371 (HPFP CL LNR PR)-(HCC HG IN PR)
459-383 (HPFP 0S PR) -(HCC PC)
412-371 (FPB PC) -(HCC HG [N PR)
480-371 (OPB PC) -(NCC HG IN PR)
63, 163 HCC PC
200 NCC PC AVG
436 HCC CLNT D$ PR
566 NCC CLNT DS T
24 NCC FU INJ PR
1951, 1956 NCC LN CAV P
595 HCC OX ]NJ TEMP
86 HPFP IN PR
459 HPFP DS PR
659 HPFP DS T
457 NPFP 8AL CAV PR
52, 76/* HPFP SPO
53, 940 HPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR
658 HPFP DR TENP
663 HPFT DS T1A
664 HPFT DS TI S
754 LPFP SPO
436 LPFT ]N PR
1205, 1206 FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
722 ENG FU FLOW
1722 ENG FU FLOW CT
233 HPOT DS T1
234 NPOT DS T2
1190 HPOT PRSL DR T
1071 OX BLD ZNT T
1054 OX FAC FM 0S T
854 FAC OX FH DS PR
1214 FAC OX FLOW CT
1212, 1213 FAC OX FLOW
858, 860 ENG OX IN PR
1058 ENG OX IN TEMP
338 HPOP DS PR
325, 326 NPOP BALCAV PR
30, 734 LPOP SPO
302 LPOP DS PR
93, 94 PBP DS TMP
341 PBP DS PR
412 FPB PC
480 OPB PC
878 HX INT PR
879 HX [NT T
881 HX VENT IN PR
882 HX VENT IN T
683 HX VENT DP
40 OPOVACT POS
42 FPOV ACT POS
STDI STD2 STD3
2.48 2.24 1.08
4.48 6.25 .632
7.86 10.10 1.08
5.13 6.16 3.28
6.00 (10) .640
7.06 11.29 7.75
5.78 8.81 4.73
10.37 10.04 3.2
4.43 3.89 3.25
4.43 3.91 2.13
14.87 14.91 7.72
1.35 1.75 1.05
9.89 9.66 8.20
(10) (I0) (ID)
.324 .460 .072
2.02 2.7O 1.01
10.72 12.79 10.50
.068 .106 .082
17.67 25.92 10.15
31.51 44.42 30.70
4.97 3.40 5.59
1.84 .5 2.48
.01 O. .012
.05 (lD) .157
14.10 14.29 3.56
8.47 -8.16 3.74
433.8 469.45 17.35
4.09 6.39 6.56
32.80 31.78 2.10
(Sensor Trace Not Appticable)
25.60 26.68 23.86
(Sensor Trace Not AIp(icab[e)
4.83 5.89 O.
6.84 13.71 1.44
1.36 1.77 2.72
2.47 3.45 .224
.319 .315 .029
2.41 2.28 .462
(Sensor trace is not appitcab[e)
18.02 27.31 16.94
.83 1.39 .773
.11 .191 .046
12.04 19.93 7.25
12.00 12.81 4.06
18.45 28.35 4.21
1.60 2.55 3.49
.684 1.02 .268
23.95 25.33 16.1
14.04 14.85 7.04
7.46 19.03 8.02
7.78 7.33 4.29
.81 3.71 1.68
1.47 1.41 .31
.943 2.16 .O&3
.269 .282 .305
.397 .226 .112
.122 .124 .202
Table III-l: Summary of Sensor Standard Deviations
,0
TEST-TO TEST ENVELOPEData Base
L_end: 2S---Data below this heading represent envelopes 2-sec before early indications of an anomaly.
lOS---Data below this heading represent envelopes lO-sec before early ind|caUons of an anomaly.
IIGINAIJ pAGE IS
pOOR QUALITY
lOS-VaLue
t
2S-VaLue :.
.(Time of early anomaly indication)
I.._--- 10- sec--_
X---Parameter does not exist for the test number.
M---Parameter malfunction.
NA---Envetopenot applicable for parameter.
NS---Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state
UA---Data is unavailable for lO-seconds prior to early
Pie NO. (S)
366-371
366-383
371-383
395 -383
940-371
459-383
412-371
480-371
63, 163
200
436
566
24
1951, 1956
595
86
459
659
457
52, 764
53, 940
650
657
658
663
664
754
436
1205, 1206
1207, 1209
722
1722
233
234
1190
1071
1054
854
1214
1212, 1213
858, 860
1058
338
325, 326
30, 734
302
93, 94
341
412
480
878
879
881
882
883
40
42
--No early indication of an anomaly from parameter,
conditions.
indications of an anomty.
the envelope value is before cutoff time.
Test Numbers:
901-173 901-163
PARAMETER 2S 10S 2S 10S
(]NJ CLNT PR) -(MCC HG IN PR) 7 8 9.5 10
(XNJ CLNT PR) "(MCC PC) 2 4 3.5 3.5
(MCC HG IN PR) "(MCC PC) 10 10 9.5 11
(MCC OX INJ PR) "(MCC PC) 10 17.5 20.5 25.5
(HPFP CL LNR PR)'(MCC HG IN PR) X X X X
(NPFP DS PR) -(MCC PC) 26 28 25 32.5
(FPB PC) "(MCC HG IN PR) 15 20 10" 10*
(OPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR) 20 27 15" 15"
MCC PC 22 22 10.8 17
MCC PC AVG 22 22 10.8 17
MCC CLNT DS PR 25 33 20 25
MCC CLNT DS T X X 1 1.7
MCC FU ]NJ PR 11 22 NS NS
MCC LN CAV P X X X X
MCC OX INJ TEMP X X X X
HPFP IN PR 4 4.6 NS NS
HPFP DS PR 40 45 18 41
HPFP DS T .3 .46 .34 .34
HPFP BAL CAV PR 30 33 65 98
HPFP SPD 114 160 100 100
HPFP CL LNR PR X X X X
HPFP CL LNR T X X X X
HPFP DR PR X X X X
HPFP DR TEMP X X X X
HPFT DS T1A 55 55 32 34
HPFT DS T1B 30 37 22 30
LPFP SPD 1500 1500 40 UA
LPFT IN PR 25 33 20 25
FAC FU FL 70 105 80 109
FAC FU FL CT NA NA NA NA
ENG FU FLOW 100 115 105 106
ENG FU FLOWCT NA NA NA NA
HPOT DS T1 12 22 11 17
HPOT DS T2 28 54 13 16
NPOT PRSL OR T 3.5 7.5 NS NS
OX BLD INT T X X NS NS
OX FAC FM DS T .02 .04 .01" .013"
FAC OX FM DS PR 1.2" 1.8" 2.8* 3.2*
FAC OX FLOWCT NA NA NA NA
FAC OX FLOW 50 75 50 50
ENG OX ]N PR 1.9. 1.95" 1.7 2.5
ENG OX IN TEMP .033 .045 .047" .08"
HPOP DS PR 30 47 35 50
NPOP BALCAVPR 35 35 18 20
LPOP SPD 20 20 22* 120"
LPOP DS PS 5 7.6 7 11.7
PBP DS TMP X X X X
PBP DS PR 80 80 76 79
FPB PC 5 6 30.5 31
OPB PC 22 33 16.5 32
HX INT PR 15 29.5 NS NS
HX XNT T 1.4 3.9 NS NB
HX VENT [N PR 2 2 NS NS
HX VENT [N T .2 1.8 NS MS
HX VENT DP .55 1.1 NS NS
OPOVACT POS .25 UA 0 .78
FPOV ACT POS .5 .9 ,5 .71
_able III-2 :
901-331
2S lOS
X X
X X
13 15
20 27.5
X X
28.5 37.1
19.3 26.5
14.5 25.5
10 14.8
10 14.8
18 21.5
2 3.3
10 20
M M
.06 .06
4 6.5
41 62
.3 .32
25.5 34.5
115 130
X X
X X
X X
X X
15 29
18 29
33 58
18 21.5
54 87
NA NA
127 127
NA NA
8 16
8 16
4 UA
.9 1.5
.04" .07"
9* 9*
NA NA
34 66
2 2.7
.09 .37
45 45
9.5 22
22 52
5 6.5
.09 .09
M M
18.3 25
16.5 27.5
7.8 17.2
2 3.8
2 2
.9 .9
.19 .61
.27 .54
.27 .54
901-307 901-485
2S 10S 2S 10S
X X X X
X X 10.8" 16"
6.5* 17" X X
11.9 14.5 19.3" 30*
8 15 X X
12" 16" 31" 50*
NS NS 21.5" 30*
NS NS 24* 30*
6.5 15 13.3" 20*
6.5 14.8 13.3" 20"
NS NS 30* 45*
0 3 3.25* 7*
0 8 15" 25*
X X M M
.03" .034" .5" UA
9.5* 13" 7.1" 7.1"
13" 22* 42* 42*
.3" .5" .3" .4"
10" 20* 30* 30*
42* 90* 109" 109"
X X 28* 28"
X X 7.6* 12"
X X .05" .08"
X X 1 UA
X X 8.9* 8.9*
6 12 4.5* 12"
70* 100" 61.5" 100"
X X 22* 27*
25* 50* 122" 135"
NA NA NA NA
70* 70* 90* 120"
NA NA NA NA
0 11 X X
7 10 X X
1" 3* 2* UA
6 9 NS NS
1" 1" NS NS
•22" .45" 2.6* 2.6*
M M NA NA
M M 90* 90*
2" 3" 4.2* 4.2*
NS NS x x
16 29 45* 70*
7.8 11 10.8" 16.5"
18 25 57* 70*
2 4 5.3* 5.3*
NS NS NS NS
35 50 62* 72
16 18 26* 27.5*
15 18 23* 86*
11 15 X X
4 13 NS gs
.8" 1.8" O* 0_
.5 1 NS NS
.4" .78" X X
.24 .5 .25 UA
.55 .55 .20* .76"
Base,Test-to-Test Envelope Data
Definition
ORI(
OF
TEST-TO TEST
Legend:
_INAU PAGB _
,ooRQuALn ,
ENVELOPE Data Base (Continued)
2S---Data below this heading represent envelopes 2-se__c before early indications of an anomaly.
lOS---Data below this heading represent envelopes lO-sec before early indications of an anomaly.
"-_ --,-_a ine c/o time)
S-VaLue 2 VaLue -- I
Time of early anomaly indication)
X---Parameter does not exist for the test number.
M---Parameter mat function.
NA---Envetope not applicable for parameter.
NS---Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions.
UA---Data is unavailable for lO-seconds prior to early indications of an anomaly.
*---No early indication of an anomaly from parameter, the envelope value is before cutoff time.
PID NO. (S)
366-371
366-383
371 - 383
395- 383
940-371
459-383
412-371
480-371
63, 163
200
436
566
24
1951, 1956
595
86
459
659
457
52, 764
53, 940
650
657
658
663
664
754
436
1205, 1206
1207, 1209
722
1722
233
234
1190
1071
1054
854
1214
1212, 1213
858, 860
1058
338
325, 326
30, 734
302
93, 94
341
412
480
878 .
879
881
882
883
40
42
Test Numbers:
901-110
PARAMETER 2S 10S 2S
(INJ CLNT PR) -(MCC HG IN PR) 6* 6* 2.6
(]NJ CLNT PR) -(MCC PC) 5* 9.4* 1
(MCC HG IN PR) -(MCC PC) 6.9* 7.4* 1
(MCC OX INJ PR) -(MCC PC) 8.5* 17.5" 18
(HPFP CL LNR PR)-(MCC HG IN PR) X X X
(HPFP DS PR) -(MCC PC) 20* 45* 8.8
(FPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR) 19" 27* 9
(OPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR) 43* 43" 6
MCC PC 14.5" 14.5" 6
MCC PC AVG 14.5" 14.5" 6
MCC CLNT DS PR 40* 53* 23
MCC CLNT 0S T .5" .8" NS
HCC FU [NJ PR 26.5 UA NS
MCC LN CAV P X X X
MCC OX ]NJ TEMP .8" 1.2" X
HPFP IN PR 3.5* 5* NS
HPFP DS PR 30* 60* 35
HPFP DS T .18" :47* .1
HPFP BAL CAV PR M M 7
HPFP SPD 100" 150" 65
HPFP CL LNR PR X X X
HPFP CL LNR T X ,X X
HPFP DR PR X X X
HPFP DR TEMP X X X
HPFT DS T1A 19" 24* 15
HPFT DS T1B 13" 19" 13
LPFP SPD 33* 80* 115
LPFT IN PR 12" 40* 14
FAC FU FL 130" 163" 72
FAC FU FL CT NA NA NA
ENG FU FLOW 100" 150" 55
ENG FU FLCM CT MA NA NA
HPOT DS T1 16 UA .5
HPOT DS T2 11 UA 13
HPOT PRSL DR T X X 5.5
OX BLD INT T NS NS X
OX FAC FH DS T .11" .14" .01
FAC OX FM DS PR 3* 4* .65"
FAC OX FLOW CT NA NA NA
FAC OX FLOW 40* 72* 47
ENG OX IN PR 2* 3* 1.2"
ENG OX IN TEMP .04" .04" NS
HPOP DS PR 50* 70* 20
HPOP BALCAV PR 49* 57" 20
LPOP SPD 77* 77* 36
LPOP OS PS 7* 10" 3
PBP DS THP X X X
PBP 0S PR 120" 140" X
FPB PC 57* 57* 10.5
OPB PC 38* 38* 14
HX INT PR NS NS 5
HX INT T X X 2
HX VENT ]N PR X X .2
HX VENT [N T .X X .5
HX VENT DP .1" .2" .17
OPOV ACT POS .25 UA .1
FPOV ACT POS .5 UA .33
'Table III-2:
(cont.)
901 - 136 901-340 901-363 901-436
lOS 2S lOS 2S 10S 2S lOS
4 X X X X X X
2 X X 13 18 NS NS
3.6 28 37 X X X X
22 25 33.5 21.5 28 15 17
X 20 UA X X X X
14 20 UA 20 27 30 35
11 25 UA X X 25 35
19 20 UA X X 29 43
10 14 UA 15 22.5 15 20
10 14 UA 15 22.5 15 20
35.5 30 UA 70 70 30 48
1.7 3.3 UA M M 3.5 3.5
NS 19 30 29 29 30 42
X NS NS M H M M
X .9 UA .68 .9 .29 .45
NS 3.1 UA 4.6 5.7 5 5
49 20 UA 41 61 42.5 62.5
.15 .27 UA .27 .27 .3 .3
18 37 UA 4.8" 5.9" 35 39
110 110 195 95 122 20 20
X 20 UA 14 22 20 20
X X UA 12 UA 9 11
X X X X X .07. .08"
X X X X X .9" 3.4*
22 15 UA 9 13 10 10
20 22 30 5 20 5 15
115 55 UA 32 55 65 65
19 23 UA 19 29 23 33
75 82 UA 75 120 25 125
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1O0 85 UA 133 143 70 70
NA NA NA klA NA NA NA
1 8 8 8 12.4 8.6 12.6
16 4 8 8 12.4 4.5 16.3
6.5 2.5 4 NS NS 3.5 3.5
X .62" 1.9" NS NS NS NS
.01 .48 UA .03* .31" .03" .05*
1.8" 5* 5.9* 3.4 3.5 1.9" 3.7"
NA NA NA IL_ NA NA NA
67 80 UA 58 87 38 147
1.9" 3* 6* 2.45* 2.6* 3.2 5.7
NS .29 .51 .29" .48" .16" .18"
54 53* 106" 30 55 45 45
20 17 UA 16 30 20 22
86 50* 50* 50* 80* 41" 51"
5.4 5.3 UA 4.2 8.1 7 11
X .3 UA 1.8 2.4 .31" .43"
X 87 UA 80 80 104 104
19.5 X X 22.5 43 24 45
20 20.4 UA 27 43 32 44
11 13 UA 16 20 31" 31"
2.7 2 2 NS NS 2.4 3,6
.7 2 3 1.4 1.6 5* 5*
1.1 3 7 IS NS 1.5" 1.5"
.95 1 UA .5 .7 .38" .43"
• 28 1.5 UA .2S .25 .25 .85
.8 .6 UA .57 .57 .6 .6
Test-to-Test Envelope
Definition
Data Base '_-"
T_$T TO TEST ENVELOPEData I_ese (Continued)
L_efld: AVGI---Datl belo,a this heading represent average envelope values 2-sac before early indications of an anomaly.
AVG2---Oata beto_ this heading represent average envelope values _ before early indications of an anomaly.
STOl---Osta beLoM this heading represent the standard deviation derived from the respective average envelope
vatue AVG1 and the test-to-test envelopes of Table Ill-2. The STD1 data List are used in
Table Ill-1.
STD2---Data below this heading represent the standard deviation derived from the respective average envetobe
value AVG2 and the test-to-test envelopes of Table Ill-2. The STD2 data List are used in
Table 1II-1.
I0 ..... Insufficient data for derivations.
Pm NO.iS)
366-371
366- 383
371-383
395 -383
940-371
459-383
412-371
480-371
63, 163
200
436
566
24
1951, 1956
595
86
459
659
457
52, 764
53, 940
65O
657
658
663
664
754
436
1205, 1206
1207, 1209
722
1722
233
234
1190
1071
1054
854
1214
1212, 1213
858, 860
1058
338
325, 326
30, 734
302
93, 94
341
412
48O
878
879
881
882
883
40
42
PARA_ETER AVG1 AVG___.22
(INJ CLNT PR) -(MCC HG IN PR) 6.28 7.
(].j CLNTre) -(MCCPC) 5.88 8.82
(HCC HG IN PR) -(MCC PC) 10.70 14.43
(HCC OX INJ PR) -(HCC PC) 16.97 23.3
(HPFP CL LNR PR)-(HCC HG IN PR) 14. (ID)
(HPFP DS PR) -(MCC PC) 22.13 31.62
(FPB PC) -(HCC HG IN PR) 17.98 22.79
(OPB PC) -(HCC HG IN PR) 21.44 28.93
MCC PC 12.71 17.31
MCC PC AVG 12.71 17.29
HCC CLNT DS PR 31.78 41.38
HCC CLNT DS T 1.94 3.04
HCC FU INJ PR 17.56 25.14
HCC LN CAV P (ID) (ID)
HCC OX INJ TEHP .466 .529
HPFP IN PR 5.1 6.7
HPFP DS PR 32.25 49.39
HPFP DS T .266 .357
HPFP BAL CAV PR 27.14 34.8
HPFP SPD 87. 118.(>0
HPFP CL LNR PR 20.5 23.33
HPFP CL LNR T 9.53 11.5
HPFP DR PR .06 .08
HPFP DR TEHP .95 (ID)
HPFT DS T1A 19.88 24.49
HPFT DS T1S 13.85 22.4
LPFP SPD 200.5 259.13
LPFT IN PR 19.56 28.44
FAC FU FL 73.50 107.67
FAC FU FL CT (Sermor trace
ENG FU FLOW 93.50 111.22
ENG FU FLO_ CT (Sensor trace
HPOT DS T1 8.01 12.5
HPOT DS T2 10.72 18.59
HPOT PRSL DR T 3.14 4.9
OX BLD INT T 2.51 4.13
OX FAC FM DS T .192 .204
FAC OX FM DS PR 2.98 3.60
FAC OX FLOWCT (Sensor trace
FAC OX FLOW 54.11 81.75
ENG OX IN PR 2.37 3.36
• ENG OX IN TEMP .136 .244
HPOP DS PR 36.9 57.1
HPOP BALCAVPR 20.3 25.94
LPOP SPD 39.3 63.1
LPOP DS PR 5.08 7.73
PBP DS TMP .625 .973
PBP DS PR 80.5 86.43
FPB PC 23.31 30.22
OPB PC 22.44 37.94
HX INT PR 14.11 20.62
HX INT T 2.30 4.83
HX VENT IN PR 1.68 2.01
HX VENT IN T 1.1 2.22
HX VENT DP .411 .681
OPOVACT POS .336 .533
FPOV ACT POS .470 .676
STO1 STD__2
2.48 2.24
4.48 6.25
7.86 10.10
5.13 6.16
6.00 (ID)
7.06 11.29
• 5.78 8.81
10.37 10.04
4.43 3.89
4.43 3.91
14.87 14.91
1.35 1.75
9.89 9.66
LID) (I0)
.324 .460
2.02 2.70
10.72 12.79
.068 .106
17.67 25.92
31.51 44.42
4.97 3.40
1.84 .5
.01 O.
.05 (ID)
14.10 14.29
8.47 8.16
433.8 469.45
4.09 6.39
32.80 31.78
not applicable)
23.60 26.68
not applicable)
4.83 5.89
6.84 13.71
1.36 1.77
2.47 3.45
.319 .315
2.41 2.28
is not appLicabLe)
18.02 27.31
.83 1.39
.11 .191
12.04 19.93
12.00 12.81
18.45 28.35
1.60 2.55
.(_4 1.02
23.95 26.33
14.04 14.85
7.46 19.03
7.78 7.33
.81 3.71
1.47 1.41
.943 2.16
.269 .282
.397 .226
.122 .124
ORIGINAL p, ",_
• _-__ IS
OF, POOR QUALITY
Table III-2:
(cont.)
Test-to-Test Envelope Data Base
Definition
Data base for time st|cad value deviations from the average _temdy-state sensor vatue
I.E.E.G.
Average I _
Value L
I I I !
. . • T1 12 T3 T4 . . .CTINE)
OF POOR QJA;,_I'f:Y
DEVI---Data below this heading represent the standard deviation for values taken every 20 mac
over a 5-sec interval. These data were taken from Test 901-484 and derived from NTI
(New Technology Inc.) of Huntsville Atsbam.
DEV2---Oata below this heading represent the standard deviation for val.ues taken every 100 msec
over a 1-sac interval. These data were taken from Test 901-436, 901-307, and 901-173.
STD3---Osts below this heading represent the data summarized in Table !11-1
STD3= DEV1, if DEV1 is unavailable,. STD3= OEV2.
UNAV---Data is unavei table.
PID MO.(S)
366-371
366-383
371-383
395-383
940-371
459-383
412-371
480-371
63, 163
200
436
566
24
1951, 1956
595
86
459
659
457
52, 764
53, 940
650
657
658
663
664
754
436
1205, 1206
1207, 1209
722
1722
233
234
1190
1071
1054
854
1214
1212, 1213
658, 860
1058
338
325, 326
30, 734
302
93, 94
341
412
480
878
879
881
882
883
40
42
PARAMETER DEV2 DEV1 STO._3
(INJ CLNT PR) -(MCC HG IN PR) 1.08 UNAV 1.08
(INJ CLNT PR) -(MCC PC) .632 UNAV .632
(MCC HG IN PR) -(MCC PC) 1.08 UNAV 1.08
(MCC OX INJ PR) -(MCC PC) 3.28 UNAV 3.28
(HPFP CL LNR PR)-(MCC HG IN PR) .640 UNAV ._0
(HPFP DS PR) -(MCC PC) 7.75 UNAV 7.75
(FPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR) 4.7"3 UNAV 4.75
(OPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR) 3.2 UNAV 3.2
MCC PC 3.25 UNAV 3.25
MCC PC AVG 3.13 UNAV 2.13
MCC CLNT DS PR 7.72 UNAV 7.72
MCC CLNT DS T 1.05 UNAV 1.05
MCC FU INJ PR 8.20 UNAV 8.20
MCC LN CAV P UNAV UNAV UNAV
MCC OX INJ TEMP .06 .072 .072
HPFP IN PR 1.01 1.01 1.01
HPFP DS PR 10.25 10.50 10.50
HPFP DS T .081 .082 .082
HPFP BAL CAV PR 8.43 10.15 10.15
HPFP SPD 5.64 30.70 30.70
HPFP CL LNR PR 5.59 UNAV 5.59
HPFP CL LNR T 1.97 2./+8 2.48
HPFP DR PR .012 .012 .012
HPFP DR TEMP .157 UNAV .157
HPFT DS T1A 3.56 UNAV 3.56
HPFT DS T1B 3.74 UNAV - 3.74
LPFP SPO 12.71 17.35 17.35
LPFT IN PR 4.24 6.56 6.56
FAC FU FL 2.11 2.10 2.10
FAC FU FL CT (Sensor trace is not applicable)
ENG FU FLOU 21.96 23.86 23.84
ENG FU FLOW CT (Sensor trace is not appticabte)
HPOT DS T1 O. UNAV O.
HPOT DS T2 1.44 UNAV 1.44
HPOT PRSL DR T .855 2.72 2.72
OX BLD INT T .224 UNAV .224
OX FAC FM DS T .0064 .OZ9 .029
FAC OX FM DS PR .293 .462 .462
FAC OX FLOW CT (Sensor trace is not applicable)
FAC OX FLOW 6.78 16.94 16.94
ENG OX IN PR .590 .773 .773
ENG OX IN TEMP .0329 .046 .046
HPOP DS PR 7.25 UNAV 7.Z5
HPOP BALCAV PR 2.68 4.06 4.06
LPOP SPD 6.43 6.21 4.21
LPOP DS PR 3.49 UNAV 3.49
PBP DS TMP .268 UNAV .268
PBP DS PR 19.65 16.1 16.1
FP8 PC 6.43 7.64 7.64
OPB PC 5.70 8.02 8.02
HX INT PR" 4.68 4.29 4.29
HX INT T 5.99 1.68 1.68
HX VENT iN PR .31 UNAV .31
HX VENT IN T .083 UNAV .1_3
HX VENT DP .305 UNAV .305
OPOV ACT POS .112 UNAV .112
FPOV ACT POS .202 UNAV .202
Table III-3: Data Base for Time Sliced Value Deviations
from the Average Steady State Sensor Measurement
IOate Base for Early Parameter Indicators of Test Classification: ]njector Failure
-Test 901-173 (LOX Post Fractures, Eroaion-MCC) conducted 31 March 1978 for Engine 0002.
---Cutoff Time= 201.16 sac due to a HPFT discharge temperature radtine.
---Early indications occur near 92X PL.
---Damage: Main injector (burnouts of secondary and primal_y faceplate, 18-LOX posts), MCC (burnout it
one acoustic cavity and adjacent to injector burnout area), and nozzle (46 tube ruptures).
--- Impact: Unavai table.
CRITERIA LEGEND: eOperatin 9 Level Anomaly Criteria (L_.C.C)
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Value) x 100.
eRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
mOuration Criteria (DC)
DC = Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o time
WEIGHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNMENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-A:
Value of LC A-Value
>3_ ....... 1.0
>2_-3X ........ 7
1_-2_ ........ 3
<1_ ........ 1
LEVEL-g: LEVEL-C:
Value of RC B-Value Value of DC C-Value
>lO_/sec .... 1.0 >5sac ....... 1.0
>5 -lO_/sec ..... 5 >1 -5sac ........ 7
1 - 5X/sac ..... 3 .5 -1sac ........ 3
<l_/sec ..... 1 <.5sac ....... O.
( )---Numbers within the parenthesis indicate an earlier and more gradual "LC" change for the parameter.
*---Parameters prefixed with an asterisk indicate a change continues until cutoff tim.
PID NO.(S) PARAMETER
366-372 *(INJ CLNT PR) "(MCC HG IN PR)
366-383 *(INJ CLNT PR) "(MCC PC)
372-383 (HCC HG IN PR) -(MCC PC)
395-383 *(MCC OX INJ PR) -(MCC PC)
940-372 (HPFP CL LNR PR)-(MCC HG IN PR)
459-383 *(HPFP DS PR) -(MCC PC)
412-372 *(FPB PC) -(HCC HG IN PR)
480-372 *(OPB PC) -(HCC HG IN PR)
63, 163 *MCC PC
200 *MCC PC AVG
436 *MCC CLNT DS PR
18 *HCC CLNT DS T
24 *MCC FU INJ PR
1951, 1956 *MCC LN CAV P
595 *MCC OX INJ TEMP
86 *HPFP IN PR
459 *HPFP DS PR
659 *HPFP 05 T
457 *HPFP BAL CAV PR
52, 764 *NPFP SPD
53, 940 HPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR
658 HPFP DR TEMP
663 *HPFT DS T1A
664 *HPFT DS T1B
754 LPFP SPD
436 *LPFT IN PR
1205, 1206 FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
722 *ENG FU FLOW
1722 ENG FU FLOW CT
233 *HPOT DS T1 F519 *HPOT DS T2 ,_,,
1190 HPOT PRSL DR T ! ,'_
1071 OX BID INT T /
1054 OX FAC FM DS T _
854 FAC OX FH DS PR
1214 FAC OX FLOW CT
1212, 1213 FAC OX FLOW _" ._
858 ENGOX IN PR ._::._
1058 ENG OX IN TEMP '
338 *HPOP DS PR _:
325, 326 *HPOP BALCAV PR _ _'_
734 *LPOP SPO
302 LPOP DS PR
93, 94 *PBP DS TMP
59, 159 *PBP DS PR
412 *FPB PC
480 *OPB PC
878 *HX INT PR
879 *HX INT T
881 *HX VENT IN PR
882 *HX VENT IN T
883 *HX VENT DP
40 *OPOVACT POS
42 *FPOVACT POS
LEVEL
L_.CC LEVEL-A R__C LEVEL-B A +B D..CC LEVEL'C
124.4 1. 259.1 1. 2.0 .48 O.
30.(1.) 1.(.3) 63.(.1) 1.(.1) 2.0(.4) .48(28.5) 0.(1.)
4.1(1.) 1.(.3) 26.(.1) 1.(.1) 2.0(.4) .48(28.5) 0.(1.)
5.6 1. 56. 1. 2.0 .1 0.
(Sensor does not exist)
6.7(.4) 1.(.1) 19.(.1) 1.(.1) 2.0(.2) .36(23.) 0.(1.)
5.3(.3) 1.(.1) 14.(.1) 1.(.1) 2.0(.2) .37(21.) 0.(1.)
3.9 1. 5.9 .5 1.5 .66 .3
4.4 1. 7.85 .5 1.5 .48 .3
4.4 1. 7.85 .5 1.5 .48 .3
5.6 1. 12.1 1. 2.0 .46 O.
(Sensor does not exist)
4.4(1.) 1.(.3) 9.5(.1) .5(.1) 1.5(.4) .46(22.5) 0.(1.)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
2.76 .7 8.92 .5
4.63 1. 12.2 1.
2.6 .7 10.03 1.
4.87 1. 15.7 1.
1.5 .3 4.17 .5
(Sensors do not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
1.2 .32 O.
2.0 .38 O.
1.7 .26 O.
2.0 .31 O.
.8 .36 O.
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
7.45 1. 20.7 1. 2.0 .36 O.
7.45 1. 20.7 1. 2.0 .36 O.
12.2 1. 3.1 .3 1.3 29.1 1.
5.6 1. 12.1 1. 2.0 .46 O.
1.8 .3 6. .5 .8 .3 O.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
2.74 .7 7.62 .5 1.2 .36 O.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
4.87 1. 13.53 1. 2.0 .36 O.
2.96 .7 8.23 .5 1.2 .36 O.
.63 .1 .69 .1 .2 3.86 .7
(Sensor does not exist)
.009 .1 .007 .1 .2 3.16 .7
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.8 .1 1.6 .3 .4 .66 .3
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.006 .1 .0063 .1 .2 .96 .3
5.91 1. 16.4 1. 2.0 .36 O.
3.39 1. 9.4 .5 1.5 .36 O.
2.7 .7 7.5 .5 1.2 .36 O.
3.4 I. 9.6 .5 1.5 .36 O.
(Sensor does not exist)
3.2 1. 8.88 .5 1.5 .36 0.
1.1(.4) .3(.1) 7.(.02) .5(.1) .8(.2) .16(22.8) 0.(1.)
3.8(.3) 1.(.1) 11.(.1) 1.(.1) 2.0(.2) .36(23.) 0.(1.)
.94 .1 1.57 .3 .4 .26 0.
.36 .1 .33 .1 .2 2.76 .7
1.43 .3 3.98 .3 .6 .36 O.
.06(.3) .1(.1) .2(.02) .1(.1) .2(.2) .26(21.) 0.(1.)
1.12 .3 4.35 .3 .6 .26 O.
4.2(3.7) 1.(1.) 9.1(1.) .5(.5) 1.5(1.5) .46(28.5) 0.(1.)
1.83 .3 5.08 .5 .8 .36 O.
Table III-4: 901-173 Data Base
ipate Base for Earty Parameter ]ndicator_ of Test Classification: %njector Failure
-Test 901-331 (LOX Post Fractures, Erosion-MCC) conducted 15 July 1981 for Engine 2108.
---Cutoff Time- 233.14 sec. due to • NPOTdischarege temperature redline.
---Early indications occur near lOON PL.
---Damage: Main injector (burn through of prtmry and secondary feceptate, 169 LOX posts), MCC (minor
erosion in acoustic cavity), and nozzle (60 tubes damaged).
---Impact: S_.lM, Delay Time- 24 weeks. +
CRITERIA LEGEND: eOperatin9 Level Anomaly Criteria (LC)
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Value) x 100.
cRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
eOurstion Criteria (DC)
DC = Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o time
WEIGHTEDLEVEL VALUE ASSIGNMENTLEGEND:
LEVEL-A: LEVEL-B:
Value of LC A-Value Value of RC B-Value
>3%....... 1.0 >lOX/sec .... 1.0
>2X-3% ........ 7 >5 -lpZ/sec ..... 5
1%-2_ ........ 3 1 - 5%/sec ..... 3
<IZ ........ 1
I l ,+x ursiontime
-T- I
LEVEL-C:
Value of DC C-Value
>5sec ....... 1.0
>1 -5sec ........ 7
.5 -Isec ........ 3
<l_/sec ..... 1 <.5sec ....... O.
( )---Numbers within the parenthesis indicate an earlier and more gradual "LC" change
*---Parameters prefixed with an asterisk indicate a change continues until cutoff time.
PID NO.(S) PARAMETER
LEVELS
L_CC LEVEL-A R__C LEVEL- B. A +__B
125. I. 1042. I. 2.0
7.2 I. 48.1 I. 2.0
17.6 1. 147.1 1. 2.0
25.5 1. 36.4 1. 2.0
(Sensor does not exist)
1.59 .3 15.9 1. 1.3
3.22 1. 32.2 1. 2.0
5.55 1. 55.5 1. 2.0
3.6(.8) 1.(.1) 33.(8.) 1.(.5) 2.0(.6)
3.6(.8) I.(.I) 33.(8.) I.(.5) 2.0(.6)
4.78 I. 22.4 I. 2.0
10.2 I. 18.2 I. 2.0
5.32 I. 44.3 I. 2.0
(Sensor malfunction)
.5 .1 .98 .1 .2
5. 1. 6. .5 1.5
2.79- .7 - 14.7 1. 1.7
.93 .I 5.78 .5 .6
2.69 .7 14.93 1. 1.7
1.2 .3 8.58 .5 .8
(Sensors do not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
10.12 1. 33.73 1.
10.74 1. 35.79 1.
5.21 1. 11.08 1.
4.13 1. 27.52 1.
9.2 1. 15.4 1.
for the parameter.
D_CC LEVEL-C
.95 .3
.93 .3
.94 .3
.84 .3
.89 .3
.85 .3
.89 .3
.82(.94) .3(.3)
•82(.%) .3(.3)
.88 .3
.86 .3
.82 .3
.69 .3
.94 .3
.86 .3
.84 .3
.84 .3
.88 .3
2.0 .84 .3
2.0 .84 .3
2.0 .76 .3
2.0 .79 .3
2.0 .79 .3
.79 .3
2.0 .74 .3
2.0 .75 .3
1.3 .36 O.
.4 .43 O.
(Sensor malfunction)
11.4 1. 27.14 1. 2.0
(No change is strikingly indicated)
41. 1. 55.5 1.
40. 1. 53.1 1.
3.04 1. 4.89 .3
.93 .1 4.43 .3
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
9.64 1. 18.5 1. 2.0 .64 .3
9.7(4.) 1.(1.) 97.(17) 1.(1.) 2.0(2.) .82(.94) .3(.3)
.14 .1 2.26 .3 1.3 .4 O.
4.06 1. 8.83 .5 1.5 .76 .3
2.74 .7 5.96 .5 1.2 .69 .3
2.06 .7 7.11 .5 1.2 .75 .3
5.76 1. 57.6 1. 2.0 .89 .3
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor malfunction)
835-371 (INJ CLNT PR) -(MCC HG IN PR)
835-383 (%NJ CLNT PR) -(MCC PC)
371-383 (MCC HG IN PR) -(MCC PC)
395-383 (MCC OX INJ PR) -(MCC PC)
940-371 (HPFP CL LNR PR)-(MCC HG IN PR)
459-383 (HPFP DS PR) -(MCC PC)
412-371 (FPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR)
480-371 ((lOB PC) -(MCC HG iN PR)
63, 163 MCC PC
200 MCC PC AVG
17 MCC CLNT DS PR
18 *MCC CLNT DS T
24 MCC FU ]NJ PR
1951, 1956 MCC LN CAV P
595 MCC OX INJ TEMP
86 HPFP IN PR
459 HPFP DS PR
659 HPFP DS T
457 HPFP BAL CAV PR
52, 764 HPFP SPD
53, 940 HPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR
658 HPFP DR TEMP
663 HPFT DS TI A
06/, flPFT DS T1B
754 LPFP SPD
436 LPFT IN PR
1205, 1207 FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
722 ENG FU FLOW
1722 ENG FU FLOWCT
233 *HPOT PS T1
254 *HPOT DS T2
1190 HPOT PRSL DR T
1071 DX BLD INT T
1054, 1056 OX FAC FN DS T
854 FAC OX FM DS PR
1210 FAC OX FLOWCT
1212 FAC OX FLOW
858, 860 ENG OX IN PR
1058 ENG OX IN TEMP
90 HPOPDS PR
325, 326 HPOPBALCAVPR
30, 734 LPOP SPD
209, 210 LPOP DS PR
93, 94 PBP DS TNP
59, 159 PEP DS PR
412 FPB PC
480 OPB PC
878 HX INT PR
879 *HX ]NT T
881 *HX VENT IN PR
882 HX VENT IN T
883 HX VENT DP
40 *OPOVACT POS
42 tFPOVACT POS
2.54 .7 21.2 1. 1.7 .77 .3
2.46 .7 12.3 1. 1.7 .86 .3
4.71 1. 10.02 1. 2.0 .64 .3
7.16 1. 10.23 1. 2.0 ._ O.
4.26 1. 8.69 .5 1.5 .57 .3
.42 .1 .698 .1 .2 .34 O.
4.31 1. 8.3 .5 1.5 .61 .3
7.17 1. 9.96 .5 1.5 .86 .3
6.55 1. 9.5 .5 1.5 .77 .3
Table III-5: 901-331 Data Base
Data Base for EarLy Parameter Indicator s of Test CLassification: ]njector Failure
-Test 750-148 (LOX Post Fractures, Erosion-NCC) conducted 2 September 1961 for Engine 0110.
---Cutoff Tim 16. sac clue to m HPOT discherle temperature redtine.
---Early indications occur near 105I PL.
---Damage: Rain injector (burn thru of primer/ and seconder/ faceptate, 149 LOX posts), NCC (erosion
in one acoustic cavity), nozzle (150 tubes ruptured).
---impact: $7.0M, Detay Time- 8 weeks.
CRITERIA LEGEND: eOperatir_ Level Anomaly Criteria (LC)
LC = (Absotute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Value) x 100.
eRate Criteria (R__C) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
eDuration Criteria (DC)
DC : Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o time
t,,/E]GHTED LEVEL VALUE ASS]GNHENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-A: LEVEL-B: LEVEL-C:
Value of LC A-Value Value of RC B-Vatue Value of DC C-Value
>3Z ....... 1.0 >lO_/sec .... 1.0 >5sac ....... 1.0
>2Z-3X ........ 7 >5 -lO_/sec ..... 5 >1 -5sac ........ 7
1_-2_ ........ 3 1 - 5X/sec ..... 3 .5 -1sac ........ 3
<1_ ........ 1 <l_/sec ..... 1 <.Ssec ... O.
I . ..l._,_rsion time
" _ 0C_ c/o
( )---Numbers ,ithin the parenthesis indicate an earlier and more gradual "LC" change for the parameter.
*---Parameters prefixed with an asterisk indicate a change continues until cutoff time.
LEVEL
PID NO.(S) PARAHETER L..CC LEVEL-A RC - LEVEL-B A +B D..CC LEVEL-C
30. 1. 167. 1. 2.0 .55 .3
50.7 1. 181. 1. 2.0 .55 .3
10.6 1. 132.4 1. 2.0 .58 .3
9.9 1. 12.3 1. 2.0 .5 .3
(Sensor does not exist)
9. 1. 45. 1. 2.0 .6 .3
4.2 1. 42. 1. 2.0 .6 .3
4.2 1. 28. 1. 2.0 .63 .3
6.43 1. 13.4 1. 2.0 .48 O.
6.43 1. 13.4 1. 2.0 .48 O.
13.6 1. 25.7 1. 2.0 .53 .3
10.6 1. 20.5 1. 2.0 .52 .3
(Sensor malfunction)
(Sensor malfunction)
.1 .1 .58 .1 .2 .56 .3
4.2 1. 42. 1. 2.0 .58 .3
7.2 1. 31.2 1. 2.0 .55 .3
2.8 .7 - 9.3 .5 1.2 .56 .3
15.9 1. 31.8 1. 2.0 .5 .3
1.47 .3 7. .5 .8 .58 .3
(Sensors do not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist) "
30.9 1. 61.8 1. 2.0 .5 .3
(Sensor m[ function)
.9 .1 1.5 .3 .4 .48 O.
13.6 1. 25.7 1. 2.0 .53 .3
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor clots not exist)
2.17 .7 21. 1. 2.0 .55 .3
(Sensor does not exist)
32.6 1. 65.2 1. 2.0 .46 O.
37.6 1. 81.7 1. 2.0 .46 O.
(Sensor
.9 .1 2.23 .3
(No change is strikingly indicated)
4.7(1.) 1.(.3) 15.(14) 1.(1.)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
.4 .4 O.
8.0(1.3)
2.2
2.0(1.3) .62(.72) .3(.3)
3.38 1. 7.68 .5 1.5 .64 .3
8.6(2.) 1.(.7) 35.(14) 1.(1.) 2.0(1.7) .68(.83) .3(.3)
(Sensor does not exist)
4.7 1. 20.5 1. 2.0 .54 .3
5.5 1. 28.9 1. 2.0 .5 .3
2.31 .7 9.2 .5 1.2 .54 .3
3.83 1. 38.3 1. 2.0 .6 .3
.8 .1 3.0 .3 .4 .54 .3
4.47 1. 13.5 1. 2.0 .65 .3
5.9 1. 24.7 1. 2.0 .56 .3
6.0 1. 26.2 1. 2.0 .56 .3
3.4 1. 8.4 .5 1.5 .5 .3
.7 .1 2.3 .3 .4 .3 .3
2.6 .7 5.8 .5 1.2 .44 O.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
1.(.3) 24.(1.) 1.(.3) 2.0(.6) .4S(1.4) 0.(.7)
.7 7.35 .5 1.2 .6 .3
437-463 (INJ CLNT PR) -(MCC HG IN PR)
437-63 (INJ CLNT PR) -(NCC PC)
463-63 (HCC HG IN PR) -(HCC PC)
395-383 (MCC OX INJ PR) -(MCC PC)
940-372 (HPFP CL LNR PR)'(MCC HG IN PR)
459-383 (HPFP DS PR) -(NCC PC)
411-463 (FPB PC) -(HCC HG IN PR)
480-463 (OPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR)
63, 163 HCC PC
200 HCC PC AVG
436 *HCC CLNT DS PR
18 *HCC CLNT DS T
24 HCC FU INJ PR
1951, 1956 MCC LN CAV P
595 NCC OX INJ TEHP
86 HPFP IN PR
459 HPFP DS PR
659 HPFP DS T
457 *HPFP BAL CAV PR
52, 764 HPFP SPD
53, 940 HPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR
658 HPFP DR TEHP
663 *HPFT DS T1 A
232 HPFT DS T1 B
754 LPFP SPD
436 LPFT IN PR
1205, 1206 FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
722 ENG FU FLOW
1722 ENG FU FLOW CT
518 *HPOT DS T1
519 *HPOT DS T2
1190 NPOT PRSL DR T
1071 *OX BLD INT T
1054 OX FAC FH DS T
854 FAC OX FH DS PR
1214 FAC OX FLOW CT
1212, 1213 FAC OX FLOW
858 ENG OX XN PR
1058 ENGOX IN TEHP
338 HPOPDS PR
325, 326 HPOP BALCAV PR
734 LPOPSPD
302 LPOP DS PR
93, 94 PBP DS THP
59, 159 PBP DS PR
412 FPB PC
480 OPBPC
878 HX INT PR
87'9 *HX INT T
881 *HX VENT IN PR
HX VENT IN T
883 NX VENT DP
40 OPOV ACT POS
42 FPOVACT POS
Table III-6: 750-I48 Data Base
Data Base for EarLy Parameter Indicators of Test Classification: Injector Fat Lure
-Test 901-183 (LOX Post Fractures, Eroston-HCC) conducted 5 June 1978 for Engine 0005.
---Cutoff Time= 51.1 sec. due to an erroneous IIPFP radial acceterameter redtine.
---Early indications occur near 92% PL.
---Damage: Hain injector (burn thru of primary faceptate only, 15-LOX posts), HCC (minor scalding),
end nozzle (a failed saddle patch at tube #246.).
--- Impact: Unavai table.
CRITERIA LEGEND: eOperatinfl Level Anomaly Criteria (LC)
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Value) x 100.
aRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
_uration Criteria (DC)
DC = Duration from the Point of first failure indications to c/o time
WEIGHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNMENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-B: LEVEL-C:
Value of RC B-Value Vatue of DC C-Value
>lO%/sec .... 1.0 >Ssec ....... 1.0
>5 -lO%/sec ..... 5 >1 -Ssec ........ 7
1 - 5%/sec ..... 3 .5 -lsec ........ 3
<1%/sec ..... 1 <.Ssec ....... O.
LEVEL-A:
Value of LC A-Value
>3% ....... 1.0
>_%-3% ........ 7
1%-2% ........ 3
<1% ........ I
PID NO.(S) PARANETER
366-371 (]NJ CLNT PR) -(HCC HG IN PR)
366-383 (|NJ CLNT PR) -(HCC PC)
371-383 (HCC HG IN PR) -(HCC PC)
395-383 (HCC OX INJ PR) -(HCC PC)
940-371 (HPFP CL LNR PR)-(MCC HG IN PR)
459-383 (HPFP DS PR) -(MCC PC)
412-371 (FPB PC) -(HCC HG IN PR)
480-371 (OrB PC) -(HCC HG IN PR)
63, 163 MCC PC
200 HCC PC AVG
436 HCC CLNT DS PR
566 HCC CLNT DS T
24 HCC FU INJ PR
1951, 1956 HCC LN CAV P
595 MCC OX ]NJ TEHP
86 HPFP IN PR
459 HPFP DS PR
659 HPFP DS T
457 HPFP BAL CAV PR
52, 764 HPFP SPD
53, 940 HPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR
658 HPFP DR TENP
663 HPFT DS T1A
664 HPFT DS T1B
754 LPFP SPD
436 LPFT IN PR
1205, 1206 FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
722 ENG FU FLOW
1722 ENG FU FLOW CT
233 HPOT DS T1
234 HPOT DS T2
1190 HPOT PRSL DR T
1071 OX BLD INT T
1054 OX FAC FH DS T
854 FAC OX FH DS PR
1214 FAC OX FLOW CT
1212, 1213 FAC OX FLOW
858, 860 ENG OX IN PR
1058 ENG OX IN TEHP
338 HPOP DS PR
325, 326 HPOP BALCAV PR
30, 734 LPOP SPD
209, 210 LPOP DS PR
93, 94 PBP DS THP
341 PBP DS PR
412 FPB PC
480 OrB PC
878 _X INT PR
879 HX INT T
861 HX VENT IN PR
HX VENT IN T
883 HX VENT DP
40 OPOV ACT POS
42 FPOV ACT POS
LEVELS
LC LEVEL-A RC LEVEL-B A+B DC LEVEL'C
157.1 1. 32.7 1. 2.0 27.1 1.
9.74 i. 2.78 .3 1.3 26.8 1.
2.44 .7 3.6 .3 1.3 26.5 1.
1.44 .3 .3 .1 .4 26.9 1.
(Sensor does not exist)
.77 .1 1.19 .3 .4 27. 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.27 .1 1.43 .3 .4 26.89 1.
.27 .1 1.43 .3 .4 26.89 1.
.52 .1 1.3 .3 .4 26.85 1.
1.04 .3 .32 .1 .4 26.6 1.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
.49 .1 1.35 .3 .4 26.88 1.
.19 .1 .16 .1 .2 28. 1.
3.39 1. .89 .1 1.1 30.9 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensors do not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
1.597 .3 15.97 1. 1.3 26.6 1.
1.38 .3 9.2 .5 .8 26.6 1.
.69 .1 .06 .1 .2 38. 1.
.52 .1 1.3 .3 .4 26.85 1.
.69 .I 1.69 .3 .4 26.5 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.51 .1 2.32 .3 .4 26.52 1.
(sensor malfunction)
.53 .1 2.11 .3 .4 26.6 1.
.28 .1 1.19 .3 .4 26.6 1.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor malfunction)
.29 .1 .37 .1 .2 26.7 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.2 .1 1.13 .3 .4 26.88 1.
.11 .1 .51 .1 .2 26.61 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor does not exist)
.48 .1 2.4 .3 .4 26.7 1.
.30 .1 .41 .1 .2 27.4 1.
.31 .1 1.54 .3 .4 26.9 1.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
.234 .1 .17 .1 .2 27.5 1.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
1.1 .3 .734 .1 .4 26.75 1.
.39 .1 1.95 .3 .4 25.8 1.
Table III-7: 901-183 Data Base
Data Base for EarLy Para_neter Indicators of Test Ctassification: Injector FaiLure
-Test 902-198 (LOX Post Fractures, Erosion-HOe) conducted 23 July 1980 for Engine 2004.
---Cutoff Time= 8.5 sac. due to a NPOT discharge temperature redtJne.
---Earty indications occur near 102_ PL.
---Danmge: Hain injector (bunn thru of primary faceptate only, 56 LOX posts), HCC (miner
erosion in acoustic cavity and to coolant channels), nozzle (11 tubes ruptured, 27 w/dents)
---Impact: $1H (for repair/reptacement only), DeLay Time- 12 weeks.
CRITERIA LEGEND: eOperating Level AnomaLy Criteria (LC)
LC = (AbsoLute Change in Steady State VaLue/Steady State Value) x 100.
aRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
eOuration Criteria (DC)
DC = Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o time
NEIGHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNHENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-A: LEVEL-B: LEVEL-C:
VaLue of LC A-VaLue VaLue of RC B-VaLue VaLue of OC C-VaLue
>3% ....... 1.0 >lO%/sec .... 1.0 >5sac ....... 1.0
>2%-3X ........ 7 >5 -lO_/sec ..... 5 >1 -Ssec ........ 7
lZ-2X ........ 3 1 - 5%/sac ..... 3 .5 -1Sac ........ 3
<1% ........ 1 <1X/sac ..... 1 <.5sac .... O.
*---Parameters prefixed with an
PID NO.(S) PARAMETER
17-24 (INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC HG IN PR)
17-163 (INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC PC)
24-163 (HCC HG ZN PR) -(HCC PC)
395-383 (HCC OX INJ PR) -(HCC PC)
940-371 (HPFP CL LNR PR)-(HCC HG IN PR)
459-383 (HPFP DS PR) -(HCC PC)
411-24 (FPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR)
480-24 (OPB PC) -(HCC HG IN PR)
63, 163 MCC PC
200 HCC PC AVG
17 NCC CLNT DS PR
18 *MCC CLNT DS T
24 HCC FU INJ PR
1951, 1956 MCC LN CAV P
595 *MCC OX INJ TEMP
86 HPFP IN PR
459 HPFP DS PR
659 HPFP DS T
457 HPFP BAL CAV PR
52, 764 HPFP SPD
53, 940 NPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR
658 HPFP DR TEMP
231 HPFT DS T1A
232 HPFT DS T1 g
754 LPFP SPD
436 LPFT IN PR
1205, 1206 FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
722 ENG FU FLOW
1722 ENG FU FLOW CT
233 *HPOT DS T1
234 *HPOT DS T2
1190 *HPOT PRSL DR T
1071 OX BLD INT T
1054 *OX FAC FM DS T
854 *FAC OX FH DS PR
1210 FAC OX FLOW CT
1212, 1213 *FAC OX FLOW
858 *ENG OX IN PR
1058 ENG OX IN TEMP
338 HPOP DS PR
325, 326 HPOP BALCAV PR
LPOP SPD
209,210 LPOP DS PR
93, 94 PBP DS TMP
59, 159 PBP DS PR
412 FPB PC
480 OPB PC
878 HX INT PR
879 *HX INT T
881 HX VENT IN PR
882 NX VENT IN T
883 HX VENT DP
40 OPOVACT POS
42 *FPOVACT POS
asterisk indicate
LC LEVEL-A
+  siontime
L__... I--- pC---.4 c/o
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
a change continues until cutoff time.
LEVELS
RC LEVEL-B A +B DC LEVEL-C
4.17 1. 16.7 1. 2.0 3. .7
5.33 1. 17.7 1. 2.0 3. .7
21.77 1. 15. 1. 2.0 2.8 .7
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
1.91 .3 9.55 .5 .8 3. .7
3.35 1. 6.7 .5 1.5 2.75 .7
6.63 1. 5.1 .5 1.5 3. .7
1.54 .3 6.98 .5 .8 3. .7
1.54 .3 6.98 .5 .8 3. .7
1.98 .3 10.98 1. 1.3 2.98 .7
12.5 1. 5.34 .5 1.5 2.84 .7
1.76 .3 7.98 .5 .8 3.01 .7
(Sensor malfunction)
1.63 .3 .77 .1 .4 2.6 .7
9.89 1. 7.27 .5 1.5 3.1 .7
1.63 . .3 7.45 .5 .8 3.0 .7
.69 .3 3.13 .3 .6 3.01 .7
2.08 .7 10.4 1. 1.7 2.92 .7
.43 .1 3.92 .3 .4 3.01 .7
1.449 .3 9.66 .5 .8 2.9 .7
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
84.1 1. 210. 1. 2.0 2.9 .7
5.5 1. 13.8 1. 2.0 2.9 .7
3.33 1. 4.44 .3 1.3 3.0 .7
2.19 .7 9.9 .5 1.2 3.0 .7
3.58 1. 5.1 .5 1.5 2.85 .7
(No change is strikingly indicated)
2.64 .7 7.57 .5 1.2 2.85 .7
(No change is strikingly indicated)
30.11 1. 12.04 1. 2.0 3.0 .7
28.5 1. 11.39 1. 2.0 3.0 .7
29.9 1. 11.96 1. 2.0 3.0 .7
4.99 1. 4.54 .3 1.3 3.1 .7
.05 .1 .02 .1 .2 3.0 .7
3.66 1. 1.47 .3 1.3 3.0 .7
(No change is strikingly indicated)
5.79 1. 2.32 .3 1.3 3.0 .7
3.44 1. 1.38 .3 1.3 3.0 .7
.76 .1 1.41 .3 .4 1.81 .7
4.21 1. 2.45 .3 1.3 2.72 .7
4.64 1. 2.32 .3 1.3 3.0 .7
2.17 .7 1.21 .3 1.0 3.0 .7
4.73 1. 18.95 1. 2.0 2.9 .7
2.05 .7 .93 .1 .8 2.7 .7
6.03 1. 3.55 .3 1.3 2.72 .7
1.17 .3 4.86 .3 .6 3.0 .7
2.24 .7 1.32 .3 1.0 2.84 .7
4.51 1. 2.48 .3 1.3 2.7 .7
15.44 1. 7.72 .5 1.5 2.5 .7
1.61 .3 1.08 .3 .6 2.88 .7
(No change is strikingly indicated)
1.85 .3 1.48 .3 .6 2.75 .7
5.00 I. 2.17 .3 1.3 3.0 .7
2.29 .7 .93 .1 .8 2.74 .7
Table III-8: 902-198 Data _ase
Data Base for Early Parameter Indicators of Test CLassification: Injector Failure
•.Test 901-307 (LOX-Post Fractures, Erosion-FPB), conducted 28 January 1981 for Engine 0009.
---Cutoff Time- 75.025 sec due to an Etevation-J pressure redline.
---Early indications occur near 65X PL
---Damage: FPB injector (severe face erosion, 4-LOX posts and fuel sleeves eroded beck into fuel
manifold), HPFTP (most 1st-stage turbines with heavy spatting & appear with cracks at root)
--- Impact: Unavai table
CRITERIA LEGEND: eOparatin9 Level Anomaly Criteria (LC)
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Vatue/Steedy State Value) x 100.
eRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
_uration Criteria (DC)
DC = Duration from the paint of first failure indications to c/o time
WEIGHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNHENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-A: LEVEL-B: LEVEL-C:
Value of LC A-Value Value of RC B-Value Value of DC C-Value
>3X ....... 1.0 >lO_/sec .... 1.0 >5sec ....... 1.0
>2_-3_ ........ 7 >5 -lOX/sec ..... 5 >1 -5sac ........ 7
1X-2_ ........ 3 1 - 5_/sec ..... 3 .5 -1sac ........ 3
<1_ ........ 1 <l_/sec ..... 1 <.5sac ....... O.
P[D NO.(S) PARAHETER
366-371 (%NJ CLNT PR) -(HCC HG iN PR)
366-163 (INJ CLNT PR) -(NCC PC)
371-163 (NCC HG IN PR) -(NCC PC)
395-163 (NCC OX INJ PR) -(HCC PC)
940-371 (HPFP CL LNR PR)-(NCC HG IN PR)
459-383 (HPFP DS PR) -(NCC PC)
410-371 (FPB PC) -(NCC HG IN PR)
480-371 (OPB PC) -(HCC HG IN PR)
63, 163 MCC PC
200 HCC PC AVG
17 HCC CLNT DS PR
18 HCC CLNT DS T
24 *HCC FU INJ PR
1951 HCC LN CAV P
21 HCC OX INJ TEHP
86 HPFP IN PR
52 HPFP DS PR
659 HPFP DS T
457 HPFP BAL CAV PR
52, T64 HPFP SPO
940 HPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR
658 HPFP DR TEHP
231 HPFT DS T1A
232 *HPFT DS T1S
754 LPFP SPD
436 LPFT IN PR
1205, 1206 FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
722 ENG FU FLOW
1722 ENG FU FLOW CT
233 *HPOT DS T1
234 *HPOT DS T2
1190 HPOT PRSL DR T
1071 OX BLD [NT T
1054, 1056 OX FAC FH DS T
854 FAC OX FH DS PR
1210 FAC OX FLO_/ CT
1212, 1213 FAC OX FLOW
858, 860 ENG OX IN PR
762 ENG OX IN TEHP
90 *HPOP DS PR
328 *HPOP BALCAV PR
30, 734 LPOP SPD
209 *LPOP DS PR
93, 94 PBP DS THP
59 e 159 PBP DS PR
410 *FPB PC
480 *OPB PC
873 *HX iNT PR
879 HX iNT T
881 HX VENT 1N PR
882 *HX VENT IN T
883 HX VENT DP
40 OPOV ACT POS
42 FPOV ACT POS
...... P.._.
L_CC LEVE L - A R_CC "LEVE L - B D_CC LEVEL - C
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
8.01 1. .29 .1 1.1 28. 1.
25.(21) 1.(1.) 50.(3.4) 1.(.3) 2.0(1.3) 20.3(53) 1.(1.)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.38 .1 .11 .1 .2 38.5 1.
.61 .1 .01 .1 .2 40.5 1.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
3.4 1. .15 .1 1.1 23. 1.
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No cha.nge is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
1.2(1.1) .3(.3) 2.48(.2) .3(.1) .6(.4) 26.(57) 1.(1.)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
4.(3.1) 1.(1.) 1.2(2.1) .3(.3) 1.3(1.3) 14.(54.5) 1.
4.6 1. .1 .1 1.1 44. 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
4.4 1. .17 .1 1.1 26. 1.
4.5 1. .16 .1 1.1 28. 1.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
21.2 1. 4.25 .3 1.3 49. 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor ma[ function)
(Sensor malfunction)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
1.26 .3 .04 .1 .4 28.5 1.
1.14 .3 .04 .1 .4 27.5 1.
.26 .1 .07 .1 .2 28.5 1.
9.2 1. .3 .1 1.1 31.0 1.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
1.69 .3 .11 .1 .4 27.5 1.
1.01 .3 .04 .1 .4 28.0 1.
.82 .1 .03 .1 .2 28.0 1.
1.5 .3 .05 .1 .4 28.0 1.
3.8 1. .15 .1 1.1 24.5 1.
(No change iS strikingly indicated)
.98 .1 .04 .1 .2 26.0 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
3.41 1. .4 .1 1.1 37.0 1.
1.26 .3 1.1 .3 .6 29.5 1.
Table III-9 : 901-307 Data Base
( )---Numbers within the parenthesis indicate an earlier and more greduet "LC" change for the parameter.
*---Parameters prefixed with an asterisk indicate a change continues until cutoff time.
Data Base for l_arty Parameter Indicators of Test CLassification: injector Failure
-SFIO-01 (FPB Anomalies) conducted 12 July 1980 for Engine Ou06.
---Cutoff Time: 106.6 sec clue to a fire detection observer.
---Early indications occur near 102"4 PL
---Damage: FPB injector (eroded hole thnu Liner and outer wall, Located 2" betou fuel manifold),
HPFTP (all turbine blades with moderate to heavy spatting of Zr coating)
---Impact: $1.5M, Delay Time- 16 weeks.
CRITERIA LEGEND: eOperating Level Anomaly Criteria (LC)
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Value) x 100.
eRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
eOuration Criteria (DC)
OC = Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o tima
_/EIGHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNHENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-A: LEVEL-B: LEVEL-C:
Value of LC A-Value Value of RC B-Value Value of DC C-Value
>3X ....... 1.0 >lO%/sec .... 1.0 >Ssec ....... 1.0
>2%-3X ........ 7 >5 -lO%/sec ..... 5 >1 -5sec ........ 7
1%-2% ........ 3 1 -" 5%/sec ..... 3 .5 -lsec ........ 3
<1% ........ 1 <1%/sec ..... 1 <.5sec ....... O.
*---Parameters prefixed with an
PID NO.(S) PARAHETER
366-371 (]NJ CLNT PR) -(HCC HG IN PR)
366-163 (INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC PC)
371-163 (HCC HG IN PR) -(HCC PC)
395-163 (HCC OX INJ PR) -(HCC PC)
940-371 (HPFP CL LNR PR)-(HCC HG IN PR)
459-383 (HPFP DS PR) -(MCC PC)
410-371 (FPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR)
480-371 (OPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR)
E41P3023D HCC PC
E41P3039D HCC PC AVG
E41P3067D HCC CLNT DS PR
E41T3070D HCC CLNT 0S T
24 HCC FU INJ PR
1921 MCC LN CAV P
595 HCC OX INJ TEHP
86 HPFP IN PR
E41P3029D HPFP DS PR
659 HPFP 0S T
457 HPFP BAL CAV PR
52, 764 HPFP SPD
53, 940 HPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR
658 HPFP DR TEHP
A49T3010H HPFT DS T1A
A49T3011H HPFT DS T1B
E41R3072D LPFP SPD
436 LPFT IN PR
1205, 1206 FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
E41RlO_D ENG FU FLOW
1722 ENG FU FLOW CT
A49T3012H *HPOT DS T1
A49T3013H *HPOT DS T2
1190 HPOT PRSL DR T
1071 OX BLD INT T
1054, 1056 OX FAC FH DS T
854 FAC OX FH DS PR
1210 FAC OX FLOW CT
1212, 1213 FAC OX FLOW
858, 860 ENG OX IN PR
1058 ENG OX IN TEHP
90 HPOP DS PR
325, 326 HPOP BALCAV PR
30, 734 LPOP SPD
209 LPOP DS PR
93, 94 PBP DS TNP
E41P3033D PBP DS PR
E41P3031D FPB PC
E41P3032D OPB PC
878 fiX INT PR
879 HX INT T
881 HX VENT IN PR
882 HX VENT IN T
883 HX VENT DP
E41H30280 OPOV ACT POS
E41NlO270 FPOV ACT POS
asterisk indicate
LC LEVEL-A
l"-'-- 0C---_ c/o
a change continues until cutoff time.
LEVELS
R_CC LEVEL-B A +B D_CC LEVEL-C
1. 1.3 5.2 1.
1. 1.3 5.2 1.
1. 1.7 5.25 1.
.1 1.1 24.1 1.
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor is unavaiLabLe)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
1.77 .3 17.7
1.77 .3 17.7
2.32 .7 15.5
3.98 1. .184
1.7 5.25 1.
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor is unavaiLabLe)
2.92 .7 29.2 1.
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensors do not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not ex{st)
(Sensor does not exist)
6.3 1. 25.4
5.3 1. 35.
.84 .I .64
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
2.44 .7 24.4
(Sensor does not exist)
8.0 1. 2.5
9.0 I. 2.8
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
1. 2.0 5.15 1.
1. 2.0 5.15 1.
.1 .2 5.2 1.
1. 1.7 5.2S 1.
.3 1.3 5.2 1.
.3 1.3 5.2 1.
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Senson does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
2.3 .7 15.5 1. 1.7 5.2 1.
2.94 .7 29.4 1. 1.7 5.25 1.
2.15 .7 21.5 1. 1.7 5.25 1.
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
3.43 1. 1.4 .3 1.3 5.2 1.
2.2 .7 14.7 1. 1.7 5.25 1.
Table III-lO: SFIO-OI Data Base
Data Sa_e for Early Parameter Indicators of Test Ctos_if|cation: Control Failure
Test 901-284 (Erroneous Sensor, Lee Jet) conducted 30 July 1980 for Engine 0010.
---Cutoff Time- 9.M sac due to a HIP radial acceterometer redtine
---Early indications occur near IOOX PL
---Damage: Extensive engine danmge t_hen LPOP dJsch, duct ruptured, HPOTP (general gutting of pump
end), POGO-system blown off with LPOP disch, duct, controller (severe fire damage)
---Impact: $9.2M, Delay Time- 16 weeks.
_RITERIA LEGEND: eOperatin 9 Level Anomaly Criteria (LC)
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Value) x 100.
eRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(ExcursJon time interval in seconds)
_uration Criteria (DC)
DC : Duration from the point of first failure indications to OlD time
WEIGHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNHENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-A: LEVEL-B: LEVEL-C:
Value of LC A-Value Value of RC B-Value Value of DC C-Value
>32 ....... 1.0 >lOX/sec .... 1.0 >5sec ....... 1.0
>2_-3g ........ 7 >5 -lOZ/sec ..... 5 >1 -Ssec ........ 7
1_-22 ........ 3 1 - 5X/sec ..... 3 .5 -lsec ........ 3
<lg ....... 1 <lZ/sec ..... 1 <.Ssec ....... O.
• LEVELS
P]D NO.(S) PARAHETER LC LEVEL-A R_.CC LEVEL-B A ÷._..BB
366-371 (INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC HG IN PR) (Sensor does not exist)
366-163 (iNJ CLNT PR) -(HCC PC) (Sensor does net exist)
371-163 (HCC HG IN PR) -(HCC PC) (Sensor does not exist)
395-163 (HCC OX INJ PR) -(HCC PC) 270.8 1. 417. 1. 2.0
940-371 (HPFP CL LNR PR)-(HCC HG IN PR) (Sensor does not exist)
459-383 (HPFP DS PR) -(HCC PC) 70. 1. 107.7 1. 2.0
410-371 (FPB PC) -(HCC HG IN PR) (Sensor does not exist)
480-371 (OPB PC) -(HCC HG IN PR) (Sensor does not exist)
63, 163 HCC PC 31. 1. 620.7 1. 2.0
200 HCC PC AVG 31. 1. 620.7 1. 2.0
17 HCC CLNT DS PR 37.9 1. 114.9 1. 2.0
18 HCC CLNT DS T 79.8 1. 798. 1. 2.0
24 HCC FU INJ PR 43.2 1. 134.9 1. 2.0
1921 HCC LN CAV P (Sensor malfunction)
595 NCC OX INJ TEHP 5.38 1. 13.5 1. 2.0
86 HPFP IN PR 20.5 1. 114. 1. 2.0
52 HPFP DS PR 39.8 . 1. - 120.7 1. 2.0
659 HPFP DS T 19.8 1. 58.2 1. 2.0
457 HPFP BAL CAV PR 16.7 1. 47.6 1. 2.0
52, 764 HPFP SPD 19.4 1. 57.1 1. 2.0
53, 940 HPFP CL LNR PR (Sensors do net exist)
650 HPFP CL LNR T (Sensor does net exist)
657 HPFP OR PR (Sensor does net exist)
658 HPFP DR TEHP (Sensor does net exist)
231 HPFT DS T1A 25.1 1. 71.7 1. 2.0
232 HPFT DS T1B (Sensor malfunction)
754 LPFP SPD 14.7 1. 40.7 1. 2.0
436 LPFT IN PR (Sensor does not exist)
1205, 1206 FAC FU FL 20.97 1. 70. 1. 2.0
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT (Sensor does not exist)
722 ENG FU FLOW 19.5 1. 52.6 1. 2.0
1722 ENG FU FLOt4 CT (No change is strikingly indicated)
233 HPOT DS T1 69.7 1. 34.9 1. 2.0
234 HPOT DS T2 (Sensor malfunction)
1190 HPOT PRSL DR T 26.7 1. 63.5 1. 2.0
1071 OX BLD INT T (Sensor does net exist)
1054, 1056 OX FAC FH DS T .52 .1 .89 .1 .2
854 FAC OX FH DS PR 28. 1. 73.6 1. 2.0
1210 FAC OX FLOW CT (No change is strikingly indicated)
1212, 1213 FAC OX FLOW 63.6 1. 212.1 1. 2.0
858, 860 ENG OX IN PR 51.6 1. 214.9 1. 2.0
1058 ENG OX IN TEHP .48 .1 1.66 .3 .4
90 HPOP DS PR 49.3 1. 149.2 1. 2.0
325, 326 HPOP BALCAV PR 52.2 1. 163.2 1. 2.0
30, 734 LPOP SPD 29.3 1. 97.6 1. 2.0
209 LPOP DS PR 28.6 1. 142.8 1. 2.0
93, 94 PBP DS THP 7.0 1. 13.5 1. 2.0
59, 159 PBP DS PR (Sensors malfunctioned)
410 FPB PC 40.8 1. 110.3 1. 2.0
480 OPB PC 47.5 1. 128.3 1. 2.0
878 HX ]NT PR 53.5 1. 133.8 1. 2.0
879 HX ]NT T 7.62 1. 11.7 1. 2.0
881 HX VENT IN PR 53.7 1. 59. 1. 2.0
882 HX VENT IN T (No change is strikingly indicated)
883 HX VENT DP 53.6 1. 59.5 1. 2.0
40 OPOV ACT POS 31.7 1. 113.4 1. 2.0
42 FPOV ACT POS 5.4 1. 27. 1. 2.0
DC--"--I clo
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D._C LEVEL-C
6.03 I.
6.03 1.
6.03 I.
6.03 I.
5.96 I.
6._ I.
5.96 I.
5.48 1.
6.08 1.
5.96 1.
5.92 1.
5.93 1.
5.96 1.
6.01
5.93
5.B8
5.95
5.88
6.03
6.46
5.96
5.88
5.9
4.43
5.96
5.96
5.88
5.76
5.92
1. _
1.
1.
1.
1.
1o
1.
1.
1.
1.
.7
1.
1.
1.
1.
1.
5.96 1.
5.96 1.
5.83 1.
5.53 1.
5.79 1.
5.78 I.
6.03 I.
6._ I.
Table III-ll: 901-284 Data Base
pats Base for Early Parameter |ndicator s of Test Classification: Duct, Manifold, or Neat Exchanger Failure
-Test 750-259 (MCC Outlet Manifold Neck Failure) conducted 2_ March 1965 for Engine 2308.
---Cutoff Time= 101.5 sac due to a HPFP ecceterlmeter redline.
---Early indications occur near 109¢ PL
---Damage: Engine sustained extensive internal and external damage as a result of the failure and
subsequent impact with the flame deflector and spillway.
---Impact: Unavailable.
CRITERIA LEGEND: eOperatin 9 Level Anomaly Criteria (LC)
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Value) x 100.
eRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
, _ OC_ clo
_uration Criteriq (DC)
PC = Duration from the paint of first failure indications to c/o time
WE]GHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNHENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-A: LEVEL-B: LEVEL-C:
Value of LC A-Value Value of RC B-Value Value of 0C C-Value
>3_ ....... 1.0 >lO_/sec .... 1.0 >Ssec ....... 1.0
>2X-3X ........ 7 >5 -lO_/sec ..... 5 >1 -5sac ........ 7
1_-2_ ........ 3 1 - 5X/sac ..... 3 .5 -1sac ........ 3
(1_ ........ 1 <l_/sec ..... 1 <.5sec ...... _ O.
( )---Numbers within the parenthesis indicate an earlier and mre gradual "LC" change for the parm=ter.
*---Parameters prefixed with an asterisk indicate a change continues until cutoff time.
PID NO.(S) PARAMETER
366-367 (%NJ CLNT PR) -(HCC HG ]N PR)
366-163 (]NJ CLNT PR) "(MCC PC)
367"163 *(HCC HG %N PR) "(HCC PC)
395"163 *(HCC OX INJ PR) "(HCC PC)
940-367 (HPFP CL LNR PR)-(MCC HG IN PR)
459-383 (HPFP DS PR) -(HCC PC)
410-367 (FPB PC) -(HCG HG IN PR)
480-367 (OrB PC) -(HCC HG IN PR)
63, 163 *MCC PC
200 HCC PC AVG
17 HCC CLNT DS PR
18 HCC CLNT DS T
24 *HCC FU ]NJ PR
1921 MCC LN CAV P
595 HCC OX ]NJ TEMP
86 HPFP IN PR
52 HPFP DS PR
659 HPFP DS T
657 *HPFP BAL CAV PR
52, 764 HPFP SPD
53 *HPFP CL LNR PR
650 NPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR
658 HPFP DR TEMP
231 HPFT DS TI A
232 *HPFT OS T1B
754 LPFP SPD
436 *LPFT IN PR
1205, 1206 *FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
722 *ENG FU FLO_
1722 ENG FU FLOW CT
233 HPOT DS TI
234 *HPOT DS T2
1190 HPOT PRSL DR T
1071 OX BLD INT T
1054, 1056 OX FAC FM 0S T
854 FAC OX FM DS PR
1210 FAC OX FLOW CT
1212, 1213 FAC OX FLOW
858, 860 ENG OX IN PR
1058 ENG OX IN TEHP
90 *HPOP DS PR
325, 326 *HPOP BALCAV PR
30, 734 *LPOP SPD
209 *LPOP DS PR
93, 94 *PaP DS THP
59, 159 *PBP DS PR
410 *FPB PC
480 *OPB PC
878 *HX iNT PR
879 *HX iNT T
881 HX VENT IN PR
882 HX VENT IN T
883 NX VENT OP
40 *OPOVACT
42 *FPOVACT POS
LEVELS
LC LEVEL-._A R_CC " LEVEL-B A +.._._B D_CC LEVEL-_
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
100. 1. 1667. 1. 2.0 .16 O.
92.1 1. 575. 1. 2.0 .16 O.
(Sensor is not available)
(Sensor is not available)
4.1 1. 45.8 1. 2.0 .22 O.
5.7 1. 188.4 1. 2.0 .16 O.
3.9 1. 20.6 1. 2.0 .19 O.
3.9 I. 20.6 I. 2.0 .19 O.
100. 1. 1667. 1. 2.0 .19 0.
275. 1. 3930. 1. 2.0 .19 O.
56.3 1. Lx)7. 1. 2.0 .19 O.
(Sensor malfunction)
.25 .1 2.5 .3 .4 .16 O.
32.9 1. 365.2 1. 2.0 .19 O.
(No change is st£ikingly indicated)
(Sensor does not exist)
36.4 1. 228. 1. 2.0 .16 O.
100. 1. 3333. 1. 2.0 .16 O.
56. 1. 295. 1. 2.0 .19 O.
(Sensor does not exist)
410. 1. 13667. 1. 2.0 .17 O.
(Sensor malfunction)
24.9 1. 355. 1. 2.0 .19 0.
14. 1. 116. 1. 2.0 .12 O.
61.9 1. 364. 1. 2.0 .17 O.
73.6 1. 1227. 1. 2.0 .17 O.
8.8 1. 88. 1. 2.0 .1 O.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
99.7 1. 623. 1. 2.0 .16 O.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
24(1.9) 1.(.3) 258(.5) 1.(.1) 2.0(.4) .19(9.7) O.
5.9(.6) 1.(.1) 39(3.2) 1.(.3) 2.0(.4) .1(10.5) O.
75.3 1. 3765. 1. 2.0 .17 0.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
36.3 1. 908.3 1. 2.0 .15 O.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
52.9 1. 278.6 1. 2.0 .19 O.
12.32 1. 77. 1. 2.0 .16 0.
5.7 1. 57. 1. 2.0 .1 O.
55.9 I. _4.1 I. 2.0 .19 O.
6.2 I. 51.4 I. 2.0 .19 O.
4.1 1. 31.3 1. 2.0 .13 O.
13.9 1 • 86.7 1. 2.0 .16 O.
14.0 1. 87.5 1. 2.0 .16 O.
.97 .1 8.07 .5 .6 .12 0.
6.1 1. 202.7 1. 2.0 .16 O.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady s;ate conditions)
(Sensor does not exist)
1.8(.5) .3(.1) 9.(.09) .5(.1) .8(.2) .2(10.5) 0.
5.7 1. 47.8 1. 2.0 .12 O.
Table III-12: 750-259 Data Base
_)ate Base for Early Parameter Indicators of Test Classification: Duct, Manifold, or Heat Exchange Failure
-Test 901-485 (Nozzle Tube Rupture), conducted 24 July 1985 for Engine 2105.
---Cutoff Time= 28.56 sac due to HPOT discharge temperature redtine.
---Early indications occur near 109_ PL
---Damage: NPFP turbine (borescope Inspection indicated a suspected crack), nozzle (hot Ma[t eyelid
tube rupture 1/8in. by 1/4|n., 14.5 inches from junction G15)
---Impact: Unavailable.
CRITERIA LEGEND: eOperatin 9 Level Anomaly Criteria (LC)
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Value) x 100.
crete Criteria (RC) = LC/(ExcurMon time interval in seconds)
_uration Criteria (DC)
OC = Duration from the l_int-of first failure indications to c/o time
I_EIGHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNMENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-A: LEVEL-B: LEVEL-C:
Value of LC A-Value Value of RC B-Value Value of DC C-Value
>3_ ....... 1.0 >lO_/sec .... 1.0 >Ssec ....... 1.0
>2_-3_ ........ 7 >5 -lO_/sec ..... 5 >1 -Ssec ........ 7
1_-2_ ........ 3 1 - 5X/sec ..... 3 .5 -lsec ........ 3
<1_ ....... ,1 <l_/sec ..... 1 <.5sec ...... , O.
*---Parameters prefixed with an
PID NO.(S) PARAMETER
366-371 (INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC HG IN PR)
366-163 (%NJ CLNT PR) -(MCC PC)
]71-163 (HCC HG IN PR) -(MCC PC)
]95-163 (HCC OX INJ PR) -(HCC PC)
940-371 (HPFP CL LNR PR)-(MCC HG IN PR)
459-383 (HPFP DS PR) -(MCC PC)
410-371 (FPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR)
480-371 (OPB PC) -(HCC HG IN PR)
63, 163 HCC PC
200 HCC PC AVG
17 MCC CLNT DS PR
18 HCC CLNT DS T
24 HCC FU |NJ PR
1921 MCC LN CAV P
595 MCC OX INJ TEHP
86 HPFP IN PR
52 NPFP DS PR
659 HPFP 0S T
457 HPFP BAL CAV PR
52, 764 HPFP SPO
53, 940 HPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR
658 HPFP DR TEMP
231 HPFT DS T1 A
232 HPFT DS T1 a
754 LPFP SPD
436 LPFT IN PR
1205, 1206 FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
722 ENG FU FLOW
1722 ENG FU FLOIJ CT
233 *HPOT DS T1
234 HPOT DS T2
1190 HPOT PRSL DR T
1071 OX BLD ]NT T
1054, 1056 OX FAC FH DS T
854 FAC OX FM DS PR
1210 FAC OX FLOW CT
1212, 1213 FAC OX FLOW
858, 860 ENG OX IN PR
1058 ENG OX IN TEHP
90 HPOP DS PR
_25, 326 HPOP BALCAV PR
30, 734 LPOP SPD
209 LPOP DS PR
93, 94 PBP DS TMP
59, 159 PBP DS PR
410 FPB PC
480 OPB PC
878 *HX INT PR
879 HX [NT T
881 HX VENT IN PR
882 NX VENT IN T
883 NX VENT DP
40 *OPOVACT POS
42 FPOI/ACT
I
DC _ c/o
asterisk indicate a change continues until cutoff time.
LEVELS
L._CC LEVEL-A RCC LEVEL-B k +._._BB D_CC LEVEL-C
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingty
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(Sensor malfunction)
.4 .1 .07
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
indicated)
indicated)
i nd i cated ) _(_
indicated) ........i );/s r PAGE
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/S
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
.1 .2 8.06 1.
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
.1 .8 7.76 1.
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
.1 1.1 8.06 1.
.1 1.1 8.06 1.
.1 1.1 4.56 .7
(No change is strikingly
2.23 .7 .4
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is stnikingty
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
3.97 1. .98
3.08 1. .88
.(_ .I .33
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
1.8 .3 .27 .1
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.4 7.56 I.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor has not settted adequately to steady state conditions)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
1.7 .3 .4 .1 .4 7.76 1.
(Sensor has not settled edequatety to steady state conditions)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor has not mettled adequately to steady state conditions)
1.79 .3 .24 .1 .4 7.76 1.
.94 .1 .23 .1 .2 4.06 .7
(No change ts strikingly indicated)
Table III-13: 901-485 Data Base
Data Base for Early Parameter Indicators of Test Classification: Duct, Manifold, or Heat Exchanger Failure
Test 750-1_ (High Cycle Fatigue in High Pressure Oxidizer Duct) conducted 27 AuCust 1982 for Engine 2208.
---Cutoff Time= 115.6 sec due to a preburner oxidizer pump redLine accelerometer
---Early indications occur near 111X PL
---Damage: Preburner oxidizer pump speparated from the engine, oxidizer preburner section of the
hotgas manifold and the oxidizer system were damaged extensively.
---Impact: Not Available
CRITERIA LEGEND:
WEIGHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNMENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-A:
Value of LC A-Value
>3% ....... 1.0
>2%-5_ ........ 7
1%-2% ........ 3
<1% ........ 1
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady StateVatue) x 100 / T .Excurs|on timeaRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
eOuration Criteria (DC)
DC = Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o time
1_--OC---.,ic/o
LEVEL-B: LEVEL-C:
Value of RC B-Value Value of DC C-Value
>10%/sec .... 1.0 >5sec ....... 1.0
>5 -lO_/sec ..... 5 >1 -Ssec ........ 7
1 - 5%/sec ..... 3 .5 -lsec ........ 3
<l_/sec ..... 1 <.5sec ....... O.
*---Parameters prefixed with an
PID NO.(S) PARAMETER
366-371 (INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC NG IN PR)
366-163 (INJ CENT PR) -(MCC PC)
371-163 (MCC HG IN PR) -(MCC PC)
395-163 *(MCC OX INJ PR) -(NCC PC)
940-371 (HPFP CL LNR PR)-(MCC HG IN PR)
459-383 (HPFP DS PR) -(MCC PC)
410-371 (FPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR)
480-371 (OPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR)
63,163 MCC PC
200 MCC PC AVG
436 *MCC CENT DS PR
18 *MCC CENT DS T
24 MCC FU INJ PR
1921 MCC LN CAV P
595 *MCC OX INJ TEMP
86 *HPFP IN PR
459 *NPFP DS PR
659 *HPFP DS T
457 HPFP HAL CAV PR
52, 764 *HPFP SPD
53, 940 *HPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR
658 HPFP DR TEMP
231 *HPFT DS T1 A
232 *HPFT DS T1B
754 *LPFP SPD
436 *LPFT IN PR
1205, 1206 *FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
722 ENG FU FLOg
1722 ENG FU FLOW CT
518 *HPOT DS T1
519 *HPOT DS T2
1190 HPOT PRSL DR T
1071 OX BLD INT T
1054, 1056 OX FAC FM 0S T
854 FAC OX FM DS PR
1210 FAC OX FLOg CT
1212, 1213 FAC OX FLOg
858, 860 *ENG OX IN PR
1058 ENG OX IN TEMP
90 *HPOP DS PR
325, 326 *HPOP BALCAV PR
30, 734 LPOP SPD
209 *LPOP DS PR
93, 94 PBP DS TMP
59, 159 *PBP DS PR
410 FPB PC
480 OPB PC
878 *HX INT PR
879 HX INT T
881 HX VENT IN PR
882 HX VENT IN T
883 HX VENT DP
40 *OPOV ACT POS
42 *FPOV ACT POS
asterisk indicate a change continues until cutoff time.
LEVELS
LC LEVEL-A RC LEVEL-B A + B DC LEVEL-C
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
484.6 I. 6923. 1. 2.0 .07 O.
(Sensor does not exist)
37.1 I. 530.6 I. 2.0 .07 O.
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
50. I. 1250. I. 2.0 .04 O.
24.7 I. 494.6 I. 2.0 .05 O.
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
2.39 .7 34.3 I. 1.7 .07 O.
" .9.6 I. 240.4 I. 2.0 .04 O.
26.5 I. 661.8 I. 2.0 .04 O.
6.0 I. 120. I. 2.0 .05 O.
19. I. 475. I. 2.0 .05 O.
5.4 I. 180.2 I. 2.0 .06 O.
42.5 I. 1062.5 I. 2.0 .06 O.
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
61. 1. 1220.8 1. 2.0 .05 O.
33. I. 659.2 I. 2.0 .05 O.
10.4 I. 172.8 I. 2.0 .06 O.
22.4 I. 448.9 I. 2.0 .05 O.
3.5 1. 70.6 1. 2.0 .05 O.
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
33.3 I. 1110. I. 2.0 .03 O.
33.3 I. 1110. I. 2.0 .03 O.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
181.3 I. 3020.8 I. 2.0 .D6 O.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
88.6 1. 886. 1. 2.0 .1 O.
67.7 1. 112.9 1. 2.0 .06 O.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
48.3 I. 965.5 I. 2.0 .05 O.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
38.3 I. 383. I. 2.0 .1 O.
27.8 I. 927.5 I. 2.0 .06 O.
28.7 I. 956.5 1. 2.0 .06 O.
5.4 1. 108.1 1. 2.0 .05 O.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor does not exist)
17.8 1. 1780.8 1. 2.0 .01 O.
15.7 1. 783.1 1. 2.0 .02 O.
Table III-14: 750-175 Data Base
Oats Base fo r Early Parameter Indicator s of Test CLassification: Duct, man/fold, or Heat Exchanger Failure
-Test 902-112 (Fuel BLockage: Solidified-N2 blockage of _ inlet) cortkcted 10 June 1978 for Engine 0101.
---Cutoff Times 5.75 sac due to u HP_P speed redLine.
---Early indications occur near 92_ PL
---Damage: LPFP and HPOP (wouLd not rotate), RCC injector (7-injector baffle elements eroded), nozzle
(3-tube splits)
• - - Impact: Unavai table.
_RITERIA LEGEHO: eOperatir_j Level Anomaly Criteria (LC)
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Value) x 100.
aRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
_uration Criteria (DC)
DC : Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o time
WEIGHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNHENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-A: LEVEL-B:
Value of LC A-Value Value of RC B-Value
>3_ ....... 1.0 >lOX/sec .... 1.0
>25;-3X ........ 7 >5 -lOX/sec ..... 5
lZ-2"h ........ 3 1 - 5X/sec ..... 3
<1_ ........ 1 <l_/sec ..... 1
*---Parameters prefixed with an
PID MO.(S) PARAHETER
366-372 (]NJ CLNT PR) -(HCC HG iN PR)
366-383 (INJCLNT PR) -(HCC PC)
372-383 (HCC HG IN PR) -(HCC PC)
395-383 (HCC OX INJ PR) -(HCC PC)
940-372 (HPFP CL LNR PR)-(MCC HG IN PR)
659-383 (HPFP DS PR) -(HCC PC)
410-372 *(FPB PC) -(HCC HG IN PR)
480"372 (OPB PC) "(HCC HG IN PR)
63, 163 *HCC PC
200 *HCC PC AVG
17 HCC CLNT DS PR
18 HCC CLNT DS T
24 HCC FU INJ PR
1921 MCC LN CAV P
595 MCC OX INJ TEHP
86 *HPFP ]N PR
52 *HPFP DS PR
659 *HPFP DS T
457 *HPFP BAL CAV PR
52, 764 *HPFP SPO
53, 940 HPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR
658 HPFP DR TEHP
231 *HPFT DS TI A
7.32 *HPFT DS T1B
754 *LPFP SPO
436 LPFT IN PR
1205, 1206 *FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
722 *ENG FU FLOW
1722 ENG FU FLOW CT
233 *HPOT DS TI
234 *HPOT DS T2
1190 HPOT PRSL DR T
1071 OX BLD ]NT T
1054, 1056 OX FAC FH DS T
854 FAC OX FH DS PR
1210 FAC OX FLOW CT
1212, 1213 *FAC OX FLOW
858, 860 ENG OX IN PR
1058 ENG OX IN TEHP
338 *HPOP DS PR
325, 326 HPOP BALCAV PR
30, 734 LI_P SPD
209 LPOP DS PR
93, 94 PBP DS THP
59, 159 PBP DS PR
410 FPB PC
480 OPB PC
878 HX LNT PR
879 HX INT T
881 HX VENT iN PR
882 NX VENT IN T
883 HX VENT DP
40 OPOV ACT POS
42 FPOVACT POS
LEVEL-C:
Value of DC C-Value _ :....
>5sec.. 1.0 ('+'"_J:/_:_'_ T_" "_ +
..... _ _C-_ -/S
>1 -5sac ........ 7 D,h_', POOR QUALITy.5 -1 ........ 3
<.Ssec+ ...... O.
asterisk indicate a change continues until cutoff time.
LEVELS
LC LEVEL-A RC " LEVEL-B A +__._BB DC LEVEL-C
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor does not exist)
4.3 1. 8.02 .5 1.5 .58 .3
6.2 1. 12.3 1. 2.0 .5 .3
(No change is strikingly indicated)
3.3 1. 5.96 .5 1.5 .55 .3
3.3 1. 6.0 .5 1.5 .55 .3
2.7 .7 5.4 .5 1.2 .57 .3
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
47. " 1. 62.6 1. 2.0 .75 .3
3.8 1. 6.7 .5 1.5 .57 .3
23.6 1. 81.4 1. 2.0 .29 O.
7.4 1. 11.9 1. 2.0 .62 .3
10.9 1. 24.3 1. 2.0 .45 O.
(Sensors do not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sermor does not exist)
(Sensor d_s not exist)
23.8 1. 43.2 1. 2.0 .55 .3
21.6 1. 127.2 1. 2.0 .17 O.
17.3 1. 49.5 1. 2.0 .35 O.
2.8 .7 4.4 .3 1.0 .04 .3
29. 1. 44.6 1. 2.0 .65 .3
(No change is strikingly indicated)
12.8 1. 51.1 1. 2.0 .25 O.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
7.4 1. 15.8 1. 2.0 .47 O.
9.0 1. 19.1 1. 2.0 .47 O.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
2.11 .7 4.32 .3 1.0 .49 O.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
1.97 .3 3.28 .3 .6 .6 .3
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
4.4 1. 25.9 1. " 2.0 .17 O.
1.7 .19 O.
1.3 .14 O.
1.3 .14 O.
1.0 ./_S O.
2.0 .48 O.
I
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensors matfunctioned)
2.5 .7 17.9 1.
1.5 .3 10.8 1.
1.5 .3 10.8 1.
(Sensor does not exist).
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
2.3 .7 4.9 .3
8.3 1. 17.2 1.
902-i12Table III-15 :
ili
Data Base
Data Base for Early Parameter Indicators of Test Classifica_|on: Valve Failure
SF6-01 (Main Fuel Valve: Structural, Fuel Leak) conducted 2 July 1979 for Engine 2002;
---Cutoff Time= 18.58 sac due to a HPFTP discharge temperature redtine.
---Early indications occur near lO0"k PL
---Damage: MFV cracked housing, HPFT 1st and 2nd stage blade erosion, minor damage to controller,
CRITERIA LEGEND:
nozzle, electrical harness, nozzle, and facility.
---Impact: $8.3M, Delay Time- 14 weeks.
eOperatin 9 Level Anomaly Criteria (LC)
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Value) x 100.
eRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
_uration Criteria (DC)
DC = Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o time
WEIGHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNMENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-A: LEVEL-B: LEVEL-C:
Value of LC A-Value Value of RC B-Value Value of DC C-Value
>3% ....... 1.0 >lO%/sec .... 1.0 >5sac ....... 1.0
>2%-3_ ........ 7 >5 -lO_/sec ..... 5 >1 -5sac ........ 7
1%-2% ........ 3 1 - 5%/sec ..... 3 .5 -lsec ........ 3
<1_ ........ 1 <1%/sec ..... 1 <.5sec ....... O.
J j_ursion time
-T-!
-- Iq-- OC "-_ c/o
*---Parameters prefixed with an
PID NO.(S) PARAMETER
366-371 (INJ CLNT PR) -(MCC HG IN PR)
366-163 (INJ CLNT PR) -(MCC PC)
371-163 (MCC HG IN PR) -(MCC PC)
395-163 (MCC OX INJ PR) "(MCC PC)
940"371 (HPFP CL LNR PR)-(MCC HG IN PR)
459-383 (HPFP DS PR) -(MCC PC)
410-371 (FPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR)
480-371 (OPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR)
E41P1023D MCC PC
E41P1039D MCC PC AVG
E41P1067D MCC CLNT DS PR
E41T1070D MCC CENT DS T
24 MCC FU INJ PR
1921 MCC LN CAV P
595 MCC OX INJ TEMP
86 HPFP IN PR
E41P1029D HPFP DS PR
659 HPFP DS T
457 HPFP BAL CAV PR
E41R10060 HPFP SPD
53, 940 HPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR (Sensor
658 HPFP DR TEMP (Sensor
A49T101OH HPFT DS T1A 29.77
A49T1011H HPFT DS T1B 29.
E41R1072D LPFP SPD 3.5
436 LPFT IN PR (Sensor
1205, 1206 FAC FU FL (Sensor
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT (Sensor
EA1R1034D ENG FU FLOW 1.73
1722 ENG FU FLOW CT (Sensor
A49T1012H *HPOT DS TI 36.4
A49T1013H *NPOT DS T2 36.4
1190 HPOT PRSL DR T (Sensor
1071 OX BLD INT T (Sensor
1054, 1056 OX FAC FH DS T (Sensor
854 FAC OX FM DS PR (Sensor
1210 FAC OX FLOg CT (Sensor
1212, 1213 FAC OX FLOg (Sensor
858, 860 ENG OX IN PR (Sensor
1058 ENG OX IN TEMP (Sensor
E41P1030D HPOP DS PR 25.4
325, 326 HPOP BALCAV PR (Sensor
30, 734 LPOP SPD (Sensor
209 LPOP DS PR (Sensor
93, 94 PBP DS TMP (Sensor
E41P1033D PBP DS PR (Sensor
E41PIO31D FPB PC 51.5
E41PIO32D OPB PC 8.2
878 HX INT PR (Sensor
879 HX INT T (Sensor
881 HX VENT IN PR (Sensor
882 HX VENT IN T (Sensor
883 HX VENT DP (Sensor
E41H10280 OPOV ACT POS (Sensor
E41H1027D FPOV ACT POS .55
asterisk
LC LEVEL-A RC
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor is unavailable)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
5.02 I. 125.4
5.02 I. 125.4
41.6 I. I039.
.86 .I 21.6
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor is unavailable)
74.6 1. 1864.4
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor has not
(Sensors do not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
indicate a change continues until cutoff time.
LEVELS
LEVEL'B A + B DC LEVEL'C
1. 2.0 .12 O.
1. 2.0 .12 O.
1. 2.0 .12 O.
1. 1.1 .12 O.
1. 2.0 .12 O.
settled adequately to steady state conditions)
does not exist)
does not exist)
1. 372.1 1. 2.0 .08 O_
1. 362.9 I. 2.0 .08 O.
1. 86.5 1. 2.0 .12 O.
does not exist)
does not exist)
does not exist)
.3 43.2 I. 1.3 .12 O.
does not exist)
I. 454.5 I. 2.0 .08 O.
I. 454.5 I. 2.0 .08 O.
does not exist)
does not exist)
does not exist)
does not exist)
does not exist)
does not exist)
does not exist)
does not exist)
I. 634.3 I. 2.0 .12 O.
does not exist)
does not exist)
does not exist)
does not exist)
not available)
1. 1287.1 1. 2.0 .12 O.
1. 205.1 1. 2.0 .12 O.
does not exist)
does not exist)
does not exist)
does not exist)
does not exist)
has not settted adequately to steady state conditions)
.1 13.8 1. 1.1 .12 O.
Table III-16: SF6-01 Data Base
Data Base for EarLy Parameter Indicators of Test Ctassificat_on: Valve Failure
Test 901-225 (Main Oxidizer Valve: Heat Addition to LOX) conducted 12 December 1978 for Engine 2001.
---Cutoff Time= 255.63 sac. due to a HPFT discharge temperature redtine.
---Early indications occur near 100_ PL
---Damage: Extensive engine fire damage, MCC injector (LOX inlet elbow ruptured, many LOX posts burned
out), HPOP (discharge duct ruptured)
---Impact: $10M, Delay Time- 4-6 weeks
CRITERIA LEGEND: eOperatin 9 Level Anomaly Criteria (LC)
Lc=(A oLuteChangeinSteadyStateValue/Ste°dyStateVa,ue)x 100.[I
• Rate Criteria (RC): LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds) / "'1_ rsion time
eOuration Criteria (Dr)
DC = Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o time
WE%GHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNHENT LEGEND: _ DC---_ c/o
_EVEL-A: LEVEL-B: LEVEL-C:
Value of LC A-Value Value of RC B-Value VaLue of DC C-VaLue
>3X ....... 1.0 >lOX/sec .... 1.0 >5sec ....... 1.0
>2"h-3_. ........ 7 >5 -lOX/sec ..... 5 >1 -5sec ........ 7
Ix-2x ........ 3 1 - 5X/sec ..... 3 .5 -lsec ........ 3 C.',I_:tNAL PAGE IS
<1_ ........ 1 <l_/sec ..... 1 <.5sec ....... O. n_ D,-_r_ ._ .......
( )---Numbers .ithin the parenthesis indicate an earlier and mare gradual "LC" Eh'ar_?_'_h_g_lm_tJer_
*---Parameters prefixed with an asterisk indicate a change continues until cutoff time.
PID NO.(S) PARAMETER
_-371 (INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC HG IN PR)
366-383 (INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC PC)
371-383 (HCC HG IN PR) -(HCC PC)
395-383 (HCC OX INJ PR) -(HCC PC)
940-371 (HPFP CL LNR PR)-(HCC HG IN PR)
459-383 (HPFP DS PR) -(HCC PC)
412-371 (FPB PC) -(NCC HG IN PR)
480-371 (OPB PC) -(NCC HG IN PR)
63, 163 HCC PC
200 HCC PC AVG
17 HCC CLNT DS PR
18 NCC CLNT DS T
24 HCC FU INJ PR
1921 MCC LN CAV P
595 NCC OX ]NJ TEHP
86 HPFP IN PR
52 HPFP DS PR
659 *HPFP DS T
457 *HPFP BAL CAV PR
52, 764 HPFP SPD
53, 940 HPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR
658 HPFP DR TEMP
231 *HPFT DS T1A
232 HPFT DS T1B
754 LPFP SPD
436 LPFT IN PR
12051 1206 FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
722 ENG FU FLOW
1722 ENG FU FLOW CT
233 HPOT DS T1
234 HPOT DS T2
1190 HPOT PRSL DR T
1071 OX BLD INT T
1054, 1056 OX FAC FM DS T
854 *FAC OX FM DS PR
1210 FAC OX FLOW CT
1212, 1213 *FAC OX FLOW
858, 860 *ENG OX IN PR
1058 ENG OX IN TENP
90 HPOP DS PR
325, 326 *HPOP BALCAV PR
30, 734 LPOP SPD
209 LPOP DS PR
93, 94 PBP DS THP
59, 159 PBP DS PR
412 *FPB PC
480 *OPB PC
878 *BX INT PR
879 HX INT T
881 HX VENT IN PR
882 HX VENT IN T
883 *HX VENT DP
40 DP(NACT POS
42 FPOV ACT POS
LEVELS
LC LEVEL-A R...CC LEVEL-B A +B OC LEVEL- C
(Sensor malfunction)
12.9 1. 322.6 1. 2.0 .1 O.
(Sensor malfunction)
38.9 1. 972.2 1. 2.0 .1 O.
(Sensor does not exist)
3.3 1. 166.7 1. 2.0 .07 O.
(Sensor malfunction)
(Sensor malfunction)
6.01 1. 1202. 1. 2.0 .14 O.
6.01 1. 1202. 1. 2.0 .14 O.
2.6 .7 36.9 1. 2.0 .15 O.
(Sensor does not exist)
5.1 1. 128.7 1. 2.0 .16 O.
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
2.9 .7 48.1 1. 2.0 .18 O.
3.2 1. -39.8 1. 2.0 .16 O.
3.1 1. 77.3 1. 2.0 .04 O.
5.3 1. 87.7 1. 2.0 .06 O.
4.2 1. 83.3 1. 2.0 .05 O.
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
15.1 1. 151. 1. 2.0 .1 O.
15.1 1. 151. 1. 2.0 .1 O.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor does not exist)
1.3 .3 33.3 1. 1.3 .07 O.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
3.1 1. 76.9 1. 2.0 .18. O.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
12.3(4.) 1.(1.) 176(39) 1.(1.) 2.0(2.0) ,08(137,6) 0.(1.)
12.3 1. 176. 1. 2.0 .08 O.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
6.5 1. 107.5 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
2.0 .06 O.
7.0 1. 140.4 1. 2.0 .05 O.
23.7 1. 295.7 1. 2.0 .08 O.
.3 .1 .007 .1 .2 147.6 1.
28. 1. 310.9 1. 2.0 _ .16 O.
31.3 1. 390.6 1. 2.0 " .18 O.
8.9 1. 127.3 1. 2.0 .15 O.
45.8 1. 572.9 1. 2.0 .16 O.
(Sensor does not exist)
14. 1. 175.4 1. 2.0 .15 O.
6.9 1. 86.6 1. 2.0 .08 O.
6. 1. 75. 1. 2.0 .08 O.
5.1 1. 64.1 1. 2.0 .08 O.
(Sensor malfunction) (!i:i
o_2.4 .7 39.6 1. 1.7 O.
(Sensor has not settted adequately to steady _state conditions)
2.2 .7 44.9 1. 1.7 .05 0..
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
.4 .1 3.04 .3 1.1(.8) .55 .3
Table III-17: 901-225 Data Base
Dmtm Bms e for EmrIy Pmrmneter Indicators of Test Ctassificatlon: High Pressure Oxidizer Tur_ (NPOTP) Failure
-Test 901-110 (Rotor/Seat _rt, Heat Addition to LOgO conducted 24 Narch 1977 for Engine 0003.
---Cutoff Tim= 74. mec due to • _ fire.
---Early indications occur near 75X PL
---Damage: Major dmMge in HPOTP arid LPOP disch, duct, engine control simulator and contro| harnesses,
fuel system insulation and facility instrumentation systems.
---Impact: $3._q (for repair[replacement on(y), Delay Time- 6 weeks.
CRITERIA LEGEND: eC)peratin.cj Level Anon_ty Criteria (LC)
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Value) x 100.
eRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
eOuration Criteria (DC)
DC = Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o time
tJEIGHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNHENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-As LEVEL-B: LEVEL-Ca
_/atue of LC A-Value Value of RC S-Value Value of DC C-Value
>3_ ....... 1.0 >lOX/sec .... 1.0 >Ssec ....... 1.0
>2_-3X ........ 7 >5 -lOX/sec ..... 5 >1 -Ssec ........ 7
lX-2Z ........ 3 1 - 5_/sec ..... 3 .5 -lsec ........ 3
<1_, ....... 1 <l_/sec ..... 1 <,Ssec ....... O,
( )---Numbers within the parenthesis indicate an earlier and more gradual "LC" change for the par_uneter.
*---Parameters prefixed with an asterisk indicate a change continues until cutoff time.
LEVELS
PID NO.(S) PARAMETER
3_-372 (INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC HG IN PR)
3_-383 (INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC PC)
372-383 (HCC HG IN PR) -(HCC PC)
395-383 (HCC OX ]NJ PR) -(MCC PC)
940-372 (HPFP CL LNR PR)-(MCC HG IN PR)
459-3a3 (HPFP DS PR) -(MCC PC)
412-372 (FPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR)
480-372 (OPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR)
63, 163 MCC PC
200 HCC PC AVG
17 MCC CLNT DS PR
18 MCC CLNT DS T
24 MCC FU INJ PR
1951, 1956 MCC LN CAV P
595 MCC OX INJ TEMP
86 HPFP IN PR
52 HPFP DS PR
659 HPFP DS T
457 HPFP BAL CAV PR
52, 76/. HPFP SPO
53, 940 HPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR
658 HPFP DR TEMP
231 HPFT DS T1A
232 HPFT DS T1S
754 LPFP SPD
436 LPFT IN PR
1205, 1206 FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
722 ENG FU FLOW
1722 ENG FU FLOW CT
233 HPOT DS T1
23A HPOT DS T2
1190 *NPOT PRSL DR T
1071 OX BLD ]NT T
1054, 1056 OX FAC FM DS T
854 FAC OX FH DS PR
1210 FAC OX FLOW CT
1212, 1213 FAC OX FLOW
858, 860 ENG OX IN PR
1058 ENG OX IN TEMP
90 HPOP DS PR
325, 326 HPOP BALCAV PR
30, 734 LPOP SPD
302 LPOP DS PR
93, 96 PBP DS THP
59, 159 PBP DS PR
410 FPB PC
48O OPB PC
878 NX %NT PR
879 NX INT T
881 HX VENT IN PR
882 I0( VENT IN T
883 I0{ VENT DP
40 OPOV ACT POS
42 FPOV ACT POS
• L.CC LEVEL-A RC LEVEL-B A +B D_CC LEVEL-C
• (No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
1.36 .3 .16 .I 16.3 1.
(Sensor does not exist)
(No'change is strikingly
(No change is 6trJkingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(Sensormetfunction)
(No change is strikingly
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
.1
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
ORIGINAI_ PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly ind|cated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
1.67 .3 ,2.38 .3 .6 16.3 I.
1.47 .3 2.1 .3 .6 16.3 I.
258(6.) I.(I.) 860.(.7) I.(.I) 2.(1.1) .3(17.8) 0.(I._
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
is strikingly indicated)
Is strikingly indicated)
Is strikingly indicated)
is strikingly indicated)
Is strikingly indicated)
is strikingly indicated)
Is strikingly indicated)
Is strikingly indicated)
indicated)
(No change
(No change
(No change
(No change
(No change
(No change
(No change
(No change
indicated)
indicated)
(No change Is strikingly
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly
(No change is strikingly
(No change is stHkingty indicated)
(Sensor has not settled edequatety to steady state conditions)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does.not exist)
(Sensor does not ex|st)
(NO change iS strikingly indicated)
.49 .1 .35 .1 .2 18.45
.36 .1 .21 .1 .2 17.7
Table III-18 : 901-ii0
le
I.
Data Base
pmta _sse for Ear|y Parameter Indicators of Test CLassification: High Pressure Oxidizer Turbolxa_ p (HPOTP) Failure
-Test 901-136 (Rotor Seal Support) conducted 8 September 1977for Engine 0004.
---Cutoff Time= 300.2 sec. due to Loss of electrical pouer and Engine Controller response.
---Early indications occur near 90_ PL
---Damage: LOX feed system (erosion or severed), HPOTP (1st stage turbinebtades damaged), NCC and
nozzle (extensive slag coating), engine controller clamged, test facility ($.2H damage)
CRITERIA LEGEND:
---impact: $2.4H, Delay Time- 4 week s.
eOperatin9 Levet Anomaly Criteria (LC)
LC : (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Value) x 100.
eRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
eOuration Criteria (DC)
OC = Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o time
WE[GHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNHENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-A: LEVEL-B: LEVEL-_:
Value of LC A-Value Value of RC B-Value Value of DC C-Value
>3_ ....... 1.0 >lOX/sec .... 1.0 >5sac ....... 1.0
>2_-3_ ........ 7 >5 -lOX/sec ..... 5 >1 -Ssec ........ 7
lZ-2_ ........ 3 1 - 5X/sec ..... 3 ,5 -1sac ........ 3
<1_ ...... 1 <l_/sec ..... 1 <.Ssec ....... O.
rID NO.(S)
( )---Numbers within the parenthesis indicate an earlier "LC" change for the parameter.
*---Parameters prefixed with an asterisk indicate a change continues until cutoff time.
**NOTE: Parameter changes where DC ranges between 49 to 115 seconds may or may not be from an anomaly,
the fuel tank was vented (as scheduled) between an equivalent DC range of 49 to 128 seconds.
PARAMETER LC LEVEL-A RC LEVEL-B LEVELS A+B DC LEVEL-C
366"372 *(INJ CLNT PR) "(HCC HG IN PR)
366"383 (INJ CLNT PR) "(HCC PC)
372"383 *(HCC HG IN PR) "(HCC PC)
395"383 *(NCC OX INJ PR) "(HCC PC)
940"372 (HPFP CL LNR PR)'(HCC HG IN PR)
459"383 (HPFP DS PR) "(HCC PC)
412"372 (FP B PC) "(HCC HG IN PR)
480"372 *(OPB PC) "(HCC HG IN PR)
63, 163 MCC PC
200 MCC PC AVG
17 HCC CLNT DS PR
18 HCC CLNT DS T
24 HCC FU ]NJ PR
1951, 1956 MCC LN CAV P
595 HCC OX INJ TEHP
86 **HPFP IN PR
52 *HPFP DS PR
659 HPFP DS T
457 HPFP BAL CAV PR
764 HPFP SPD
53, %0 HPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR
658 HPFP DR TENP
231 HPFT DS T1A
232 HPFT DS T1B
754 LPFP SPD
636 LPFT [N PR
1205, 1206 FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
722 ENG FU FLOg
1722 ENG FU FLOg ¢T
233 *HPOT DS T1
234 HPOT PS T2
1190 HPOT PRSL DR T
1071 OX BLD iNT T
1054, 1056 OX FAC FN DS T
854 FAC OX FN DS PR
1210 FAC OX FLOW CT
1212, 1213 FAC OX FLOW
858, 860 ENG OX IN PR
1058 ENG OX IN TEHP
90 HPOP DS PR
325, 326 HPOP BALCAV PR
30, 734 *LPOP. SPD
302 LPOP DS PR
93, 94 PBP DS THP
59, 159 PBP DS PR
412 FPB PC
_80 OPB PC
878 HX INT PR
87'9 HX ]NT T
881 HX VENT IN PR
882 HX VENT ]N T
883 HX VENT DP
40 *OPOV ACT POS
42 *FPOVACT PO$
3.26 1. .03 .1 1.1 96. 1.
.84 .1 .07 .1 .2 116. 1.
2.18 .7 .02 .1 .8 116. 1.
1.68 .3 .12 .1 .4 13.8 1.
(Sensor does not exist)
.43 .1 .02 .1 .2 116. 1.
.18 .1 .02 .1 .2 112. 1.
1.12 .3 .01 .1 .4 112. 1.
.26 .1 .13 .1 .2 25. 1.
.26 .1 .13 .1 .2 25. 1.
.33 .1 .02 .1 .2 112. 1.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
22.6 1. .27 .1 1.1 126. 1.
.58 .1 -.005 .1 .2 112. 1.
2.84 .7 .03 .1 .8 122. .1.
1.18 .3 .01 .1 .4 126. 1.
1.09 .3 .01 .1 .4 122. 1.
(Sensors do not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
1.47 .3 .02 .1 .4 112. 1.
2.4(1.4) .7(.3) 1.2(.02) .3(.1) 1.0(.4) 112. 1.
.66 .1 .02 .1 .2 112. 1.
.34 .1 .02 .1 .2 112. 1.
.84 .1 .05 .1 .2 66. 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.74 .1 .009 .1 .2 112. 1.
(No change iS strikingly indicated)
1.4(1.9) .3(.3) .1(.02) .1(.1) .4(.4) 25.(112.) 1.(1.)
1.8(1.4) .3(.3) .04(.03) .1(.1) .4(.4) 25.(112.) 1.(1.)
1.3(2.8) .3(.7) .09(.03) .1(.1) .4(.8) 13.8(98.) 1.(1.)
(Sensor does not exist)
.004 .1 .0001 .1 .2 92.6 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.41 .1 .01 ,1 .2 27.8 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
2.42 .7 ,: .02 .1 .8 112. 1.
1.39 .3 .03 .1 .4 112. 1.
1.24 .3 6.2 .5 .8 .2 O.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor doesn't exist)
(Sensor doesn't exist)
.3 .1 .02 .1 .2 112. 1.
.33 .1 _ .02 .1 .2 112. 1.
.79 .1 :_ .03 .1 .2 27.8 1.
1.86 .3 _'_: .02 .1 .4 98. 1.
1.22 .3 :_ .02 .1 .4 70. 1.
1.38 .3 .07 .1 .4 73. 1.
• 52 .1 .02 .1 .2 70. 1.
3.(1.05) .7(.3) .12(.01 .1(.1) .8(.4) 25.(116.) 1.(1.)
1.78 .3 .02 .1 .4 112. 1.
::., Table III-19: 901-136 Data Base
Data Base for Early Parameter Indicators of Test C|assif|cation: Nigh Pressure Oxidizer Turbof:clp (HPOTP) Failure
T_s t 902-1_0 (Heat Addition to Liquid Oxygen (LOX)) conducted 18 July 1978 for Engine 0101.
---Cutoff Time= 41.81 sac due to a high-pressure oxidizer preburner pump axial vibration redtine.
---Early indications occur near 100_ PL
---Damage: Severe erosion to HPOP, controller simulator and control harnesses, broken LPOP housing,
- - - Impact:
CRITERIA LEGEND:
burned facility instrumentation system.
$1.65M, Delay Time- 5 weeks
• Operating Level Anomaly Criteria (L C)
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Value) x 100.
eRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
eDuration Criteria (DC)
DC = Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o time
WEIGHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNMENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-A: LEVEL-B: LEVEL-C:
Value of LC A-Value Value of RC B-Value Value of DC C-Value
>3X ....... 1.0 >lO%/sec .... 1.0 >5sec ....... 1.0
>2_-3% ........ 7 >5 -lO%/sec ..... 5 >1 -5sec ........ 7
1_-2% ........ 3 1 - 5_/sec ..... 3 .5 -lsec ........ 3
<1% ........ 1 <1%/sec ..... 1 <.5sec ....... O.
I -- 0c- c/o\
.C)_ POOR QUALITY
PIO NO.(S)
366-372
366-383
372-383
395-383
940-372
459-383
411-372
480-372
63, 163
200
17
18
24
1951, 1956
595
86
52
659
457
52, 764
53, 940
650
657
658
231
232
754
436
1205, 1206
1207, 1209
722
1722
233
234
1190
1071
1054, 1056
854
1210
1212, 1213
858, 860
1058
90
325, 326
30, 734
302
93, 94
59, 159
410
480
878
879
881
882
883
40
42
*---Parameters prefixed with an
PARAMETER
*(INJ CLNT PR) (MCC HG IN PR)
*(INJ CLNT PR) (MCC PC)
*(MCC HG IN PR) (MCC PC)
*(MCC OX IHJ PR) (MCC PC)
(HPFP CL LNR PR) (MCC HG IN PR)
*(HPFP DS PR) (MCC PC)
*(FPB PC) (MCC HG IN PR)
*(OPB PC) (MCC HG IN PR)
*MCC PC
MCC PC AVG
MCC CLNT DS PR
HCC CLNT DS T
MCC FU INJ PR
MCC LN CAV P
MCC OX INJ TEMP
*HPFP IN PR
HPFP DS PR
HPFP DS T
HPFP BAL CAV PR
HPFP SPD
HPFP CL LNR PR
HPFP CL LNR T
HPFP DR PR
HPFP DR TEMP
HPFT DS T1A
HPFT DS T1B
LPFP SPD
LPFT IN PR
FAC FU FL
FAC FU FL CT
ENG FU FLOW
ENG FU FLOW CT
HPOT DS T1
HPOT DS 72
HPOT PRSL DR T
OX BLD INT T
OX FAC FH DS T
FAC OX FM DS PR
FAC OX FLOW CT
FAC OX FLOW
*ENG OX 1N PR
ENG OX IN TEMP
HPOP DS PR
*HPOP BALCAV PR
*LPOP SPD
*LPOP DS PR
PBP DS TMP
*PBP DS PR
*FPB PC
*OPB PC
_X INT PR
HX INT T
HX VENT IN PR
HX VENT IN T
HX VENT DP
*OPOV ACT POS
*FPOV ACT POS
asterisk indicate
LC LEVEL-A
a change continues until cutoff time.
LEVELS
R.CC . LEVEL-B A + B DC LEVEL-C
54.5 I. 1363.6 I.
11.9 I. 595.2 I.
6.3 I. 211.6 I.
23.6 I. 589.2 I.
(Sensor does not exist)
2.1 .7 51.7 I.
2.8 .7 138.9 I.
2.8 .7 138.9 I.
23.3 1. 333.3 1.
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
12.5 1. 178.6 1.
2.0 .04 O.
2.0 .02 O.
2.0 .03 O.
2.0 .04 O.
1.7 .04 O.
1.7 .02 O.
1.7 .02 O.
2.0 .07 O.
2.0 .07 O.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(SensOr does not exist)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly
(No change lS
(No change is
(No change is
(No change is
(No change IS
(No change is
(No change is
(No change is
(No change is
strikingly
strikingly
strikingly
strikingly
strikingly
strikingly
strikingly
strikingly
strikingly
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)
indicated)(No change is strikingly
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
9.3 1. 463.9 1. 2.0
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
5.8 I. 289.9 1. 2.0
55.6 I. 793.3 I. 2.0
78.4 1. 784. 1, 2.0
(Sensor does not exist)
61.8 1. 882.6 I. 2.0
I. .3 50. I. 1.3
I. .3 50. I. 1.3
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
2.9 .7 142.9 1. 1.7
2.5 .7 125. 1. 1.7
.02 O.
.02 O.
.07 O.
.1 O.
.07 O.
.02 O.
.02 O.
.02 O.
.02 O.
Table III-20: 902-120 Data Base
Oats Base for Earty Parameter |ndicators of Tes t Ctessification: High Pressure Fuel Turbspu_ (HPFTP) Failure
-Tesl; 901-340 (Turn Around Duct Cracked/Torn) conducted on 15 October 1961 for Engine 0107.
---Cutoff Time= 405.5 sac due to amHPFT temperature redtine.
---Early indications occur near 109¢ PL
---Damage: HPFT turnaround sheet metal cracked and bulged, HPFT buttnose nut and stud eroded away,
nozzle belly band and jacket damaged.
---Impact: Unavai table.
CRITERIA LEGEND: eOperatin 9 Level Anomaly Criteria (L C)
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Value) x 100.
sRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
_uration Criteria (DC)
DC : Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o tim
WEIGHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNHENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-A: LEVEL-B: LEVEL-C:
Value of LC A-Vatue Value of RC B-Value Value of DC C-Value
>3% ....... 1.0 >lO%/sec .... 1.0 >5sec ....... 1.0
>2%-3% ........ 7 >5 -lO%/sec ..... 5 >1-Ssec ........ 7
1%-2% ........ 3 1 - 5%/sec ..... 3 .5 -1sac ........ 3
<1% ........ 1 <1%/sec .... ,1 <.5sec ...... O.
Pt0 No.(s)
366-371
366-383
371-383
395-163
940-371
459-383 (HPFP DS PR)
411-371 (FPB PC)
480-371 (OPB PC)
63, 163 HCC PC
200 MCC PC AVG
17 HCC CLNT DS PR
18 HCC CLNT OS T
24 HCC FU ]NJ PR
1921 HCC LN CAV P
595 NCC OX INJ TEHP
86 HPFP IN PR
52 HPFP DS PR
659 HPFP DS T
457 HPFP BAL CAV PR
52, 764 HPFP SPD
53, 940 HPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR
658 HPFP DR TEHP
663 HPFT DS T1A
664 HPFT DS T1B
754 LPFP SPD
436 LPFT IN PR
1205, 1206 FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
722 ENG FU FLOW
1722 ENG FU FLOW CT
233 HPOT DS T1
234 HPOTDS T2
1190 HPOT PRSL DR T
1071 OX BLD INT T
1054, 1056 OX FAC FH DS T
854 FAC OX FH DS PR
1210 FAC OX FLOW CT
1212, 1213 FAC OX FLOW
858, 860 ENG OX IN PR
1058 ENG OX IN TEHP
90 HPOP DS PR
325, 326 HPOP BALCAV P_
30, 734 LPOP SPD
209 LPOP DS PR
93, 94 PBP DS THP
59, 159 PBP DS PR
410 FPS PC
480 OPB PC
878 -HX %NT PR
879 HX INT T :_
881 HX VENT IN P_'_:
882 HX VENT IN T J
883 NX VENT DP
40 OPOVACT POS
42 FPOVACT POS
( )---Numbers within the parenthesis indicate an earlier "LC" change for the parameter.
LEVELS
PARAHETER L CC LEVEL-A R_ . LEVEL-S A+B D._CC
(INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC HG IN PR)
(INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC PC)
(NCC HG IN PR) -(HCC PC)
(HCC OX INJ PR) -(HCC PC)
(HPFP CL LNR PR)-(MCC HG IN PR)
-(MCC PC)
-(MCC HG IN PR)
-(MCC HG IN PR)
LEVEL-_
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
17.7 1. 117.8 1. 2.0 115.5 1.
1.82 .3 .23 .1 .4 122.5 1.
31(89.) 1.(1.) 5.(9.5) .5(.5) 1.5(1.5) 116(384.9) 1.(1.)
1.9(.9) .3(.1) 13(1.7) 1.(.3) 1.3(.4) 116(127.) 1.(1.)
4.8(1.1) 1.(.3) 7(.97) .5(.1) 1.5(.4) 116(127.) 1.(1.)
3.3(1.3) 1.(.3) 4.7(3.) .3(.3) 1.3(.6) 116(127.) 1.(1.)
1.6(.3) .3(.1) 11(1.5) 1.(.3) 1.3(.4) 116(127.) 1.(1.)
1.6(.3) .3(.1) 11(1.5) 1.(.3) 1.3(.4) 116(127.) 1.(1.)
1.6(.5) .3(.1) 11(3.5) 1.(.3) 1.3(.4) 116(127.) 1.(1.)
.7(.7) .1(.1) 7(7.) .5(.5) .6(.6) 115(127.) 1.(1.)
2.2 .7 14.6 1. 1.7 115.5 1.(1.)
(Sensor has not settted adequately to steady state conditions)
.43(.2) .1(.1) .43(.2) .1(.1) .2(.2) 115(128.) 1.(1.)
5.1(1.7) 1.(.3) 50(3.5) 1.(.3) 2.0(.6) 116(127.) 1.(1.)
1.5(.4) .3(.1) 15(2.5) 1.(.3) 1.3(.4) 116(127.) 1.(1.)
1.04(:2) .3(.1)- 5.2(.8) .5(.1) .8(.2) 116(127.) 1.(1.)
2.3(.5) .7(.1) 11(.97) 1.(.1) 1.7(.2) 116(127.) 1.(1.)
1.37 .3 6.86 .5 .8 115.5 1.
3.8(6.9) 1.(1.) .72(1.1) .1(.3) 1.1(1.3) 116(384.9) 1.(1.)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does net exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
6.4(7.) 1.(1.) 16(73.) 1.(1.) 2.0(2.) 116(384.9) 1.(1.)
6.(3.6) 1.(1.) 14(1.) 1.(.3) 2.0(1.3) 116(384.9) 1.(1.)
1.2(.3) .3(.1) 1.9(1.6) .3(.3) .6(.4) 116(127.) 1.(1.)
1.3(.4) .3(.1) 13(.8) 1.(.1) 1.3(.2) 116(127.) 1.(1.)
2.5(.8) .7(.1) 8.3(.8) .5(.1) 1.2(.2) 115(127.) 1.(1.)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
3.3(.6) 1.(.1) 27(3.2) 1.(.3) 2.0(.4) 116(127.) 1.(1.)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
5.3 1. .4 .1 1.1 124.9 1.
4.55 1. .48 .1 1.1 123. 1.
2.2 .7 .17 .1 .8 124.5 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.01 .1 .02 .1 .2 126.5 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.5 .1 .97 .1 .2 126.5 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingty indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
1.2(.5) .3(.1) 12(1.1) 1.(.3) 1.3(.4) 116(127.) 1.(1.)
(No change is strikinglying indicated)
2.1 .7 11.6 1. 1.7 115.5 1.
.35(.24) .1(.1) 1.8(.5) .3(.1) .4(.2) 116(127.) 1.(1.)
.32(.63) .1(.1) 1.6(1.3) .3(.3) .4(.4) 116(127.) 1.(1.)
(Sensor not available)
1.2(.4) .3(.1) 12(.9) 1.(.1) 1.3(.2) 116(127.) 1.(1.)
.99(.5) .1(.1) 2.8(.9) .3(.1) .4(.2) 116(127.) 1.(1.)
2.72 .7 .23 .1 .8 123.1 1.
.9 .1 4.5 .3 .4 115.5 1.
1.48 .3 .12 .1 .4 123.1 1.
1.49(.3) .3(.1) 4.97(.3) .3(.1) .6(.2) 116(127.) 1.(1.)
2.1(1.9) .7(.3) .75(.51) .1(.1) .8(.4) 118(127.) 1.(1.)
4.4(1.9) I.(.3) 2.2(.2) .3(.1) 1.3(.4) 116(127.) 1.(1.)
.. Table III-21: 901-340 Data Base
pate Base fcr Early Par_ter lndicator_ of Tes_ Classification:
-Test 901-_63 (Turn Around Duct Crecked/Torn) conducted 30 Narch 1982 for Engine 2013.
---Cutoff Time= Z50. sec, Program Duration.
---Early indications occur near 109_ PL
---Damage: HPFT -14 turbine sheet metal cracks.
---Impact: Unavai table.
_RITERIA LEGEND: eOperating Level Anomaly Criteria (LC)
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Value) x 100.
eRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
_uration Criteria (DC)
DC = Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o time
WEIGHTEDLEVEL VALUE ASSIGNHENT LEGEND:
High Pressure Fuel Turbopump (NPFTP) Failure
u
LEVEL-A: LEVELJ: LEVEL-C:
Value of LC A-Value Value of RC B-Value Value of DC C-Value
>3X ....... 1.0 >lOX/sec .... 1.0 >Ssec ....... 1.0
>2¢-3X ........ 7 >5 -lOY./sec ..... 5 >1 -5sec ........ 7
lg-2X ........ 3 1 - 5Y./Sec ..... 3 .5 -lsec ........ 3
<1_.,, .... T1 <lZ/sec I .... 1 <.5sec..T,r.. O,
PID NO.(S)
366-367
366-163
367-163
395 - 163
940-367
/,59-163
/.10-367
480-367
63, 163
200
17
18
24
1951, 1956
595
86
52
659
/*57
52, 764
53, 940
650
657
658
231
232
754
/*36
1205, 1206
1207, 1209
722
1722
233
234
1190
1071
1054, 1056
854
1210
1212, 1213
858, 860
1058
90
325, 326
30, 734
302
93, 94.
59, 159
410
/*80
878
879
881
i
882
883
40
42
( )---Numbers within the parenthesis indicate an earlier "LC" change for the parameter.LEVELS
PARANET_R
(INJ CLNT PR) -(MCC HG IN PR)
(INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC PC)
(HCC HG IN PR) -(HCC PC)
(HCC OX INJ PR) -(HCC PC)
(HPFP CL LNR PR)-(HCC HG IN PR)
(HPFP DS PR) -(HCC PC)
LEVEL-C
(FP8 PC)
(OPB PC)
HCC PC
HCC PC AVG
HCC CLNT DS PR
HCC CLNT DS T
HCC FU INJ PR
HCC LN CAV P
HCC OX INJ TEHP
HPFP IN PR
HPFP DS PR
HPFP DS T
HPFP BAL CAV PR
HPFP SPO
HPFP CL LNR PR
HPFP CL LNR T
HPFP DR PR
HPFP DR TEHP
HPFT DS T1A
HPFT DS T1B
LPFP SPO
LPFT IN PR
FAC FU FL
FAC FU FL CT
ENG FU FLOW
ENG FU FLEA,/CT
HPOT DS T1
HPOT D$ T2
HPOT PRSL DR T
OX BLD INT T
OX FAC FH DS T
FAC OX FH DS PR
FAC OX FLOWCT
FAC OX FLOW
ENG OX IN PR
ENG OX IN TEHP
HPOP DS PR
HPOP BALCAVPR
LPOP SPD
LPOP DS PR
PBP DS THP
PBP DS PR
FPB PC
OPB PC
HX INT PR
NX iNT T
HX VENT IN PR
HX VENT IN T
HX VENT DP
OPOVACT POS
FPOVACT POS
-(HCC HG IN PR)
-(HCC HG [N PR)
L..CC LEVEL-A R_CC LEVEL-8 A+B DC
(Sensor does not ex]st)
(Sensor does not exist)
2. .7 1.54 .3 1.0 112.7 1.
1.52 .3 .61 .1 .4 114.5 1.
30.2(25) 1.(1.) 34(1.6) 1.(.3) 2.0(1.3) 114(165) 1.(1.)
1.01 .3 .92 .1 .4 114.6 1.
.2 112.7 1.
.4 114.5 1.
.2 114.5 1.
.2 114.5 1.
.2 114.5 1.
.2
.2 114.5 1.
.2 113.7 1.
.6 114. 1.
.4 114. 1.
.2 114.3 1.
.2 114.5 1.
.4(.2) 114(165) 1.(1.)
2.0 120./* 1.
.6(.4) 113(165) 1.(1.)
.4 113.6 1.
.2 114.6 1.
.2 114.5 1.
.2 113.3 1.
.2 112.6 1.
.81 .1 .81 .1
1.16 .3 .83 .1
.49 .1 .288 .1
.46 .1 .27 .1
.65 .1 ./.1 .1
(Sensor malfunction)
.56 .1 .61 .1
(Sensor malfunction)
.3 .1 .32 .1
1.03 .3 2.6 .3
.63 .1 2.09 .3
.1_ .'1 .92 .1
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.3 .1 .3 .1
1.65(.8) .3(.1) ,23(.1) .1(.1)
19.7 1.0 19.7 1.0
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
1.3(1.3) .3(.3) 1.1(.1) .3(.1)
1.85 .3 .26 .1
._ .1 .49 .1
.68 .1 .76 .1
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.6 .1 .8 .1
.73 .1 .81 .1
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditfons)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state corcfitions)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.65 .1 .4 .1 .2 114.5 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.58 .1 .38 .1 .2 114.6 1.
.68 .1 .61 .1 .2 114. 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated) _.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.22 .1 .19 .1 .2 114.0 1.
1.17 .3 1.31 .3 .6 113.8 1.
./*5 .1 .5 .1 .2 114.5 1.
.84 .1 .76 .1 .2 113.9 1.
.6 .1 .4 .1 .2 114.8 1.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
.67 .1 .52 .1 .2_ 114. 1.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state cohditions)
.62 .1 .89 .1 .Z _ 114. 1.
3.11 1. .65 .1 .2 114. 1.
1.01 .3 .918 .1 .4 113.8 1.
Table III-22: 901-363 Data Base
iData Base for Earty Parameter Indicator s of Test CLassification: High Pressure Fuel Turbotxs___(HPFTP) Faiture
-Test 902-118 (Turn Around Duct Cracked/Torn) conducted 12 July 1978 for Engine u101.
---Cutoff Time= 6.84 sac. due s HPFT discharge temperature redtine
---Early indications occur near 92Z PL
---Damage: HPFTP turnaround ducts (5-meier bulges tn both %0 and OD sheet metal, 1.5 in. tears in ID
sheet metal), HCC heat shield (26-retainers missing or partially failed)
--- Impact : Unavai table.
C_RITERIA LEGEND: eOperatin 9 Level Anomaly Criteria (L C)
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Value) x 100.
eRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
eOuration Criteria (DC)
DC = Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o time
_EIGHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNHENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-__A: LEVEL-B: LEVEL-.._C:
Value of LC A-Value VaLue of RC B-VaLue Value of DC C-VaLue
>3X ....... 1.0 >lOX/sec .... 1.0 >Ssec ....... 1.0
>2X-3X ........ 7 >5 -lOX/sec ..... 5 >1 -Ssec ........ 7
1_-2X ........ 3 1 - 5_/sec ..... 3 .5 -lsoc ........ 3
<1_ ........ 1 <l_/sec .... 1 <_Ssec_.,,... O.
*---Parameters prefixed with an asterisk indicate a change continues until cutoff time.
LEVELS
PID NO.(S) PARAMETER
366-372 (INJ CLNT PR) -(MCC HG IN PR)
_:_-383 (]NJ CLNT PR) -(MCC PC)
3T2-383 (MCC NG IN PR) -(MCC PC)
395-383 (HCC OX INJ PR) -(HCC PC)
940-372 (HPFP CL LNR PR)-(HCC HG IN PR)
459-383 (HPFP DS PR) -(HCC PC)
411-372 (FPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR)
480-371 (OPB PC) -(HCC HG IN PR)
63, 163 MCC PC
200 MCC PC AVG
436 MCC CLNT DS PR
18 MCC CLNT DS T
24 HCC FU [NJ PR
1951, 1956 HCC LN CAV P
595 MCC OX ]NJ TEMP
86 HPFP IN PR
459 HPFP 05 PR
659 HPFP DS T
457 HPFP BAL CAV PR
52, 76/+ HPFP SPO
940 HPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR
658 HPFP DR TEHP
663 *HPFT DS T1A
6_ *HPFT DS T1B
754 LPFP SPD
1205, 1206 FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
436 LPFT IN PR
722 ENG FU FLOW
1722 ENG FU FLOW CT
516 HPOT DS TI
517 HPOT DS T2
1190 HPOT PRSL DR T
1071 OX BLD 1NT T
1054, 1056 *OX FAC FH DS T
854 FAC OX FH 05 PR
1210 FAC OX FLOW CT
1212, 1213 FAC OX FLOW
858, 860 ENG OX IN PR
1058 ENG OX IN TEHP
338 *HPOP DS PR
325, 326 *HPOP BALCAV PR
30, 734 LPOP SPO
302 LPOP DS PR
93, 94 PBP DS TNP
59, 159 PBP DS PR
410 *FPB PC
480 *OPB PC
878 NX INT PR
879 HX INT T
881 HX VENT IN PR
882 HX VENT IN T
883 NX VENT DP
40 OPOV ACT POS
42 FPOVACT POS
i
LC LEVEL-A RC - LEVEL-B A +_.__BB DC LEVEL-C
45.7 1. 76.2 1. 2.0 .74 .3
6.81 1. 3.7 .3 . 1.3 1.84 .7
6.88 1. 38.3 1. 2.0 .72 .3
4.76 1. 5.67 .5 1.5 .84 .3
10. 1. 9.9 .5 1.5 1.3_ .7
2.08 .7 1.54 .3 1.0 1.34 .7
7.88 1. 6.57 .5 1.5 1 ._ .7
4.49 1. 3.74 .3 1.3 1.34 .7
(No change is strikingty indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
1.2 .3 4.01 .3 .6 .44 O.
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
10.3 1. 5.51 .5 1.5 1.95 .7
.96 .I .85 .I .2 1.34 .7
1.06 " .3 - .88 .I .4 1.2 .7
1.2 .3 4.01 .3 .6 .44 O.
.9 .I 6. .5 .6 .19 O.
(Sensor measurement not avaitabte)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
13.88 1. 7.54 .5 1.5 1.84 .7
10.15 1. 5.51 .5 1.5 1.84 .7
1.63 .3 .84 .1 .4 2.06 .7
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
1.2 .3 4.01 .3 .6 .44 O.
1.38 .3 6.27 .5 .8 .74 .3
(No change is strikingly indicated)
2.33 .7 1.17 .3 1.0 1.34 .7
2.43 .7 1.23 .3 1.0 1 .Y .7
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(Sensor does not exist)
.04 .1 .03 .1 .2 1.34 .7
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.58 .1 .9 .1 .2 .64 .3
(No change is strikingty indicated)
(Sensor has not settled adquatety to steady state conditions)
2.67 .7 1.99 .3 1.0 1.34 .7
2.9 .7 1.36 .3 1.0 2.14 .7
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor does not exist)
1.18 .3 23.6 1. .4 .24 O.
1.7 .3 1.89 .3 .6 1.06 .7
1.3 .3 4.35 .3 .6 .48 O.
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
2.75 .7 5.5 .5 1.2 .72 .3
• Table TTT--23: 902-118 Data Base
pats Base for Early Parameter Indicator_ of Test CLassification: High Pressure Fuel Turbopump (NPFTP) Faitu're
-Test 901-436 (Coolant Liner Buckle) conducted 14 February 1984 for Engine 0108.
---Cutoff Time= 611.06 sac due to s high pressure fuet turbine discharge temperature redtine.
---Early indications occur near 109_ PL
---Dmge: HPFTP (inlet volute blown off, 2nd stage disk w/blades 75-80X eroded), 14CC injector (LOX
posts eroded back to interpropettant plate), nozzle (3-areas of burn through), engine
totally gutted due to LOX rich shutdown.
--- Impact: Unavai table.
CRITERIA LEGEND: eOperatin 9 Level Anomaly Criteria (LC)
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Value) x 100.
eRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
_uration Criteria (DC)
DC = Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o time
_IGHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNHENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-A: LEVEL-B: LEVEL-C:
VaLue of LC A-Value Value of RC B-Value Value of DC C-Value
>3_ ....... 1.0 >lO_/sec .... 1.0 >5sec ....... 1.0
>2_-3_ ........ 7 >5 -lO_/sec ..... 5 >1 -Ssec ........ 7
1Z-2"_ ........ 3 1 - 5X/sac ..... 3 .5 -lsec ........ 3
<IZ., ..... _I <1X/sac .... +I <.5sec.,t.+_. O.
*---Parameters prefixed with an asterisk indicate a change continues until cutoff tim.
( )---MtJd_ers within the parenthesis indicate an eartier "LC" change for the parameter
/_r_+ : ,ursiont me
I'---- DC---,-I c/o
PID NO.(S} PARAMETER LC _ RC LEVEL-B LEVEL A+B DC LEVEL-C
366-367 (INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC NG IN PR) (Sensor does not exist)
366-383 (INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC PC) (Senson has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
367-383 (MCC HG IN PR) -(MCC PC) (Sensor does not exist)
395-383 *(MCC OX ]NJ PR) -(MCC PC) 9.6 1. 19.6 1. 2.0 .49 O.
940-367 (HPFP CL LNR PR)-(MCC HG IN PR) 87.5(60) 1.(1.) 208(133 1.(1.) 2.0(2.0) 4(12.563 .7(1.)
459-383 *(HPFP DS PR) -(HCC PC) 4.2 1. 10.2 1. 2.0 .41 O.
410-367 (FPB PC) -(HCC HG %M PR) 18.7 1. 30.2 1. 2.0 .62 .3
480-367 (OrB PC) -(HCC HG IN PR) 5.95 1. 9.6 .5 1.5 .62 .3
63, 163 *HCC PC 3.86 1. 7.88 .5 1.5 .51 .3
200 *MCC PC AVG 3.86 1. 7.88 .5 1.5 .51 .3
17 *HCC CLNT DS PR 3.09 1. 7.03 .5 1.5 .51 .3
18 *HCC CLNT DS T 3.33 1. 9.26 .5 1.5 .36 O.
24 *HCC FU INJ PR 1.91 .3 6.37 .5 .8 .51 .3
1951, 1956 NCC LN CAV P (Sensor malfunction)
595 HCC OX INJ TEHP (No change is strikingly indicated)
86 *HPFP IN PR 29.8 1. 53.2 1. 2.0 .56 .3
52 *HPFP DS PR 4.41 1. 7.88 .5 1.5 .5 .3
659 HPFP DS T 1.5 .3 3.84 .3 .6 .5 .3
457 *HPFP BAL CAV PR 5.63 1. 12.24 1. 2.0 .46 O.
52, 764 *HPFP SPD 5.71 1. 13.93 1. 2.0 .47 O.
940 HPFP CL LNR PR 10.5(23 1.(.3) _.(.4) .3(.1) 1.3(.43 3.96(13) .7(1.)
650 *HPFP CL LNR T 14.52 1. 36.2 1. 2.0 .4 O.
657 HPFP DR PR (No change is strikingly indicated)
658 NPFP DR TEI4P (No change is strikingly indicated)
231 *NPFT DS T1A 20. 1. 39.22 1. 2.0 .51 .3
232 *HPFT DS T1B 22.8 1. 44.72 1. 2.0 .51 .3
754 *LPFP SPD .61 .1 5.08 .5 .6 .12 O.
436 *LPFT IN PR 4.08 1. 8.87 .5 1.5 .46 O.
1205, 1206 *FAC FU FL 11.9 1. 25.8 1. 2.0 .46 O.
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT (No change is strikingly indicated)
722 *ENG FU FLOW 2.45 .7 12.27 1. 1.7 .5 .3
1722 ENG FU FLOW CT (No change is strikingly indicated)
233 *HPOT DS T1 2.58 .7 16.1 1. 1.7 .16 O.
234 *HPOT DS T2 1.47 .3 13.4 1. 1.3 .11 O.
1193 HPOT PRSL DR T .71 .1 .48 .1 .2 3.46 .7
1071 OX BLD INT T (No change is strikingly indicated)
1054, 1056 OX FAC FH DS T (No change is strikingly indicated)
854 FAC OX FN DS PR (No change is strikingly indicated)
1210 FAC OX FLOW CT (No change is strikingly indicated)
1212, 1213 *FAC OX FLOW 1.22 .3 7.62 .5 .8 .16 O.
858, 860 *ENG OX IN PR 4.76 1. 43.2 1. 2.0 .11 O.
1058 ENG OX IN TENP (No change is strikingly indicated)
90 HPOP DS PR (No change is strikingly indicated)
325, 326 *HPOP BALCAV PR 1.56 _3 4.34 .3 .6 .36 O.
30, 734 LPOP SPO (No change is strikingly indicated)
302 *tPOP DS PR 8.8 1. 31.6 1. 2.0 .28 O.
93, 94 PBP DS THP (No change is strikingly indicated)
59, 159 PBP 05 PR (No change is strikingly indicated)
410 *FPB PC 2.92 .7 5.2 .5 1.2 .56 .3
480 *orb PC .99 .1 2.17 .3 .4 .46 O.
878 HX %NT PR (No change is strikingly indicated)
879 NX iNT T .35 ;I .122 .1 .2 3.46 .7
881 HX VENT IN PR (No change:is strikingly indicated)
882 HX VENT iN T (No chamg#iis strikingly indicated)
883 HX VENT DP (No change is strikingly indicated)
40 OPOVACT POS 3.62 1. 6.24 .5 1.5 .34 O.
42 FPOV ACT POS 11.9 1. 24.3 1. 2.0 .51 .3
: Table III-24 : 901-436
m
Data Base
Data Base f9 r _arty Parameter Indicators of Test Classification: Nigh Pressure Fuel TurbsDtmp (HPFTP) Failure
-Test 901-36/, (Hotgas |ntrusion to Rotor Cooling) conducted on 7 April 1982 for Engine 2013.
---Cutoff Time= 392.15 sec due a PBP radial acceterameter radtine.
---Early indications occur near 109_ PL
---Damage: Engine sustained extensive internal and external damage as • result of the failure and
subsequent impact with the spillway. The test facility showed t_ght to moderate damage.
---Impact: S26M_- 8 weeks.
r.RITERIA LEGEND: sO--Level Anomat_ (LC)
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Value) x 100.
eRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion t|me interval in seconds)
eOuration Criteria (DC)
DC = Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o time
_J_IGHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNMENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-A: LEVEL-B: LEVEL-C:
Value of LC A-Value Value of RC B-Value Value of DC C-Value
>3Z ....... 1.0 >lOY,/sec .... 1.0 >5sec ....... 1.0 +-,.--r -_.,
>2_-3_ ........ 7 >5 -lOZ/sec ..... 5 >1 -Ssec ........ 7 . :, _ ; .... T_,\_E _r
1_-2_ ........ 3 1 -5Y./sec ..... 3 .5-lsec ........ 3 _);L; PO©R QUALITY+
<1_ ..... ,. .1 <l_/sec ..... 1 <. 5sec ...... O.
Pm .o.(s)
366-367
366-163
367-163
395 - 163
940- 367
459-383
410-367
480-367
63, 163
2O0
17
18
436
1921
595
86
459
'_9
_7
52, 764
53, 940
650
657
658
231
232
754
436
1205, 1206
1207, 1209
722
1722
233
234
1190
1071
1054, 1056
854
1210
1212, 1213
858, 860
1058
90
325, 326
30, 734
2O9
93, 94
59, 159
410
48O
,J)
882
883
4O
42
I _ oc _ clo
( )---Numbers within the parenthesis indicate an earlier change for the pormeter.
*---Parameters prefixed with an asterisk indicate • change continues until cutoff time.
**NOT._._[E: Parameter changes where 0C ranges between 233 to 292.2 seconds may or my not be from an anomaly;
on and off between these equivalent DC ranges.
LC LEVEL-A RC LEVEL-B LEVELS A+8
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
11.9 1. .05 .1 1.1
(No change is strikingly indicated)
21(8) I.(I.) .5(.2) .I(.I) 1.1(1.1)
1.56(.6) .3(.I) .01(.02) .I(.I) .4(.2)
4.3(1.3) I.(.3) .05(.05) .I(.I) 1.1(.4)
3.05 I. .04 .I 1.1
.82 .I 1.03 .3 .4
.82 .1 1.03 .3 .4
.82 .1 .01 .1 .2
1.44 .3 .04 .1 .4
.73(.2) .1(.1) .01(.01) .1(.1) .2(.2)
(Sensor ma[ function)
.7 .1 .01 .1 .2
6.32 " 1. .13 .1 1.1
.9(.93) .1(.1) .01(.03) .1(.1) .2(.2)
2.33 .7 .bl .1 .8
(Sensor malfunction)
.4(.4) .1(.1) 1.(.3) .3(.1) .4(.2)
.5(.14) .1(.1) .01(.004) .1(.1) .2(.2)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
2.4(2.8) .7(.7) 6.1(.02) .5(.1) 1.2(.8)
2.95(2.) .7(.7) 7.4(.02) .5(.1) 1.2(.8)
.63(.4) .1(.1) .01(.01) .1(.1) .2(.2)
.52(.2) .1(.1) .004(.01) .1(.1) .2(.2)
1.33 .3 .005 .1 .4
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.99 .1 .003 .1 .2
(No change is strikingly indicated)
D_CC LEVEL-C
233.71 1.
186.2(270) 1.
117(292.) 1.(1.)
117(263.) 1.(1.)
186.2 1.
6.45 1.
6.45 1.
292.2 1.
117. 1.
117(292. ) 1,(1.)
186.2 1.
292.2 1.
117(292. ) 1.(1.)
292.2 1.
7.2(117) 1.(1.)
98.2(274) 1.(1.)
7.2(292.) 1.(1.)
7.2(292.) 1.(1.)
117(292.) 1.(1.)
117(292.) 1.(1.)
292.2 1.
292.2 1.
5.26 1. .08 .1 1.1 184.2 1.
6.25 1. .09 .1 1.1 104.2 1.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
3.2 1. .5 .1 1.1 " 188.2 1.
.24 .I .003 .I .2 204.5 I.
144. I. 2.12 .3 1.3 189.2 I.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
144. I. 2.12 .3 1.3 189.2 I.
.24 .1 .003 .1 .2 204.5 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
2.2 .7 .04 .1 .8 188.2 1.
1.7 .3 .03 .1 .4 189.2 1.
34.4 1. .52 .1 1.1 188.2 1.
1.02 .3 .02 .1 .4 188.2 1.
1.92 .3 .03 .1 .4 184.2 1.
.62(.4) .1(.1) .01(.01) .1(.1) .2(.2) 117(263.) 1.(1.)
1.1 .3 .02 .1 .4 182.2 1.
.51 .1 .02 .1 .2 146.1 1.
4.7 1. .07 .1 1.1 181.2 1.
(No change is strikingty indicated)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
3.9(2.3) 1.(.7) .05(.1) .1(.1) 1.1(.8) 210(292.) 1.(1.)
2.9(.7) .7(.1) .04(.02) .1(.1) .8(.2) 182(292.) 1.(1.)
the fuel tank was vented
PARAMETER
(INJ CLNT PR) -(MCC HG IN PR)
(INJ CLNT PR) -(MCC PC)
*(MCC HG IN PR) -(MCC PC)
(MCC OX INJ PR) -(MCC PC)
*(HPFP CL LNR PR)-(MCC HG IN PR)
(HPFP DS PR) -(MCC PC)
(FPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR)
(OPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR)
MCC PC
MCC PC AVG
MCC CLNT DS PR
MCC CLNT DS T
MCC FU INJ PR
MCC LN CAV P
MCC OX INJ TEMP
**HPFP IN PR
HPFP DS PR
*HPFP QS T
.HPFP BAL CAV PR
NPFP SPO
HPFP CL LNR PR
HPFP CL LNR T
HPFP DR PR
HPFP DR TEMP
HPFT DS T1A
NPFT DS T1B
LPFP SPD
LPFT IN PR
FAC FU FL
FAC FU FL CT
ENG FU FLO_
ENG FU FLOW CT
HPOT DS T1
HPOT DS T2
HPOT PRSL DR T
OX BLD 1NT T
OX FAC FM DS T
FAC OX FM DS PR
FAC OX FLOW CT
FAC OX FLOW
ENG OX IN PR
ENG OX IN TEMP
HPOP DS PR
HPOP BALCAV PR
LPOP SPD
LPOP DS PR
PBP DS TMP
PBP DS PR
FPB PC
OPB PC
HX JNT PR
HX %NT T
HX VENT IN PR
HX VENT IN T
HX VENT DP
OPOV ACT POS
FPOV ACT POS
Table III-25: 901-364 Data Base
ppTs Base for Early Parameter Indicator s of Test CLassification: High Pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP) Failure
-Test 902-209 (Hotgas Intrusion to Rotor Coating) conducted 16 NovemOer _980 for Engine 2008.
---Cutoff Time= 823. sec., Program Duration.
---Early indications occur near 90_ PL
---Dmge: FPD injector (minor inner baffle tip erosion), HPFTP (nut found off turbine, dome and Lock
tab missing).
---impact: Unavaitabte,
CRITERIA LEGEND: aOperatin 9 Level AnomaLy Criteria (LC)
LC = (AbsoLute Change in Steady State VaLue/Steady State VaLue) x 100.
eRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
_uration Criteria (DC)
DC = Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o time J.-..0c-..i o
WEIGHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNHENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-A: LEVEL-B: LEVEL-C:
Vatue of LC A-VaLue Value of RC B-VaLue Vatue of DC C-Value
>3% ....... 1.0 >lO%/sec .... 1.0 >5sec ....... 1.0
>2%-3Z ........ 7 >5 -lO%/sec ..... 5 >1 -5sac ........ 7
1%-2X ........ 3 1 - 5X/sec ..... 3 .5 -1sac ........ 3
<1% ........ 1 <l_/sec .... ,1 <.Bsec ....... O.
PID NO_{S) PARAMETER
]66-371 (INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC HG IN PR)
366-383 (INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC PC)
371-383 (HCC HG IN PR) -(HCC PC)
395-583 (MCC OX INJ PR) -(MCC PC)
940-371 (HPFP CL LNR PR)-(HCC HG IN PR)
459-383 (HPFP DS PR) -(HCC PC)
411-371 (FPB PC) -(HCC HG IN PR)
480-371 (OPB PC) -(HCC HG IN PR)
63, 163 HCC PC
200 HCC PC AVG
17 HCC CLNT DS PR
18 NCC CLNT DS T
24 MCC FU INJ PR
1951, 1956 MCC LN CAV P
595 MCC OX INJ TEMP
86 HPFP IN PR
52 HPFP DS PR
659 HPFP DS T
457 HPFP BAL CAV PR
52, 764 HPFP SPO
53, 940 HPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 NPFP DR PR
658 HPFP DR TENP
231 HPFT DS T1A
232 HPFT DB T1B
754 LPFP SPD
436 LPFT IN PR
1205, 1206 FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
722 ENG FU FLO_/
1722 ENG FU FLOW CT
233 HPOT DS T1
234 NPOT DS T2
119t] HPOT PRSL DR T
1071 OX OLD INT T
1054, 1056 OX FAC FM DS T
854 FAC OX FM DS PR
1210 FAC OX FLOI4 CT
1212, 1213 FAC OX FLOW
858, 860 ENG OX IN PR
1058 ENG OX IN TEMP
90 HPOP DS PR _
325, 326 HPOP BALCAV'PR
30, 734 LPOP SPO
302 LPOP DS PR
93, 94 POP DS THP
59, 159 PEP DS PR
414 FPB PC
480 G°B PC
878 HX INT PR.,
879 HX INT T i;_.
881 HX VENT IN _R
882 IIX VENT IN T
883 HX VENT DP
40 OPOVACT POS
42 F_ACT
m
LEVELS
LC LEVEL-A RC LEVEL-B A + B DC LEVEL-C
(Senson does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
.96 .1 .32 .1 .2 204. 1.
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
.21 .I .11 .I .2 117.1 I.
.14 .I .11 .I .2 176.2 I.
.24 .1 .4 .1 .2 203.5 I.
(Sensor metfunotien)
.46 .1 .04 .1 .2 173. 1.
(Sensor malfunction)
(Sensor does not exist)
1.13 .3 .11 .1 .4 213. 1.
.42 .1 _ 2.08 .3 .4 203.2 1.
.53 .1 .26 .I .2 204. I.
.75 .I .37 " .I .2 204. 1.
.16 .1 .26 .1 .2 203.1 1.
(Sensors do not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
1.16 .3 .05 .1 .4 203. 1.
(Sensor _[f_tion)
.33 .1 .6 .1 .2 203.1 1.
.32 .1 .16 .I .2 204. I.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
._ .1 ;57 .1 .2 175.8 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
2.14 .7 .71 .1 .8 203.1 1.
1.70 .3 .85 .1 .4 203. 1.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
./_ .1 .15 .1 .2 176. 1.
.58 .1 .13 .1 .2 176. 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.1 .1 .025 .1 .2 177. 1.
.72 .1 .18 .1 .2 177. 1.
.26 .I .02 .I .2 193. I.
.31 .1 .08 .1 .2 177. 1.
.52 .1 .17 .1 .2 178. 1.
1.03 .3 .09 .1 .4 203. 1.
1.31 .3 .26 .1 .4 208. 1.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
1.47 .3 .06 .1 .4 208. 1.
.35 .1 1.75 .3 .4 203.2 1.
.36 .1 .12 .1 .2 - 202. 1.
Table III-26: 902-209 Data Base
Data Base for Ear!y Parameter Indicators of Test Ctessificption: High Pressure Fuel Turbotxnl) (HPFTP) Failure
-Test 902-249 (Power Transfer Failure, Turbine Blades) conducted 21 September 1981 for Engine 0204.
---Cutoff Time= 450.58 sec due to HPFTP accelerometer red(ins.
---Early indications occur near 10_ PL
---Damage: HPFTP (massive turbine damage, HPFP inlet ruptured), entire engine gutted due to LOX rich shutdown.
---impact: S15.1H, Delay Time- 3 week s.
CRITERIA LEG,END: _perating Level Anomaly Criteria (LC) _ i
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Value) x 100. I LX_ "Ur$iOn time
sRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds) | --T-.'_"7_---
iOuration Criteria (DC)
DC = Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o time
t_IGHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNHENT LEGEND: .... _ DC--mi c/o
LEVEL-____._A: LEVEL-B: LEVEL-C:
Value of LC A-Value Value of RC B-Value Value of DC C-Value
>3_. ....... 1.0 > lO'/,/sec .... 1.0 >5sac ....... 1.0
>2%-3% ........ 7 >5 -lO%/sec ..... 5 >1 -5sac ........ 7
lX-2_ ........ 3 1 - 5_/sec ..... 3 .5 -1sac ........ 3
.... <1¢..._ .... 1 <1%/sec ..... 1 <.5sac ...... , O.
( )---Numbers within the parenthesis indicate an earlier %C" change for the parameter.
*---Parameters prefixed with an asterisk indicate a change continues until cutoff time.
PID NO.(S)
**NOTE:
PARAMETER
Parameter changes where DC ranges between 131.0 - 350.6 seconds may or may not be from an anomaly;
propellant was transferred between these equivalent OC ranges.
L._C LEVEL-A LC "LEVEL-B LEVELS A+B OC _EVEL-C
366-371 (INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC HG iN PR)
366-38.3 (INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC PC)
371-383 (HCC HG IN PR) "(HCC PC)
395"383 *(HCC OX INJ PR) "(HCC PC)
940"371 (HPFP CL LNR PR)'(HCC NG IN PR)
459"383 *(HPFP DS PR) "(HCC PC)
410"371 (FPB PC) "(HCC HG IN PR)
480"371 (OPB PC) "(HCC HG IN PR)
63, 163 HCC PC
200 HCC PC AVG
17 *HCC CLNT DS PR
18 *HCC CLNT DS T
24 *HCC FU ]NJ PR
1921 NCC LN CAV P
595 *HCC OX INJ TEHP
86 **NPFP IN PR
52 HPFP OS PR
659 *HPFP DS T
457 *HPFP BAL CAV PR
52, 764 *HPFP SPO
53, 940 HPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR
658 HPFP DR TERP
231 HPFT DS T1 A
232 HPFT DS T1B
754 LPFP SPO
636 LPFT IN PR
1205, 1206 FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
722 ENG FU FLOW
1722 ENG FU FLOU CT
233 HPOT DS T1
234 HPOT DS T2
1190 NPOT PRSL DR T
1071 OX BLD INT T
1054, 1056 OX FAC FN DS T
854 FAC OX FH OS PR
1210 FAC OX FLOW CT
1212, 1213 FAC OX FLOW
858, 860 ENG OX iN PR
1058 ENG OX IN TEHP
90 HPOP OS PR
325, 326 HPOP BALCAV PR
30, 734 LPOP SPD
209 LPOP OS PR
93. 94 POP DS THP
59, 159 PBP DS PR
410 FPB PC
480 OPB PC
878 HX INT PR
879 HX ZNT T
881 HX VENT iN PR
882 HX VENT IN T
HX VENT DP
40 OPOV ACT POS
42 FPOV ACT POS
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
3.2 I. .04 .I I.I 90.6 I.
(Sensor does not exist)
2.2 .7 .01 .1 .8 300.6 1.
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
1.04 .3 .003 .1 .4 350.6 1.
4.2 1. .01 .1 1.1 326.6 1.
1.08 .3 .005 .1 .4 200.6 1.
(Sensor malfunction)
.25 .I .001 .I .2 275.6 1.
2.11 .7 .01 .1 .8 130.6 1.
1.2 .3 .006 .1 .4 200.6 1.
11.3 1. .04 .1 1.1 350.6 1.
1.82 .3 .01 .1 .4 150.6 1.
2.9(1.3) .7(.3) .OZ(.01) .1(.I) .8(.4) 130.6(351) 1.(1.)
(Sensors do not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
17.5(5) 1.(1.) .13(.0002) .1(.1) 1.1(1.1)
5.3(3.6) 1.(1.) .04(.0001) .1(.1) 1.1(1.1)
1.2(.9) .3(.1) .01(.01) .1(.1) .4(.2)
.96 .1 .004 .1 .2
3.63 I. .01 .1 1.1
(NO change is strikingly indicated)
3.59 I. ,01 .1 1.1
(No change is strikingly indicated)
5.3(7.1) 1.(1.) .04(.1) .1(.1) 1.1(1.1)
4.5(6.9) I.(I.) .03(.I) .1(.I) 1.1(1.1)
4.6(4.7) I.(I.) ,04(.07) .1(.1) 1.1(1.1)
5.95 I. .11 .I 1.1
1.53 .3 .004 .1 .4
220. 1. 4.1 .3 1.3
(No change is strikingly indicated)
2.9 .7 .03 .1 .8
220. 1. 4.1 .3 1.3
1.53 .3 .004 .1 .4
1.22(.3) .3(.1) .01(.003) .1(.1) .4(.2)
.75(1.6) .1(.3) .01(.03) .1(.1) .2(.4)
.62(1.8) .1(.3) .004(.03) .1(.1) .2(.4)
1.7(20.) .3(1.) .03(.37) .1(.1) .4(1.1)
130.6(351) 1.(1.)
130.6(351) 1.(1.)
121(351.) 1.(1.)
250.6 1.
350.6 1.
350.6 I.
75.6(351) 1.(1.)
75.6(351) 1.(1.)
141(351.) 1.(1.)
350.6 I.
350.6 I.
350.6 1.
100.6 1.
350.6 1.
350.6 I.
151(351.) 1.(1.)
101(351.) 1.(1.)
151(351.) 1.(1.)
66.(351.) 1.(1.)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
1.1(2.8) .3(.7) .01(.05) .1(.1) .4(.8) 73.(351.) 1.(1.)
1.4 .3 .04 .1 .4 350.6 1.
1.8(1.1) .3(.3) .01(.02) .1(.1) .4(.4) 251(351.) 1.(1.)
1.1 .3 .004 .1 .4 250.6 1.
4.2(4.9) 1.(1,) .01(.01) .I(.1) 1.1(1.1) 201(351.) 1.(1.)
4.5 1. .045 .1 1.1 350.6 1.
1.5(9.1) .3(1.) .02(.13) .1(.1) .4(1.1) 71.(351.) 1.(1.)
3.8 1. .038 .1 1.1 350.6 1.
7(3.8) 1.(1.) .03(.07) .1(.1) 1.1(1.1) 226(351.) 1.(1.)
3.5(3.3) 1.(1.) .OK(.Oa) .1(.1) 1.1(1.1) 101(351.) 1.(1.)
Table III-27: 902-249 Data Base
Data Base for Early Parameter Indicators of Test Classification: High Pressure Fuel Turbopu_ (HPFTP) Failure
-Test 902-095 (Power Transfer Failure, Turbine Blades) conducted on 17 Novmr 1977 for Engine O00Z.
---Cutoff Time- 51.09 sec due to a PBP radial accelerometer redt|ne.
---Early indications occur near 95X PL
---Damage: HPFTP (extensive turbine damage) e HCC |njector (8-LOX posts eroded, 15 MCC face nuts eroded)
--- Impact: Unavai table.
CRITERIA LEGEND: eOperatin 9 Level Anomty Criteria (L__C)
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Value) x 100.
aRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
eOuration Criteria (DC)
DC = Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o time
_/EIGHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNHENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-A: LEVEL-B: LEVEL-C:
Value of LC A-Value Value of RC B-Value Value of DC C-Value
>3% ....... 1.0 >lO%/sec..._ 1.0 >Ssec ....... 1.0
>2%-3% ........ 7 >5 -lO%/sec ..... 5 >1 -Ssec ........ 7
1%-2% ........ 3 1 - 5%/sac ..... ] .5 -1sac ........ 3
<1_ ........ 1 <l_/sec ..... 1 <.Ssec ....... O.
*---Parameters prefixed with an
PID NO.iS) PARAHETER
3_-372 (INJ CLNT PR) -(HCC HG |N PR)
366-383 ([NJ CLNT PR) -(HCC PC)
372-383 (MCC HG IN PR) -(MCC PC)
395-383 (MCC OX INJ PR) -(MCC PC)
940-372 (HPFP CL LNR PR)-(HCC HG IN PR)
459-383 (HPFP DS PR) -(HCC PC)
410-372 (FPB PC) -(HCC HG IN PR)
480-372 (OPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR)
63, 163 MCC PC
200 MCC PC AVG
17 HCC CLNT DS PR
18 HCC CLNT 0S T
24 *MCC FU INJ PR
1921 HCC LN CAV P
595 MCC OX INJ TEMP
86 HPFP IN PR
52 HPFP DS PR
659 HPFP DS T
457 HPFP BAL CAV PR
52, 7_ HPFP SPD
53, 940 HPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR
658 HPFP OR TEMP
231 HPFT DS TI A
232 HPFT DS T1B
754 LPFP SPD
436 LPFT IN PR
1205, 1206 FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
722 ENG FU FLOM
1722 ENG FU FLOM CT
233 HPOT DS TI
234 HPOT DS T2
1190 HPOT PRSL DR T
1072 OX BLD INT T
I054, 1056 OX FAC FM 0S T
854 *FAC OX FM DS PR
1210 FAC OX FLOW CT
1212, 121] FAC OX FLOIJ
858, 860 ENG OX IN PR
1058 ENG OX IN TEMP
338 HPOP DS PR
325, 326 HPOP BALCAV PR
30, 734 LPOP SPD
209 LPOP DS PR
93, 94 PBP DS THP
341 PBP 0S PR
412 FPB PC
480 OPB PC
878 HX INT PR
879 HX INT T
881 *HX VENT IN PR
882 HX VENT IN T
883 HX VENT DP
40 *OPOV ACT POS
42 FPOV ACT POS
asterisk indicate a change continues until cutoff time.
LEVELS
L._C _ RC " LEVEL-B A +.._..BB DCC LEVEL-C
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.42 .1 .25 .1 .2 15.39 1.
.78 .I .46 .I .2 15.39 I.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor malfunction)
.86 .1 .09 .1 .2 15.39 1.
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sen;or has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change iS strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensors do not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor malfunction)
.43 .1 .06 .1 .2 15.39 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
9.2 1. .9 .1 1.1 10.29 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
8.66 1. .84 .1 1.1 10.29 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.34 .1 .2 .1 .2 10.29 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
2.12 .7 .25 .1 .8 8.59 1.
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
1.13 .3 .14 .1 .4 17.1 1.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
1.76 .3 .15 .1 .4 12. 1.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
2.7 .7 .3 .1 .8 9.09 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
Table III-28: 902-095 Dgta Base
Data Base for ferry Parameter Indicators of Tes t Classification: High Pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP) Failure
Test 901-346 (Localized: Turbine Btacles) conducted 19 November 1981 for Engine 0107.
---Cutoff Time- 500 sac, Program Duration.
---Early indications occur near 109_ PL
---Damage: HPFTP (fishmouth seal dropped approx. 1/16 inches, 180-deg around; 1st stage blade shanks
undercut approx..02 inches)
---Impact: Unavailable
_RITERIA LEGEND: • Operating Lave[ Anomaly Criteria (L C)
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Vatue) x 100.
eRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
eOuretion Criteria (DO)
DO = Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o time
_/EIGHTED LEVE L VALUE ASSIGNHENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-A: LEVEL-B: LEVEL-C:
Value of LC A-Value Value of RC S-Value Value of DC C-Value
>3% ....... 1.0 >lO_/sec .... 1.0 >Ssec ....... 1.0
>2%-3% ........ 7 >5 -lO_/sec ..... 5 >1 -Ssec ........ 7
1%-2_ ........ 3 1 - 5X/sac ..... 3 .5 -1sac ........ 3
<1_.._ ..... 1 <l_/sec ..... 1 <.5sec ....... O.
pID NO.(S)
366-371
366-383
371-383
395-383
940-371
459-383 (HPFP DS PR) -(HCC PC)
410-371 (FPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR)
480-371 (OPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR)
63, 163 MCC PC
200 MCC PC AVG
17 HCC CLNT OS PR
18 MCC CLNT DS T
24 NCC FU INJ PR
1921 HCC LN CAV P
595 NCC OX INJ TENP
86 HPFP IN PR
52 HPFP DS PR
659 HPFP DS T
457 HPFP BAL CAV PR
52, 764 HPFP SPO
53, 940 HPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR
658 HPFP DR TENP
231 HPFT DS TI A
232 HPFT DS T1 0
754 LPFP SPD
436 LPFT IN PR
1205, 1206 FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
722 ENG FU FLOW
1722 ENG FU FLOW CT
233 HPOT OS T1
234 HPOT DS T2
1190 HPOT PRSL DR T
1071 OX BLD INT T
1054, 1056 OX FAC FN DS T
854 FAC OX FN DS PR
1210 FAC OX FLOW CT
1212, 1213 FAC OX FLOW
858, 860 ENG OX IN PR
1058 ENG OX IN TEHP .:_,
90 HPOP DS PR
325, 326 HPOP BALCAV PR
30. sPo
209 LPOP 0S PR r_' _
93, 94 PBP DS TNP %_
59, 159 PBP DS PR _'_/
410 FPB PC _'/'
480 (:b°B PC ,,(_
878 HX INT PR
881 NX VENT IN PR %J
882 NX VENT IN T
883 NX VENT DP
40 OPOVACT POS
42 FPOVACT POS
( )---Numbers within the parenthesis indicate an earlier end more gradual "LC" change for the parameter.
LEVELS
pARAMETER LCC LEVEL-A RC LEVEL-B A +.__..BB OC LEVEL-C
(INJ CLNT PR) -(MCC HG IN PR)
(INJ CLNT PR) -(MCC PC)
(NCC HG IN PR) -(MCC PC)
(HCC OX INJ PR) -(NCC PC)
(HPFP CL LNR PR)'(HCC HG IN PR) 1.1 400. 1.
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
18.9 1. .08 .1
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.65 .1 .005 .1 .2 300. 1.
3.3(1.3) 1.(.3) .44(.01) .1(.1) 1.1(.4) 15.5(350.) 1.
8.24 1. .03 .1 1.1 400. 1.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
.27 .1 .01 .1 .2 200. 1.
1.04 .3 1.04 .3 .6 200. 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
2.8 .7 .006 .1 .8 400. 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.54 .1 .001 .1 .2 400. 1.
1.31 .3 .003 .1 .4 400. 1.
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
3.2(1.2) 1.(.3) .07(.01) .1(.1) 1.1(.4) 125(400.) 1.
3.3(.8) 1.(.1) .07(.01) .1(.1) 1.1(.2) 125(400.) 1.
.04(.4) .1(.1) .6(.003) .1(.1) .2(.2) 200(400.) 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.96 .1 .002 .1 .2 400. 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
1.47 .3 .003 .1 .4 400. 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
5.84 1. .03 .1 1.1 200. 1.
2.55 .7 .01 .1 .8 200. 1.
.9 .1 .04 .1 .2 200. 1.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.3 .1 .001 .1 .2 300. 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.47 .1 .002 .1 .2 300. 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.96 .1 .003 .1 .2 400. 1.
5.81 1. .02 .1 1.1 400. 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor has not settled edequetety to steady state conditions)
1.69 .7 .004 .1 .8 400. I.
3.1(1.9) 1.(.3) .12(.1) .1(.1) 1.1(.4) 135(350.) 1.
3.5(2.4) 1.(.7) .11(.01) .1(.1) 1.1(.8) 120(400.) 1.
Table III-29:
i
901-346 Data Base
pete Base for EarLy Parameter Indicators of Test CLassification: High Pressure Fuel Turl=opump (HPFTP) FaiLure
-Test 901-_?. (Power Transfer FaiLure) conducted 27 March 1982 for Engine 2013.
---Cutoff T|me= 500 sac, Program Duration.
---EarLy indications occur near 10_ PL
---Damage: HPOTP (1st stage turbine blade has corners chipped off), NCC (two old cracks have grown
.125 inches)
---Impact: Unavai table.
CRITERIA LEGEND: • Operating Level AnomaLy Criteria (LC)
LC = (AbsoLute Change in Steady State VaLue/Steady State Vatue) x 100.
eRate Criteriq (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
eDuration Criteria (DC)
DC = Duration from the point of first failure indications to c/o time
WE]GHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNHENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-A: LEVEL-B: LEVEL-C:
VaLue of LC A-VaLue VaLue of RC B-VaLue VaLue of DC C-VaLue
>3_ ....... 1.0 >lO_/sec .... 1.0 >5sac ....... 1.0
>2X-3_ ........ 7 >5 -lOX/sec ..... 5 >1 -5sec ........ 7
lX-2_ ........ 3 1 - 5_/sec ..... 3 .5 -1sac ........ 3
<1_ ..... _. .1 <l_/sec .... 1 <.5sac ....... O.
I x ursion time
.... I---- 0c---I c/o J
( )---Nmbers within the parenthesis indicate an earlier and more gradual "LC" change for the parameter.
LEVELS
L_CC LEVEL-A R._CC " LEVEL-B
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
6.8 1. .2 .1
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor does not exist)
1.15 .3 .58 .1
2.8 .7 .03 .1
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.41 .1 2.06 .3
.31 .1 3.1 .3
.63 .1 6.3 .5
2.23 .7 .02 .1
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor malfunction)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
7.1(1.6) 1.(.3) .2(1.6) .I(.3)
.74 .I 1.48 .3
.53 .1 1.05 .3
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.32 .1 .65 .1
(Sensors do not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
1.7(1.3) .3(.3) .04(.17) .1(.1)
1.6(.8) .3(.1) .03(.53) .1(.1)
.63(.6) .1(.1) .01(1.1) .1(.3)
.63(.6) .1(.1) .01(1.1) .1(.3)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
A +_._.BB D,,_CC .LEVEL- C
1.1 175. 1.
.4 262. 1.
.8 260. 1.
.4 261. 1.
.4 260. 1.
.6 260. 1.
.8 210. 1.
1.1(.6) 175(261.) 1.
.4 260.5 1.
.4 260.5 1.
.2 260.5 1.
.4(.4) 160(266.) 1.
• 4(.2) 175(258.5) 1.
.2(.4) 210(261.) 1.
.2(.4) 200(261.) 1.
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
1.07 .3 2.14 .3 .6 258.5 1.
1.35(.6) .3(.1) .01(2.9) .1(.3) .4(.4) 225(260.2) 1.
.3 .1 1.43 .3 .4 260.1 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.63 .1 .2 260.1 1.
1.06 .3 .6 260.2 1.
.09 .1 .2 260.2 1.
.38 .1 .2 260.2 1.
.3 .1 .2 260. 1.
not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
.4 .1 .2 260. 1.
not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
.4 .1 .2 260. 1.
.9 .1 .4 260. 1.
.5 .1 .2 2(>0. 1.
.2 .1
1.06 .3
.62 .1
.76 .1
.6 .1
(Sensor has
.7 • .1
(Sensor has
.7 .1
1.8 .3
.99 .1
PID NO.(S) PARAHETER
366-367 (INJ CLNT PR) -(MCC HG IN PR)
366-163 (]NJ CLNT PR) -(MCC PC)
367-163 (MCC HG IN PR) -(HCC PC)
395-163 (MCC OX INJ PR) -(MCC PC)
940-367 (HPFP CL LNR PR)-(MCC HG IN PR)
459-383 (HPFP DS PR) -(MCC PC)
410-367 (FPB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR)
480-367 (OrB PC) -(MCC HG IN PR)
63, 163 MCC PC
200 HCC PC AVG
17 MCC CLNT DS PR
18 MCC CLNT DS T
24 MCC FU ]NJ PR
1921 MCC LN CAV P
595 MCC OX INJ TEHP
86 HPFP ]N PR
52 HPFP DS PR
659 HPFP DS T
457 HPFP BAL CAV PR
52, 764 HPFP SPD
53, 940 HPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP OR PR
658 HPFP OR TEHP
231 HPFT DS T1A
232 HPFT DS T1B
754 LPFP SPD
436 LPFT IN PR
1205, 1206 FAC FU FL
1207,1200 FAC FU FL CT
722 ENG FU FLOW
1722 ENG FU FLOM CT
233 HPOT DS T1
234 HPOT 0S T2
1190 HPOT PRSL OR T
1071 OX BLD INT T
1054, 1056 OX FAC FM DS T
854 FAC OX FM DS PR
1210 FAC OX FLOW CT
1212, 1213 FAC OX FLOW
858, 860 ENG OX IN PR
1058 ENG OX IN TEHP
90 HPOP DS PR
325, 326 HPOP BALCAV PR
30, 734 LPOP SPD
209 LPOP 0S PR
93, 94 PBP DS THP
59, 159 PBP DS PR
410 FPB PC
480 OPB PC
878 HX INT PR
879 HX INT T
681 HX VENT IN PR
682 HX VENT IN T
883 HX VENT DP
40 OPOVACT POS
42 FPOYACT POS
Table III-30: 901-362 Data Base
Data Base for Earty Parameter Indfcators of Test CLassification: Nigh Pressure Fuel Turbol_ (NPFTP) Failure
-Test 901-410 (Power Transfer Failure, Turbine BLades) conducted 20 Nay 1983 for Engine 2014.
---Cutoff Time= 595. sac, Program Duration.
---Early indications occur near 104_ PL
---Damage: HPFTP (2nd stage turbine damper missing, all tacking tabs end pins missing, impact damage
to 1st stage turbine blades and tip seats), HPFP has .75in*'2 piece of scroll missing.
---Impact: Unavailable.
CRITERIA LEGEND: eOperatin 9 Level Anomaly Criteria (L__C)
LC = (Absolute Change in Steady State Value/Steady State Value) x 100.
eRate Criteria (RC) = LC/(Excursion time interval in seconds)
eOuration Criteria (DC)
DC = Duration from the point of first fsiture indications to c/o time
WEIGHTED LEVEL VALUE ASSIGNMENT LEGEND:
LEVEL-A: LEVEL-B: LEVEL-C:
Value of LC A-Vatue Value of RC B-Value Value of DC C-Value
>3X ....... 1.0 >10_/sec .... 1.0 >5sec ....... 1.0
>2X-3_ ........ 7 >5 -10Z/sac ..... 5 >1 -5sac ........ 7
1_-2_ ........ 3 1 - 5_/sec ..... 3 .5 -1sac ........ 3
<1_ ........ 1 <l_/sec ..... 1 <.5sac...,... 0.
PID NO.(S)
_ -_sion time
_--- DC--_ c/o
( )---Numbers within the parenthesis indicate an earlier and more gradual "LC" change for the parameter.
*---Parameters prefixed with an asterisk indicate a change continues until cutoff time.
**NOTE: Parameter changes where DC ranges betueen496 - 575 seconds may or may not be from an anomaly;
the fuel tank was vented between the equivalent DC ranges.
PARAMETER LCC LEVEL-A RC • LEVEL-B LEVELS A+B
(INJ CLNT PR) -(MCC HG IN PR)
(INJ CLNT PR) -(MCC PC)
(MCC HG IN PR) -(MCC PC)
(MCC OX ]NJ PR) -(MCC PC)
(HPFP CL LNR PR)-(HCC HG IN PR)
"(MCC PC)
-(MCC HG IN PR)
-(MCC HG IN PR)
(Sensor does not exist)
(Sensor does not exist)
4. 1. .95 .1 1.1
(No change is strikingty indicated)
50.(16) 1.(1.) 1.9(2.) .3(.3) 1.3(1.3)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.6(5.5) .I(I.) .01(.03) .I(.I) .2(1.1)
(No change is strikingty indicated)
(No change is strikingty indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
2.6 .7 .007 .1 .8
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor malfunction)
(Sensor malfunction)
3.57 ' 1. .06 .1 1.1
(NO change is strikingly indicated)
1.52 .3 .004 .1 .4
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.45 .1 .001 .1 .2
4.1(1.2) 1.(.3) .2(.01) .1(.1) 1.1(.4)
9.6(9.) 1.(1.) .4(2.5) .1(.3) 1.1(1.3)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
7.42 1. .02 .1 .8
2.03 .3 .01 .I .2
.92 .1 .004 .1 .2
.77 .1 .003 .1 .2
.35 .1 .001 .1 .2
.86 .1 .002 .1 .2
(No change is strikingly indicated)
.77 .1 .002 .1 .2
(No change is strikingly indicated)
1.76 .3 .01 .1 .4
2.28 .7 .02 .1 .8
DCC LEVEL-C
465. I.
90.(455.) 1.
185.(495) I.(1.)
527. 1.
535. 1.
485. 1.
485. 1.
90.(455) 1.(1.)
80.(430.) 1.(1.)
485. 1.
495. I.
345. I.
445. I.
485. 1.
495. I.
485. 1.
485. 1.
485. I.
366-367
366-163
367-163
395-163
940-367
459-163 (HPFP DS PR) •
410-367 (FPB PC)
/,80-367 (OPB PC)
63, 163 MCC PC
200 MCC PC AVG
17 MCC CLNT DS PR
18 MCC CLNT DS T
24 MCC FU INJ PR
1951, 1956 MCC LN CAV P
595 MCC OX INJ TEMP
86 *_HPFP IN PR
52 HPFP DS PR
659 HPFP DS T
457 HPFP BAL CAV PR
52, 764 HPFP SPD
53, 940 flPFP CL LNR PR
650 HPFP CL LNR T
657 HPFP DR PR
658 *HPFP DR TEMP
231 HPFT DS T1A
232 HPFT DS T1B
754 LPFP SPD
436 LPFT IN PR
1205, 1206 FAC FU FL
1207, 1209 FAC FU FL CT
ENG FU FLOIJ
1722 ENG FU FLOW CT
233 NPOT DS T1
234 HPOT DS T2
1190 HPOT PRSL DR T
1071 OX BLD INT T
1054, 1056 OX FAC FM DS T
854 FAC OX FM DS PR
1210 FAC OX FLOW CT
1212, 1213 FAC OX FLOW
858, 860 ENG OX [N PR
1058 ENG OX IN TEMP
90 HPOP DS PR
325, 326 HPOP BALCAV PR
30, 734 LPOP SPD
302 LPOP DS PR
93. 94 PBP DS TMP
59, 159 PBP DS PR
410 FPB PC
OPB PC
878 _X INT PR
879 HX INT T
8,81 HX VENT IN PR
HX VENT IN T
883 HX VENT OP
40 OPOV ACT POS
42 FPOVACT POS
(Sensor has not settled edequatety to steady state conditions)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingty indicated)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
.67 .1 .002 .1 .2 395. 1.
1.79 .3 .009 .1 .4 545. 1.
.24 .1 .001 .1 .2 370. 1.
(No change is strikingly indicated)
(Sensor has not settled adequatety to steady state conditions)
(No change is strikingty indicated)
(Sensor has not settled adequately to steady state conditions)
(No change is strikingly indicated)
3.17 .1. 3.17 .3 1.3 579. 1.
.7(.33) .1(.1) .004(.03) .1(.1) .2(.2) 345.(555) 1.(1.)
Table III-31: 901-410 Data Base
6.0 PHASE II AND III DESIGN PLANS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The Phase II and III plans relate directly to the original statement of work
submitted to NASA MSFC in the original proposal effort. The efforts in both
phases will lead to a preliminary definition of efforts required including
added hardware, software, and system integration requirements for a prototype
SAFD system.
6.2 PHASE II: DEVELOPMENT
In this phase, chosen failure detection algorithms and the development of
failure simulations will be accomplished to quantify system requirements for
the proposed failure detection system. Phase II includes five tasks necessary
to develop the prototype failure detection algorithm. A schedule is defined
in Figure 6-1.
Task 7: Develop Failure Simulation Models
Based on the rating scheme developed in Task 2, the chosen failure
detection algorithms will be implemented and tested for their ability to
detect the selected failure modes, the robustness to false detection, and
for their ability to detect different classes of failures. The process
of choosing the methods will be iterative in nature with the goal of
choosing the proper combination of algorithms that best detects the
maximum number of failures. Five (5) tests approved by NASA MSFC will be
used. These tests are: 901-173, 901-284, 901-364, 901-340, and 901-225.
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TASKS
TASK 7 DEVELOPFAILURE
SIMULATIONMODELS
TASK8: 'MPLEMENT & TEST
DETECTIONMETHODS
TASK9: QUANTIFY FAILURE
DETECTIONPERFORMANCE
TASK 10: DEFINE PRIMITIVE
SYSTEMCONCEPTS
TASK 11: FINALREPORT
SYSTEM FOR ANOMALY AND FAILURE DETECTION
PHASEII SCHEDULE
1 12 13 14 [5 16 17 18 19 I10 Ill 1121131"4
CRITERIATABLECOMPLETE
COMPLETE FINALDATA
PRELIMINARY BASECOMPLETE
UST
A A _k, v
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X
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Figure 6-i: Phase II Schedule
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Task 8: Implement Oetection Methods
Based on the rating scheme developed in Task 2, the chosen failure
detection algorithms will be implemented and tested for their ability to
detect the selected failure modes, the robustness to false detection, and
for their ability to detect different classes of failures. The process
of choosing the methods will be iterative in nature with the goal of
choosing the proper combination of algorithms that best detects the
maximum number of failures. This task also corresponds to the
development of algorithms specifically related to those failure modes
selected in Task 7.
Task 9: Quantify Failure Detection Performance
In this task, the proposed failure detection prototype system will be
quantified in terms of its performance characteristics, e.g., its ability
to detect system anomalies and failure modes. This ability will be
quantified in terms of the failure detection robustness, time for the
failure to be detected by the sof{ware (e.g., failure detection time
constant), and other performance parameters that may be derived from this
study. The failure detection performance criteria will be limited to the
five tests selected in Task 7.
Task lO: Define Primitive System Concepts
In this task, a primitive system functional flow diagram will be derived
based on technical results from Tasks 7, 8, and 9. These top-level
functional flow diagrams will yield valuable information for the hardware
and software design engineers to determine the hardware/software
development required for implementation of the SAFD system. This task
will be limited to the five specified failure modes listed in Task 7.
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Task ll: Final Report
This report will discuss the primitive system design concept, the derived
requirements for the design, and component requirements. These
requirements will be presented with top-level functional flow diagrams
with descriptions and lists. Results of the prototype failure detection
system on an analog or digital SSME model will be presented. Currently,
only the SSME Digital Transient Model will be used to evaluate algorithm
results.
6.3 PHASE III: DESIGN
The revised Phase III option corresponds to a request by NASA MSFC. The Phase
I and II efforts will complete the initial work required to anchor the
algorithm to estimated statistical parameter variations. However, it is
highly recommended that the estimated statistical variations be enhanced and
verified by utilization of the NTI Corporation capability to analyze raw data
mathematically. This will help to alleviate uncertainty associated with the
envelopes developed by Rocketdyne and add further certainty to the developed
algorithms. This effort should be initiated during the Phase II effort to
support Rocketdyne failure detection algorithm developments.
Figure 6-2 represents the preliminary organization structure at Rocketdyne to
accomplish the Phase III efforts. The Control System Engineering Unit will
coordinate the development of all the requirements specifications. This unit
will develop the overall functional specification to support the hardware and
software groups. The Electronics Design unit will be responsible for the
development of the hardware specification and integration efforts. The
Software Support Unit will develop the software requirements specifications
based on the system requirements specification. Based on funding level,
selected individuals will be assigned out of each functional area to support
the outlined tasks.
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The SAFD detection algorithms will be tested on time histories collected from
actual engine tests and also to a limited extent using the SSME Digital
Transient Model for simulated criticality l FMEA anomalies related to the five
tests selected during the Phase II effort. This effort will not complete the
intensive efforts required to review all FMEA criticality l and 2 failure
modes needed to adequately address detectable failure modes present on engine
test stands. The engine-to-engine parameter variations have also been lightly
addressed in the SAFD study because of funding limitations. The Phase Ill
tasks are presented below. A preliminary schedule based on a 14-month Phase
III effort is defined in Figure 6-3. Costs for the Phase III effort will
remain the same as those defined in the negotiated proposal.
Task 12: Final System Desiqn Specification/Cost Estimates
This task will encompass the definition of subtasks necessary to
determine the system components (hardware/software) necessary to
implement the SAFD system. This task does not include any actual
software/hardware development but defines those tasks necessary for NASA
MSFC planning purposes for fundi6g to actually build and test a
breadboard system on a testbed. A set of functional diagrams defining
interface requirements, hardware/software functional breakdowns and
scheduling and cost data will be generated. The output of this task will
be the funding and supporting tasks necessary to implement a breadboard
SAFD system on a selected test stand system. The list of subtasks to
Task 12 are summarized below and represent the bulk of the work necessary
to accomplish the efforts required during Phase III. No additional data
analysis or algorithm development will be accomplished during the Phase
III efforts.
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Task 12-A: Functional Requirements
A requirements specification will be developed by Control Systems
Engineering unit personnel based on Phase II efforts in algorithm
definition. A system hierarchy will be defined and a detailed work
breakdown structure will be correlated with the development of the
system. The specification will include the preliminary interface
requirements, performance requirements, and preliminary CPU and memory
requirements required to accomplish the goals derived during Phase II.
Task 12-B: Software Requirements
A software requirements specification including required manpower,
language selection and test support will be defined by the Rocketdyne
Software Systems group. A software specification will be defined based
on the Functional Requirements Specification defined in Task 12-A.
Task 12-C: Hardware Requirements -
Based on the functional requirements specification, the Electronic
Systems organization will define the hardware necessary to implement the
SAFD system on a typical test stand including specialized electronic
interfaces, computer hardware and support equipment. A computer system
will be selected and recommended to NASA MSFC-off-the-shelf components
will be selected whenever possible to minimize the costs of developing a
breadboard system. It is recommended that a test stand be selected by
NASA MSFC so detailed interface requirements can be defined for a
breadboard SAFD system. Different implementations are possible for SAFD
including additions to the current CADS II design for the SSME Block II
controller effort to a totally new system utilizing a VAX class computing
installation. Any specialized equipment that will need to be prototyped
and developed as part of this program will be defined in this task.
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Task 12-D: Work Breakdown Structure
A detailed work breakdown structure (WBS) will be developed to coincide
with the efforts required to implement requirements defined in the above
tasks. The WBS will include all tasks including those that relate to
added test data analysis or simulation that relate to the definition and
selection of elements of the SAFD system including manpower estimates and
schedules. The WBS will also define all deliverables required to meet
the SAFD functional objectives.
Task 12-E: Cost Estimation
A cost estimate will be developed that correlates to the Task 12
specifications efforts. The definition of the costs will include all
required manpower, facility, hardware and special test equipment costs
required to integrate a working breadboard of an SAFD system.
Task 13: Define Future Research Need_
During the Phase I/II preliminary design tasks, further research efforts
will be defined that should be continued to further enhance the SAFD
prototype and concept. A prioritized list will be defined with sample
work breakdown structure and cost estimates for NASA MSFC to select. As
a further enhancement to SAFD capabilities, new instrumentation involving
condition monitoring sensors or specialized failure detection sensors
will be defined. Efforts required to implement any new concepts in
addition to those outlined in Task 12 will be discussed and sample work
breakdown structures generated. The growth of the SAFD system into test
beds for new health and condition monitoring areas will be discussed so
preliminary planning for the enhanced capability can be defined by NASA
MSFC.
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Task 14: Final Report
This report will contain preliminary system, hardware and software design
specifications. It will define plans for further study, certification,
operation, and give cost and manpower estimates correlating directly to a
detailed work breakdown structure for the overall goal of implementing a
SAFD system on a NASA MSFC selected test facility. The design
specification will follow a Rocketdyne approach to the system engineering
process, which is designed to include criteria such as adaptability and
optimum design concepts in its functions. The adaptability to different
testing conditions and test facilities will be discussed in the
specifications relating to adding new sensor information and its effect
on hardware and software requirements.
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